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ABSTRACT
This study is primarily concerned with the years 1950-1960, but the 
period 1945—1949 is also addressed, because many of the policies and insti­
tutions introduced to democratize Germany immediately after World War II 
were carried forward.
The official position on both sides during the 1950s was that 
cooperation was of the essence. In the beginning, the Americans believed 
that the virtues of democracy could best be cultivated in the German 
consciousness if the Germans themselves implemented democratic programs 
under broad, philosophical guidelines, while simultaneously observing 
Americans and American ideas in practice. This study points out that the 
Germans accepted the guidelines and their responsibilities for building a 
democracy, and by the end of the decade, Germany was considered to be an 
established democracy.
Economic recovery was crucial to overall recovery, and this disser­
tation describes how spending by the U.S. forces contributed more to 
the German economy than did the Marshall Flan.
The Americans had definite ideas on how to change the German educa­
tional system to make it more democratic. However, Germany had its own 
traditions, and German educators insisted on restoring the school structure 
of the Weimar period. How these traditions were restored while complying 
with the principles of denazification and democratization are discussed.
The Americans reshaped the information media, contributed to cultural 
changes, and influenced political life in Germany. The measures taken in 
these areas are treated in this study.
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Specific examples from the city of Zweibrueeken are presented to 
illustrate how the American presence affected the Germans and how they got 
along together. This dissertation shows that personal contacts produced an 
untold number of individual friendships as well as conflicts. Countless 
joint ventures, literally thousands of German-American marriages, and 
hundreds of friendship clubs resulted. These relationships, together with 
organized efforts, suoh as the America Houses, exposed millions of Germans 
to American ideas, products, practices, and tastes and left a lasting 
impression on German life.
Germans value traditions, and they retained a distinctiveness, but 
this dissertation concludes that the American presence had a large influence 
which was felt rather distinctly at the grass-roots level.
vii
THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE 
OH GERMANS
AMD
GERMAN-AMERICAN GRASS-ROOTS RELATIONS IH GERMANY 1950-1960
INTRODUCTION
German-American relations have a long, rich, and sometimes stormy 
history. The first substantive connection began in October 1683, when 
a shipload of German immigrants landed in the new world. Since that 
day, over seven million Germans have found their way to America's 
shores. It has been estimated that in the mid-20th century one out of 
every eight Americans is of German heritage.^ Other estimates say the 
percentage of German-Americans is much higher; the census of 1980, for 
example, showed over twenty percent of present-day Americans claim German 
heritage. These immigrants and their descendants have provided 
America with a large, influential segment of society which has 
literally shaped the face of America. This shaping process brought 
with it the deep, subtle, yet still significant result of binding the 
two nations together.
Even the stark reality of millions of dead from both countries 
brought about by two world wars in this century was only able to 
disrupt that bond temporarily, not to destroy it permanently.
Both sides were prompted to set their disputes aside after World War 
II, when it became obvious that Russian communism was a mutual enemy.
The necessity of accepting one another was facilitated by some common 
links. The very large German influence in America fostered
on the American side feelings of sympathy for the German people that 
helped the two countries to patch up their differences almost imme­
diately* On the German side, there was undoubtedly a considerable 
amount of reciprocal affection, once the immediate bitterness and 
shock of defeat wore off.2 This is substantiated by the fact that, 
of 21,306 opinions expressed about Americans in censored German mail 
in late 1945 and early 1946, approximately seventy-five percent indi­
cated that the Germans were satisified with their impressions of the 
Americans. In contrast, only twenty percent of the opinions expressed 
about the Russians showed satisfaction.3 Natural inclinations made 
cooperation easier, but it was further encouraged because the Germans 
were so thoroughly dependent on the victorious Americans for their 
very livelihood.
When the armed hostilities ceased, Germany lay in ruins. Sixty- 
five percent of the Germans had lost either everything or nearly 
everything.^ There were 48,000,000 people in the western zones, 
including 9,000,000 Germans sent there from Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia.^ The American Zone had 17,600,000 people in it. The 
railroads were not in working order, food and other essential supplies 
such as clothing and medicine were scarce, millions of soldiers were 
held prisoner, and the conquering Allies were intent on removing all 
Nazis from positions of responsibility, a process which denied the 
war-torn country much of the trained leadership it had left. The 
situation was bleak. But within five short years, virtually the 
entire picture had changed.
Germans have been co-architects of American society since 1683, 
and in a different but very real way, Americans have been co­
architects of German society since 1945. Germans found a tabula rasa 
on which to build a society in America. On the other hand, Americans 
found an old country with many strong traditions, most of which were 
undemocratic. The Americans entered the occupation phase with a 
determination to rebuild Germany as a democracy. This goal was never 
changed, but the procedures followed to achieve it were flexible. By 
1950, the official attitude of Americans towards Germans had changed 
from hatred to friendliness, and American influence was working at 
every level of German society, helping to make certain that democracy 
would succeed. The plans for Germany's development as an 
industrialized member of the western world were in full swing. What 
had been a policy of "no German employment by the Allies" had switched 
to one of "full employment." And the effort to push all former Nazis 
out had been converted to an approach which left the identification 
and punishment of former Nazis in the hands of the Germans themselves. 
Many former Nazi party members were back in government, industry, and 
the business world. Even the U.S. military forces employed former 
Nazis, and plans were being made to remilitarize Germany as a bulwark 
against Russian aggression.
This transition was neither simple nor easy. It required great 
understanding and patience on both sides. The Germans had to succumb, 
willingly or otherwise, to American control, and the Americans went to 
great lengths to fulfill the commitment to democratize the Germans.
The influence of the Americans was felt at all levels, and it is one
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intent of this study to examine, within the time and resources 
available, the extent of the American influence as it affected the 
ordinary citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. An attempt 
will also be made to understand how the Germans and Americans related 
to one another as a result of having worked together to rebuild 
Germany. There are many fine analyses of the occupation period, but 
none of them has adequately addressed the impact of the American pre­
sence at the grass-roots level. Studies such as John Gimbel's A 
German Community under American Occupation and Edward N. Peterson's 
The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory reveal much 
about the officially articulated policies and how leaders of the occu­
pation and of Germany interacted. However, studies which are con­
cerned mainly with the actions of elites treat only part of the total 
relationship. One must also look at how the ordinary members of the 
vast American military establishment and German citizens fared in 
their daily lives during the occupation, and also during the 
following years because an evolutionary process existed. Furthermore, 
even though mistakes occurred and many changes had to be made in the 
American approach to reorienting Germans, real alterations in German 
life did result. There was an almost spontaneous spirit of together­
ness which frequently arose wherever Germans and Americans met, and 
the fact that this spirit was in line with the overall policy of 
democratization reflected a consistency in American views and a German 
willingness and ability to accept responsibility.
The Americans had different sorts of influence in Germany 
depending on the nature of the issues at hand or the proximity of the
Americans to the Germans. For example, there was statutory or admin­
istrative influence due to the legal right of the Americans to 
prescribe rules and regulations prior to the reestablishment of full 
German sovereignty. This was normally the case in the U.S. Zone, and 
whenever American influence was constrained by zonal authority, the 
term "U.S. Zone" is used in this study. Some of the changes were 
directed, but oftentimes they were the results of policies jointly 
decided upon by Americans and Germans and executed by Germans. There 
was also personal influence derived from person-to-person contacts. 
This situation existed wherever Americans were located — even outside 
the U.S. Zone, as often happened. In addition, there was influence 
attributable to knowledge of American products and the American way of 
life; such influence existed throughout West Germany and was spread by 
a variety of ways —  with America Houses being of particular impor­
tance.
The approach of this study is to look at the areas of influence 
in the Republic as a whole (Berlin excluded) while also using examples 
from a local community, Zweibruecken in the Rhineland-Palatinate, to 
gain a better understanding of what was happening where Americans 
were physically located. It is an effort to ascertain how American 
policies, practices, and presence affected the Germans.
There is frequent mention in this study of the early, formative 
years of the American presence in Germany because that is when the 
major policy decisions were made, the laws formulated, and the insti­
tutions established. The attitudes of the German people were also
heavily influenced during the early years. In many cases, once the 
course was set, the Germans stayed on the same path for several year6.
A few words on the setting are necessary. When the war ended in 
1945, U.S. forces occupied a large portion of southwest Germany, an 
area which subsequently evolved into the states of Hesse, Bavaria, and 
Baden-Wuerttemberg. In addition, they occupied a sector of Berlin and 
the Bremen enclave in Northern Germany. There were also significant 
numbers of Americans in the Rhineland-Palatinate.
The city of Zweibruecken was captured by the Americans on March 
20, 1945, during the waning days of World War II. The Americans held 
Zweibruecken until July 7, 1945, when they left the city in the hands 
of the French, inasmuch as it was in the French area of occupation. 
Thus, the people of Zweibruecken were subject to the Americans for the 
first three and one-half months after the fighting ended in their 
city, and they were under French administrative control for the 
remainder of the time of the occupation. The U.S. forces returned 
early in the decade of the 1950s, and then in 1953 the Canadians too 
came to town. (in this respect, it should be noted that the terms 
"America" or "American" are used throughout this study as synonyms for 
the U.S.A. or a person from the U.S.A. The Canadians are referred to 
as such —  even though they too are North Americans.) All three 
nations (France, the U.S.A. and Canada) shared garrison duties in 
Zweibruecken from 1953 until 1956, when they were joined by units of 
the newly formed Bundeswehr. From that time on, all four nations had 
troops stationed in Zweibruecken until the Canadians moved out in 
1969. The French left in 1977.
In addition to that already mentioned, some information on the city of 
Zweibruecken is appropriate, since that city is the source of many examples 
used here.
Zweibruecken is a small city located in the Rhineland-Palatinate only 
a few kilometers from the French-German border. It is in a region histori­
cally influenced by the nearness of France. The present population is 
33,169, and many of its residents are fluent in French, although it is 
unquestionably a German city. For centuries, Zweibruecken was agri­
culturally oriented, surrounded by small farms and forests. However, in 
1834, a factory for farm implements was built there, and the city has had a 
touch of industrial life ever since although it has never lost its country 
connections. Its kinship with its surroundings has been enhanced by the 
presence of an extension of a school of agriculture located in Pirmasens. 
The city has been the administrative center for the surrounding area 
throughout modern history. The Kreis (county) which it serves bears the 
same name, i.e. Zweibruecken. There is much pride in local history; for 
example, the citizens of Zweibruecken are quick to point out that their 
city was the site of a duke's residence, and the rebuilt castle is a 
stately reminder of that bygone era. The citizens mark as one of the high­
lights of Zweibruecken's history the fact that the Royal Deux-Ponts 
Regiment, which fought on the side of the American colonists at York town, 
was Zweibruecken1s own regiment fighting under the French flag. Thus, they 
like to claim at least a little credit for America's independence.
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As far as the social and economic structure of the community is con­
cerned, figures from a census dated May 17, 1939, show that just before 
World War II the city of Zweibruecken had a permanent population of 28,221. 
The inhabitants were categorized according to social standing into five 
groups based on the occupation of the head of each household. The most 
numerous by far were those in the Arbeiter (blue-collar worker) class; 
there were 13,367 people classified as such. Of the blue-collar group, 
10,294 people were spread out through eight different metal-work factories 
(where farm implements, tools, barbed wire, nails, and chains were made), 
one electrical components factory, one tile and brick factory, one fur­
niture factory, a printing business, and a brewery. The second largest 
group fell under the heading of Angestellte (white-collar workers) and 
totaled 4,190. Close in number to the Angestellte was a category titled 
Selbstaendige (self-employed persons) with 3,768. Beamte (civil servants 
and comparably situated officials) accounted for another 3,301 people. The 
remaining, assorted members of the population, 3,595, were termed 
Berufslose ohne Hauptberuf (These were persons without any career, or with 
more than one career but no one dominating career. Further clarification, 
other than they were independent, was not noted in the census.) Unemployed 
persons did not appear in the census, presumably because the building of 
the Westwall and a military installation, Kreuzberg Kaserne, had employed 
every available person. In fact, military construction in and around 
Zweibruecken brought an influx of more than 20,000 temporary workers and 
family members to Zweibruecken for a short period of time in the late 
1930s. The 28,221 permanent residents were further categorized based on
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the nature of their respective businesses. These categories were: Land-
und Forstwirtschaft (agriculture and forestry); Industrie und Handwerk 
(industry and crafts); Handel und Verkehr (shops, restaurants, etc.); 
Oeffentliche und private Dienstleistungen (public and private services); 
and Haeusliche Dienste (domestic services). People in the catch-all social 
group of Berufslose ohne Hauptberuf were not applied against any particular 
business group.® Table 1 shows the population distribution of the per­
manent inhabitants of the city in May 1939, and the percentage of the total 
represented by each social category. These figures indicate that 
Zweibruecken was heavily blue collar in nature with industry and crafts 
supplying nearly one half the population.
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TABLE 1
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN ZWEIBRUECKEN IN 1939
Social Category
Agriculture
and
Forestry
Industry
and
Crafts
Natur
Shops
Restaurants
etc.
e of Busines
Public and 
Private 
Services
s
Domestic
Services
Unspecified
Careers
Total for 
Social 
Group
Z of 
Total
Blue-Collar
Workers
217 10,294 1,155 983 718 13,367 47.36
White-Collar
Workers
22 2,167 944 1,054 3 4,190 14.85
Self-Employed 641 1,514 1,232 381 3,768 13.35
Officials 43 82 779 2,397 3,301 11.70
Unspecified
Careers
3,595 3,595 12.74
TOTALS 923 14,057 4,110 4,815 721 3,595 28,221 100
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PART I 
BACKGROUND 
Chapter 1 
Nonfraternization
At the end of the war, the entire spectrum of interpersonal rela­
tions between the occupation forces and the Germans was governed by 
the Allied policy on nonfraternization as expressed in General 
Eisenhower's letter of September 12, 1944, to all Allied occupation 
troops. The policy had been formulated and decided upon at the 
governmental level and sent to the Supreme Commander in Europe,
General Eisenhower, for implementation.1 In effect, the policy 
banned all contact between members of the American and British occupa­
tion forces and the Germans except for that which was absolutely 
essential to the conduct of official business. When official con­
tacts were made, it was prescribed that they be accompanied by a "firm 
and correct attitude." Nonfraternization was defined as follows:
Nonfraternization is the avoidance of mingling with Germans upon 
terms of friendliness, familiarity, or intimacy, whether individ­
ually or in groups, in official or unofficial dealings. However, 
nonfraternization does not demand rough, undignified, or 
aggressive conduct, nor the insolent overbearance which has 
characterized Nazi leadership.^
The policy was carefully stated to leave little or no doubt as to 
what was authorized and what was not. The Allied commanders were 
instructed to enforce it and to maintain a position of superiority 
over the Germans at all times. Numerous acts were specifically for­
bidden. Members of the occupation forces were prohibited from:
(1) entertaining Germans.
(2) billeting Allied personnel with German families.
(3) marrying Germans.
1
2(4) visiting German homes.
(5) drinking with Germans.
(6) shaking hands with Germans.
(7) playing games or participating in sporting events with Germans.
(8) giving gifts to Germans or receiving gifts from them.
(9) attending German dances or other social events.
(10) accompanying Germans in the streets or into places of entertain­
ment, such as theaters, taverns, hotels or elsewhere (except when
required to do so by official business).
(11) conversing or arguing with Germans.
(12) sitting with Germans in church.
The directive which specified these restrictions further stated that 
the occupation troops would receive orientations to acquaint them with 
their expected conduct.3
Eisenhower's letter also contained a prediction as to how the 
conquered Germans would react to their defeat, and the fear of a resistance 
movement was a primary reason for the promulgation of the policy of nonfra­
ternization. First and foremost, it was a security m e a s u r e .4 Military 
operations can be significantly impaired if information pertaining to troop 
dispositions, strengths, activities, attitudes, and plans are divulged. It 
was felt that personal contacts between Allied personnel and Germans could 
reveal such facts. This was of particular concern during the time that 
only portions of Germany were occupied and the fighting was still in 
progress. Once the hostilities had ceased, there was a possibility renewed 
fighting might erupt. There was an additional security factor involved, 
and that was the need to safeguard the lives of Allied soldiers from acts 
of retribution by embittered Germans who might have attacked Allied 
soldiers during unguarded moments.
3The policy of nonfraternization had reasons beyond security, even 
though that was the primary motivating factor. It was also designed to 
prevent the minds of the Allied soldiers from being influenced by German 
propaganda —  propaganda which was intended to cleanse the German image in 
the eyes of the occupiers. The insurance of respect for the victors by 
discouraging familiarity and maintaining aloofness was an additional 
reason, as was the belief that this separation would help to emphasize 
the total defeat of the Germans and their "black sheep" status in the eyes 
of the rest of the world. Emotions played a part too. A "mixture of 
self-righteousness and indiscriminate contempt" was present.5 it was con­
sidered advantageous to make certain that the Germans accepted their state 
of inferiority and that this condition be emphasized.
General Eisenhower's subordinate commanders made a serious attempt to 
enforce the nonfraternization policy. It was communicated down to the 
lowest levels of command, company and comparable sized units, but the 
American War Department also decided that, in order to make certain that 
the policy was understood, it should be given in writing to every soldier. 
Thus, the soldier's official Pocket Guide to Germany was printed for issue 
to Allied soldiers when they arrived in Germany. This little guide con­
tained the rules expressed in the nonfraternization policy; however, 
incongruous as it seems, it also contained a section on conversational 
German —  information which would have been primarily of use to persons 
violating the policy. This inconsistency was brought to Eisenhower's 
attention, and he approved the withdrawal of the guide, but it was sub­
sequently released and given to a great many soldiers.^ A campaign to
4publicize the official position was launched using every means available. 
The soldier-oriented press was used. The Stars and Stripes, Yank, and 
Army Talks all gave extensive coverage to the nonfraternization issue. The 
War Department produced a film titled Your Job in Germany, which stressed 
Germany's warlike heritage, but it also featured the peaceful, industrious 
nature of the average German. It is hard to say which aspect of German 
life had the most impact on the American soldiers who viewed it, but all 
American personnel in Germany were required to see the film. The American 
Forces Network also conveyed the nonfraternization policy. A total of 
seventy-four different spot announcements appeared on the radio network, a 
network which was intended to entertain and inform the Americans.
Sometimes they were simple slogans, such as, "Soldiers wise don't 
fraternize," but others were lengthier and carried more explicit messages. 
Some announcements went as follows:
(1) Pretty German girls can sabotage an Allied victory. Don't 
fall for that booby trap. Steer clear of all German civilians.
Don't fraternize!
(2) In heart, body and spirit, every German is Hitler! Hitler is 
the single man who stands for the beliefs of Germans. Don't make 
friends with Hitler. Don't fraternize!
(3) If, in a German town, you bow to a pretty girl, or. pat a 
blond child, you bow to Hitler and his reign of blood. You caress 
the ideology that means death and persecution. Don't fraternize!^
Another official document meant to educate Allied soldiers on the pit­
falls of occupation duty was a little folder entitled "Special Orders for 
German-American Relations." It was first issued in January 1945. The 
guidance provided in these "Special Orders" was compatible with that issued 
by General Eisenhower on September 12, 1944, and discouraged all but the
5most essential contacts. During the closing days of the war and in the 
early months of the postwar period, these "Special Orders" were issued to 
all soldiers in Germany and were carried inside their helmet liners. In 
addition, there was a widespread training program conducted by officers to 
inform the men orally of the restrictions. When all of these factors are 
considered, there is little doubt that the occupying soldiers knew that 
they were prohibited from fraternizing with the Germans.
It was relatively easy to inform the troops that they were not allowed 
to associate with the conquered Germans and of the reasons for the prohibi­
tion —  but enforcement was another matter.
American soldiers had no sooner crossed the border into Germany than 
fraternization began. The first German town to be taken by Americans was 
Roetgen, and the children of the town immediately asked the conquering 
soldiers for chewing gum and candy. The Americans gladly obliged, and the 
newspaper coverage reached the Supreme Allied Commander, General 
Eisenhower. Eisenhower told General Bradley, the commander of the 12th 
Army Group in whose area the incident had occurred, "This must be nipped in 
the bud immediately."8 At various times, other reports of fraternization 
showed that Americans were not being stern with German prisoners of war.
For example, an American general was photographed while shaking hands with 
Goering, and that high Nazi official was allowed to give interviews to 
newspaper reporters. It was also reported that German civilians were being 
shown kindness in matters of housing, transportation, and food. One offi­
cial U.S. Army record on the fraternization problem states, "The perplexi­
ties of the American soldier on finding that the enemy whom he had been
6taught to hate and fear was a people with a culture and living habits so 
much like his own had already become evident."9 The attitude of the 
American soldier toward hiB recent enemy was tested by a survey in 
November, 1945. Eighty percent of the soldiers surveyed indicated that 
they had been favorably impressed by the Germans. In fact, twenty-eight 
percent of the Americans surveyed preferred the company of Germans to that 
of the people of any other nationality with whom they associated. It is 
interesting to compare this figure with the factor of eleven percent, which 
represented those Americans who preferred the French. It is also worth 
noting that only forty-three percent held the German people responsible for 
the war. Over half, fifty-six percent, volunteered the information that 
they had engaged in conversation with German girls during the preceding 
week. According to the survey, the attributes which most impressed the 
Americans were the Germans' cleanliness and industriousness^O —  charac­
teristics which stood high on the list of admirable qualities which Germans 
assigned to themselves in 1952, when these two traits topped the list of 
their perceived "best qualities."H
The incidents of fraternization were not confined to common soldiers. 
Officers, too, were involved, and even the members of the military government 
were alleged to have had inappropriate contacts; they were charged with 
commandeering the most desirable houses for their own billets and engaging 
the prettiest German women as office and domestic workers. It was also 
felt on occasion that the military government personnel were overly solici­
tous when it came to caring for German refugees. There were, in addition, 
instances when Allied soldiers fraternized with captured German soldiers to
7obtain war souvenirs.12
The problem was large enough to cause the senior commanders and 
government officials consternation prior to V-E Day; there had been 
courts martial cases in an attempt to discourage the prohibited con­
tacts, most of which involved German girls or visits to German homes.
But the problem took on new dimensions once the hostilities s t o p p e d . 13
When the immediate dangers of war were removed and when the 
soldiers began to have more free time, the policy of nonfraternization 
became increasingly more difficult to enforce. The repeated admonitions 
evidently did not appeal to the intellect of the occupation troops and 
in reality made little sense to t h e m . ^  The Americans believed that 
the other Allies (British, French and Russian) were not restricted in 
the same w a y . 13 They were hungry for the company of women, curious 
about their defeated foes, sympathetic to those who suffered, intent 
on obtaining souvenirs, and desirous of what comforts could be found 
in the German homes left standing. On top of all these personal 
reasons, there were also frequent requirements for translators, above 
and beyond those which could be satisfied by using Allied personnel; 
during those times, Germans who spoke English were brought into ser­
vice by the Americans. Both the Americans and the Germans were 
willing to fraternize, and the opportunities were there —  to try to 
stop them was practically impossible. It was a well-known fact that 
the American soldiers had an abundance of cigarettes, chocolate bars, 
and other food-stuffs, as well as items of clothing. The subjugated 
Germans traded services, sexual favors, and material things such as 
cameras, jewelry, and works of art to gain these treasures —
8frequently out of the direst necessity.^ Much of the task of enforcing the 
rules against fraternization fell on the shoulders of the military police, 
but they seem to have had essentially the same attitude as their fellow 
soldiers and took action only when flagrant violations o c c u r r e d . Unit 
patrols, officers, and noncommissioned officers all shared the respon­
sibility of enforcement, but their exercise of it was spotty at best. The 
situation was also complicated by the rule against fraternization not 
applying to displaced persons (individuals of a nationality other than 
German who were in Germany against their will). It became a common prac­
tice for soldiers to declare their female companions to be displaced per­
sons, and it was frequently difficult to prove otherwise.!®
As the combat forces turned into occupation forces and units became 
more stabilized, the rate of fraternization incidents i n c r e a s e d . 19 Most of 
the violations were never detected, and a true measure of just how 
extensively the victors and the vanquished were socializing was impossible 
to reach. Although the problem of fraternization began with German 
children, it did not take long to spread to adults of the opposite sex.
This became evident as the venereal disease rate accelerated and the 
number of court martial cases involving contact with German females grew. 
Enlisted men were tried under Article of War 96, for violating standing 
orders, and given fines of up to two-thirds of their pay for six months and 
prison sentences for up to six months. Officers were fined and could even 
be dismissed from the service.20
Venereal disease was used as a rough barometer to measure the extent 
of contact; since VD is primarily transmitted by sexual contact and
9since there were relatively few females other than the Germans, it was a 
means of showing that soldiers had associated with German females. A medi­
cal report covering the period May 8 to September 30, 1945, revealed the 
severity of the situation.
The venereal disease rate for the Continent which had leveled off 
below 50 per 1000 per annum during the spring of 1945, took a 
sudden rise after V-E Day. The rate increased steadily through 
the summer and reached a peak of 190 per 1000 per annum in August 
1945. Since August, the venereal disease rate has begun to 
decline, until by the end of September the annual rate reached 153 
per 1000. After the cessation of hostilities the rate in the 
fighting troops, which had remained consistently below 20, imme­
diately increased to a figure approximately equivalent to that for 
Com Z [rear area] troops. The rate for colored troops soared to 
the unprecedented peak 890 per 1000 per annum in August. Since 
then it has dropped gradually to a little over 500. The rate for 
white troops followed the theater trend and climbed to 138 in 
August, subsequently falling to 118 by the end of September.21
It should be noted that these figures are for the continent and not 
just Germany. In fact, another medical report covering the period July 6 - 
December 21, 1945, showed that France accounted for the greatest number of 
VD cases, 56,320, as compared to Germany's 43,988.22 Fraternization was 
not prohibited in France; it was merely a health problem there. The rate 
began to decrease in September due to the establishment of centers for the 
treatment of venereal diseases in civilians, wherever American troops were 
located.23
It is difficult to assess precisely why the disease rate was so much 
higher among black soldiers than white soldiers. A lower educational level 
was assumed to be one reason; blacks did not know what precautions to take. 
Also, it was not unusual for several black soldiers to associate with the
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same woman. Blacks were relatively strange to the Germans and thus 
shunned by many. Those German women who did accept the blacks were 
often ostracized by whites, German and American alike. Once rejected 
by white men, they continued to associate with black soldiers, and one 
infected woman could infect several men.2**
One recorded effort to estimate the extent of fraternization 
shows that noncompliance with the policy was widespread, but it varied 
from unit to unit.2^ The reasons for these differences were not 
explained, but they quite possibly had to do with the degree of con­
tact afforded by proximity to civilian population groups, the amount 
of free or unsupervised time the soldiers had, and the methods of 
estimation used by the authorities.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATES OF EXTENT OF FRATERNIZATION FROM 
T-E DAY TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1945
Dnit_______________________________________ Amount of Fraternization
Fraternization
4th Armored Division 
(Authorized strength was 10,666)
•70th Ordnance Group
*53rd Quartermaster Base Depot
60th Infantry Regiment 
(Authorized strength was 3,207)
9th Infantry Division 
(Authorized strength was 14,037)
*
•Nonstandard units were tailored for changing missions. Strengths 
varied according to the way the units were tailored; therefore, 
strengths cannot now be determined.
15-20 percent
all but a small percentage 
all members of the unit 
minority
fraternization was the rule 
rather than the exception
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Some early attempts were made to punish the German parties in frater­
nization cases by fining them, but before the war was even over, it was 
decided that the American witnesses probably would be sympathetic with the 
Germans and not testify against them. Thus, that course of action was not 
pursued beyond March of 1945.26
Black marketing too became a prodigious problem. The Americans had 
material goods that the Germans needed and wanted and were even willing to 
pay exorbitant prices to obtain. Cigarettes, gasoline, coffee, and alcoho­
lic beverages were in particular demand. The military government tried to 
combat the flourishing underground trade by publishing notices to remind 
the Americans that they could not transfer either items issued to them by 
the U.S. forces or articles purchased in the post exchanges. It was even 
made unlawful for Germans to acquire such things —  unless they were bona- 
fide gifts —  and the giving of gifts by occupation troops was prohibited. 
The law placed the burden of proof on any German who came into possession 
of American-made products, but it was almost in vain, and goods continued 
to change hands. Black-market contacts led to greater social contacts and 
vice v e r s a . 27 General Bruce C. Clarke described the black-market period of 
1945-1953 as "a black period" as far as the ethics, honesty and discipline
of the U.S. A m y  were c o n c e r n e d . 28
Other attempts were made to keep the Germans and the Americans apart. 
In the beginning, Americans were discouraged from shopping in German stores 
because it would lead to fraternization and because it would take scarce 
commodities away from the Germans.29 At one point, steps were taken to bar 
from Germany all U.S. military personnel with relatives in Germany. The
12
directive which sought to implement this policy was issued on March 29, 
1945, and specified the degrees of relationship constituting a bar to duty 
in Germany.
The forms of relationship could be either by blood or by marriage and 
were as identified in Table 3.^0
TABLE 3
RELATIONSHIPS BARRING DUTY IN GERMANY 
Relatives by Blood Relatives by Marriage
Grandparents Husbands
Parents Wives
Brothers or half brothers Fathers-in-law
Sisters or half sisters Mothers-in-law
Sons Brothers-in-law
Daughters Sisters-in-law
Uncles 
Aunts
Cousins (if descended from one or more 
grandparents of the individual 
concerned)
The biggest objection to this policy came from those agencies respon­
sible for dealing with the Germans, the G-2 (intelligence) and G-5 (civil 
affairs) staffs. This policy effectively denied the G-2 and G-5 elements 
the very linguists they needed to function and threatened to place such 
heavy reliance on German linguists that the military government would, 
effectively, have been in their hands. The policy was successively 
modified until its intended purpose was no longer discernible. In May
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1945, cousins were removed from the list and specially qualified indivi­
duals were exempted. In July 1945, grandparents, uncles and aunts no 
longer applied, and a provision was added which simply required that the 
soldier be separated by at least one hundred miles from his German 
relative.31
The prohibition against serving in Germany, if one had a relative 
there, was written specifically to preclude soldiers from fraternizing, but 
it was generally interpreted to include U.S. civilians as well —  even 
though it was never rigidly enforced for either category of personnel.
A particularly curious aspect of the nonfraternization policy was 
that it was never officially announced to the Germans. It was believed 
that if the Germans knew of the restriction, they would encourage viola­
tions by tempting Americans, and thus the Germans would be given an oppor­
tunity to conduct a subversive campaign —  one that would be difficult to 
defeat. It also seemed at the time that a public proclamation on such an 
unpopular issue would have led to disrespect for the Allied authorities and 
thus defeated one of the policy's goals.32 The Germans did know about the 
policy of course through the posters, radio announcements, newspaper articles, 
and word of mouth whenever soldiers told them of it.
Fraternization, officially banned by a few on the American side, was 
practiced by many on both sides; however, there was a certain element 
within German society that opposed fraternization with Americans. A small 
but intent group of German youths and some members of the defunct military 
forces took it upon themselves to conduct a campaign to discourage Germans,
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particularly females, from associating with Americans. There were many 
Germans who disapproved of collaborating with the former enemy, but only a 
small number resorted to violence. The advocates of violence assaulted 
American soldiers, wrote threatening letters, circulated inflammatory 
posters and handbills, and sheared the hair of German females who asso­
ciated with Americans. This form of resistance to the illegal but common 
practice of fraternization produced only isolated incidents and ceased to 
be a concern after the policy of nonfraternization was r e v o k e d . ^3
The fact that Americans and Germans did associate extensively with one 
another prompted the ban to be lifted on October 1, 1945; it was a restric­
tive policy which could not be enforced. It was a farce.34
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Chapter 2 
Fraternization
The change in policy on fraternization was not abrupt. The reversal 
began on June 8, 1945, when Eisenhower declared via telegram to his subor­
dinate commanders that the nonfraternization policy was "obviously not 
expected to apply to small children." He refused to specify a definite age 
above which the rules would apply, thereby leaving it open to interpreta­
tion. 1 As a result, the exception for children was interpreted liberally, 
and the rule on nonfraternization must have lost some of its impact.
A further relaxation came three days later on June 11, 1945, based on 
the Judge Advocate General's advice that soldiers could not be punished 
for fraternization simply because they were receiving treatment for a 
venereal disease. This was not a concession to individual rights (that is 
an admission by the military that it was improper to use privileged medical 
information against the soldier), but rather an acknowledgment that it was 
more important to get soldiers to go for medical treatment and admit con­
tact than it was to court martial them for the contact. Based on the 
advice of the theater's Judge Advocate General, the policy on nonfrater­
nization was modified as follows:
The contraction of venereal disease or the facts concerning 
prophylactic treatment will not be used, directly or indirectly, 
as evidence of fraternization or as evidence of violation by the 
individual of the policy on nonfraternization with the inhabitants 
of Germany.^
The order of June 11 stated that it was not intended to ease the
17
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restrictions against social contacts; nevertheless, it did constitute a 
relaxation because now one type of contact with German women, while not 
authorized, was not punishable.
On July 14, 1945, Eisenhower lifted the ban against conversations on 
the streets and in public places between Germans and members of the occupa­
tion forces. Differences of opinion arose as to what constituted
"conversations." There was also a question as to just what was a "public 
place"? In some cases, the term "public places" was interpreted to include
places of entertainment. In any event, the door had been opened to allow
for cordial relations, and from then on, even the pretense of nonfrater­
nization was doomed to failure. It was about this same time that a major 
disciplinary problem suddenly came to an end. Initially, rape had been a 
frequent occurrence. During the first seven months of 1945, 1,301 charges 
of rape had been filed against American soldiers. Of this total, 623 had 
been brought to trial with 297 resulting in convictions. By August 1945, 
the number of rape cases dropped abruptly to what officials termed "only a 
scattering.
The final nail was driven into the coffin of nonfraternization on 
September 20, 1945, when Eisenhower decided to lift all restrictions except 
the prohibitions against marriage to Germans and the billeting of occupa­
tion troops with Germans. Eisenhower explained his rationale for the 
change in a statement made available to every member of the command.
The strict nonfraternization policy, instituted upon the entry of 
our forces into Germany, has been gradually relaxed to help you 
carry out your occupational duties. The time has come when it 
is to our best interests to make further modifications.
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Therefore, restrictions on fraternization will comprise strict 
prohibition against marriage to Germans and against the billeting 
of troops with German families. This policy goes into effect on 
October 1, 1945. I want to impress on each of you that so long 
as you are stationed in Germany you will be regarded as represent­
atives of the American way of life, and in your contacts with 
the German people I expect you to so conduct yourselves as to 
reflect credit on your country and your uniform.^
While marriages were still banned, it was speculated that they were 
possible, with Eisenhower's permission.5
Although fraternization was no longer barred, it was still officially 
discouraged. As the occupation proceeded, the Americans (in 1946) started 
to bring their dependents to Germany and facilitated isolation by building 
their own communities and making themselves so self-sufficient that they 
really did not need to mix with Germans. Where Americans did not build, 
they expanded the practice of requisitioning German homes to accommodate 
their families and keep them separate from the Germans. Such requisi­
tioning caused more than a little resentment. A certain amount of requisi­
tioning was understood, but Americans took property from both Nazis and 
non-Nazis with little apparent discrimination between them. Property owned 
by Nazis usually went first because it was the best, and comforts were in 
demand. However, non-Nazis were not immune and routinely had to give up 
their holdings as well. Resentment was fueled when larger buildings and 
more furnishings than necessary were lost and vacant rooms were left 
lighted at night.6 These practices were viewed by the Germans as wasteful. 
Language was a problem too, and some people on both sides still harbored 
feelings of hostility. But the majority of Americans continued to asso­
ciate with Germans as the opportunities allowed.7
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The attitude that fraternization, while legal, was to be discouraged 
did not last long. In January of 1947, a "Theater Troop Information and 
Orientation Program," which encouraged fraternization as a means of teaching 
an appreciation for democracy, was unveiled. This new approach called for 
teaching such subjects as German history, German organizations, and the 
"correct attitude" to be shown towards Germans. Soldiers were also 
encouraged to study the German la n g u a g e . &
Just as before the ban was lifted, the most common type of social rela­
tionship between Germans and Americans immediately after it was that of the 
American soldier and his German sweetheart.9 The male-female relationship 
seemed to dwindle in numerical significance, however, as the Americans 
became more settled at their duty stations. In November, 1947, the mili­
tary government had a survey conducted, by German pollsters, of 3,500 
Germans in various areas of the country. Twenty-seven percent of those 
interviewed had made the acquaintance of Americans since the war. The sur­
vey showed that by the time of the poll, a greater percentage of German men 
than women had met Americans, and that most of the Germans involved were 
from the upper socio-economic brackets. Table 4 shows the percentages by 
age, gender, and socio-economic grouping of the Germans who had met 
Americans. Another interesting piece of information came out of the survey 
—  twelve percent of those interviewed had been the recipients of gift 
packages from Americans.^®
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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF GERMANS WHO HAD MET AMERICANS BY NOVEMBER 1947
By Age Men Women
Under 30 years 43 25
30 - 39 36 23
40 - 49 35 24
50 - 59 35 21
60 years and over 25 11
Social Status:
Upper 58 47
Middle 39 28
Lower 26 14
The fact Chat associations had been legalized led to confrontations 
on the issue of marriages between Germans and Americans. American 
soldiers, as members of the occupation forces, were theoretically barred by 
the military from marrying Germans. But the civil authorities in Germany 
were still empowered to conduct weddings, and by international standards, 
such marriages were legal. Even if the military punished a soldier who 
circumvented the rules and married a German, he was still married. The 
occupation authorities contemplated punishing German officials who per­
formed such marriages, but that would not have made the marriages any less 
valid. Therefore, in December, 1946, it was announced that American 
soldiers could marry German citizens if approval was obtained in advance 
from the military and if the German civil authorities were given the order 
to perform the ceremony by the military government. At first, only a 
general officer could approve such a marriage, and then the couple had to 
wait at least three months. A further stipulation was that any such
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marriage could only take place in the soldier's final month of duty in 
Germany. In other words, marriages were allowed —  but still discouraged.
Prior to the legalization of German-American marriages, some marriages 
were performed by church officials —  even though they were not legally 
recognized. There is no accurate count of the number of marriages that 
took place before they were officially sanctioned, but they probably num­
bered in the dozens, and some took place as early as the summer of 1945.^
A few couples showed their determination and ingenuity by finding loopholes 
in the laws. One enterprising soldier saw that the law addressed only 
soldiers, so he took his discharge in Europe and then legally married his 
fiancee. Subsequently, the law was expanded to include U.S. civilians, but 
not before another soldier who had been discharged in America had returned 
and been married. Evidently some soldiers considered renouncing their 
citizenship, because in September, 1946, the U.S. Government announced that 
it would not acknowledge any such renunciation when the circumvention of 
marriage restrictions was the intent.^
After it became legal for Americans to marry Germans, applications 
began to roll in, and it soon became necessary to grant approval authori ty 
to officers of lower rank; it was simply too time-consuming for only 
generals to handle the applications. Although accurate records do not 
exist, it was estimated that there were about 3,500 legal German-American 
marriages by June 30, 1948.^^
The granting of the right to marriage was one of the first steps in 
the renewal of German emigration to America, because the wives of American
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citizens had certain rights and privileges; these included financial 
allotments, free transportation to the U.S.A. and entry on a nonquota 
b a s i s . E m i g r a t i o n  from Germany to the U.S.A. had been suspended in 1941. 
The War Brides Act of December 28, 1945, did not specify that it did not 
apply to Germans, since marriages to Germans were not yet legal; thus, when 
the bar was lifted, they too were entitled to some of the same benefits as 
other war brides.^ The children of these war brides, whether fathered by 
Americans or adopted, were also allowed entry into the U.S.A., but not on a 
nonquota basis.
Contacts between Germans and Americans took many forms. Members of 
the occupation forces attended church services in the civilian places of 
worship, and in some areas they were encouraged to do so. It was com­
monplace for Americans to attend German cultural events, go to German 
motion picture theaters, and congregate in German beer halls. The beer 
hall was the favorite gathering place for American soldiers. It was in 
these establishments that many black-market contacts were made and that 
rowdy, undisciplined behavior flourished. The standard approach to 
correcting the problem was to place notorious bars off limits, but the 
soldiers usually moved elsewhere and picked up where they had left 
off.^ The problem was normally not the bar, but the patrons.
Large-scale black marketing by Americans was significantly curbed in 1948, 
when so-called "barter markets" in Frankfurt and Berlin were closed and 
when the currency reform replaced the cigarette as the standard of value 
with a solid currency.
As time passed, Germans were allowed in American messes (troop dining
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facilities), clubs, theaters, and snack bars. It became standard practice 
for Germans and Americans to associate with one another socially, but 
efforts were made to screen out unacceptable Germans wherever functions on 
post were involved; German girls were not allowed on post without social 
passes. The social passes were approved by local commanders, and emphasis 
was placed on trying to induce Germans of a better class to apply for the 
permits. The girls had to fill out questionnaires and submit to an 
interrogation.!® This was one of the first efforts to provide a controlled 
environment for the purpose of socializing. For a while in late 1946, it 
was standard policy. During the three-to-four-month period for which 
records were kept, 4,762 applications for social passes were submitted, and 
1,333 were turned down. Those refused were for the following reasons: 
thirty percent, married with children; twenty percent, politically 
undesirable; twenty percent, generally bad appearance; ten percent, 
pregnant; ten percent, police records; and ten percent, false statements on 
their questionnaires or during interrogation.!® Eventually, the practice 
was discarded as mandatory, and it was left to the discretion of the 
local commander as to whether or not it would be continued. One reason for 
its discontinuance was that some German girls with good backgrounds chose 
to avoid Americans because they did not want the passes which were too 
similar to the permits carried by prostitutes.20
Another avenue by which the Germans and Americans were brought 
together was that of employment. The history of the employment of Germans 
by the U.S. forces is very similar to that of fraternization. In the early 
days of the American presence in Germany, it was intended that Germans 
generally would not be employed by Americans unless the labor was offered
voluntarily and then only if a sufficient number of displaced persons was not 
available.21 in fact, German civilians were put to work as early as the 
occupation of Aachen in October, 1944. They served essentially as laborers 
to repair roads and clean up rubble, but they also worked as nurses' aides 
and in offices. Due to the absence of skilled people of other nationali­
ties, it was soon deemed necessary to revamp the rules, and in October,
1944, the employment of Germans was authorized to fill 112 skilled and 
semiskilled trades, IS clerical and supervisory occupations, and 14 hotel, 
mess and hospital occupations. Five months later, the list was expanded to 
include jobs in the welfare services, such as post exchanges. The policy 
was subsequently interpreted to allow professional, technical, and other 
skilled positions to be filled by G e r m a n s . ^2
After V-E Day, the number of Germans employed by the U.S. forces shot 
up. Comprehensive statistics for the entire army of occupation were not 
kept, but on November 1, 1945, there were 168,000 Germans employed by the 
U.S. forces in E u r o p e .^3
The fact that Germans worked for the Americans brought them into imme­
diate contact with one another, and although the contact was supposed to be 
minimal, social relationships and black-market connections developed.^ 
Working for the Americans also meant eating, since provisions had been made 
to feed German workers one meal a day, and in certain cases up to three 
meals per day were allowed.^5 it did not take long for the American mili­
tary to earn a reputation as a preferred employer. German prisoners of war 
who returned from camps in the U.S.A. seemed to be particularly eager to
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work for the Americans. It was estimated that about thirty-five percent of 
all repatriated Germans who had spent time in a prisoner of war camp in 
America and who returned to the U.S. Zone went to work for the Americans. 
One returned prisoner who did so explained it.
We had been treated well in America. We had learned some
English, and besides, the Americans were just about the only 
ones hiring. If you did not have a farm or a business to go to, 
you looked for work with the Americans.26
The position of the American military as a major employer in Germany
became a standard feature of the German economy, including the entire
spectrum of employment from common laborers to physicians and attorneys. 
Domestic servants were also hired by the Americans, and it was common for 
these servants to become closely acquainted with the American families for 
whom they worked and with whom they lived.2? During the postwar period, 
when quarters were built for American families throughout the U.S. Zone, a 
room for the live-in maid was almost always included.
It has already been mentioned that American soldiers were quick to take 
up with German children and that the policy of nonfraternization was not 
expected to be applied where children were concerned. Early contacts were 
incidental and casual; however, it was not long until American soldiers 
were actively involved in youth programs, and the U.S. military command was 
sponsoring German youth clubs throughout the U.S. Zone. Unofficially, 
there were some efforts by Americans to support German children's groups as 
early as July of 1945.28 The situation was officially sanctioned in 
September of 1945, when the Seventh U.S. Army directed that German youth 
clubs be formed and that military chaplains, along with other personnel, 
take part and devote resources to that mission. Shortly after the Seventh 
Army had taken an official position on the issue, the program was taken out
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of the military's hands and given to local youth committees comprised of 
Germans who had the approval of the military government. This did not, 
however, mark the end of American involvement, because military units con­
tinued to sponsor unofficial activities, such as Christmas parties.
And on April 15, 1946, the military was brought back into the picture. 
A directive pertaining to the entire theater was issued, stating that 
sports equipment would be provided to German children and urging military 
personnel to lend a helping hand in organizing programs. The connection 
took on new proportions at Christmas time of 1946, when every soldier was 
encouraged to give presents to German children. By this time the program, 
which was officially designated the "Program of Army Assistance to German 
Youth" but routinely referred to as the "GYA" (German Youth Assistance), 
enjoyed considerable support. In October, each unit (down to company 
level) had been instructed to assign an officer, or a noncommissioned 
officer in the case of a company, on a full-time basis to the task of 
implementing the program. This was the practice in the U.S. Zone; 
elsewhere, the support continued to be voluntary.
The GYA had its negative side too. Some German parents preferred their 
children stay home and work or participate in activities organized by 
Germans. And one famous story tells how soldiers in Nuremberg gave base­
ball equipment to a group of German boys, told them to be back at 1600
hours, then disappeared with their German girl friends. In 1948, GYA was
expanded to bring in support from the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, and
the name was changed to "The Armed Forces Assistance Program to German
Youth Activities." But it was still referred to as GYA.29
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By the end of 1948, the program was touching the lives of many. In 
December of that year, 1,689,046 German youths of both sexes were par­
ticipating. Americans, 9,589 of them, worked in one way or another in the 
program, as did 3,108 German adults. There were, at that time, 285 German 
youth centers in operation to accommodate the 1,668 organized youth groups. 
The GYA program continued under American auspices until the end of the 
occupation, when it was turned over to the Germans. This American 
influence undoubtedly contributed to good relations, both at the time and 
later on, as the Germans who benefited from the program knew from whence 
the help came. It was not an integral part of the plan for youth reorien­
tation and re-education designed to channel young people away from the kind 
of thinking found in the earlier Hitlerjugend, but it served much the same
purpose.30
When the GYA program, with its personal touch, was coupled with other 
organized efforts to assist the Germans, such as CARE and the Marshall 
Plan, it was clear to many Germans who their benefactors were. Throughout 
the period of the occupation, the Germans received $3,578,900,000 in 
various forms of economic assistance from the U.S.A. In addition, huge 
sums of money were spent in Germany by the American forces stationed 
there.31
To some U.S. authorities, increasing German-American contacts served 
a political end. It was argued that besides allowing normal human rela­
tions to occur, the association of Germans with Americans facilitated the 
acceptance of democracy in Germany. It was held that the typical American
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soldier was the best ambassador of American democracy. Through personal
contacts, the Americans were supposedly providing examples of how indivi-
32dual freedom worked for the benefit of the nation as a whole.
Germany's Grundgesetz (Basic Law) was drafted under the aegis of the mili­
tary government and based on the American interpretation of democracy.33 
What better way to convince the average German of the merits of democracy 
than to let him see Americans living by its precepts?
These convictions provided a conscious rationale for the founding of 
German-American clubs and discussion groups. The first of these clubs was 
the Cosmopolitan Club founded in Bad Kissingen in the U.S. Zone on June 
19, 1946. It was specifically dedicated to improving German-American rela­
tions and inculcating an appreciation for democratic principles in the 
German members.^ Prince Louis Ferdinand and a former colonel in the 
German air force were among the members. The inclusion of these indivi­
duals caused concern in the U.S. War Department that it created an 
impression of favoritism; therefore, the club was disbanded, in spite of 
General Lucius Clay's objections. The only other German-American club at 
the time was an informal discussion group at the University of Marburg. 
Since it concerned itself with religious, scientific, and educational 
subjects and evidently had no controversial members, it was allowed to 
continue.35 Towards the end of 1946, the military government instituted 
other discussion groups made up of American servicemen and Germans. These 
discussion groups were intended to demonstrate to Germans, through personal 
contact, the American way of life. In late 1947 and in 1948, 
German-American Women's Clubs began to appear. Here, Germans and Americans
30
shared offices, e.g. American president and German vice-president. These 
clubs were concerned with repairing and distributing clothing to needy 
Germans, with cultural exchanges between the two countries, and with 
various women's problems in Germany. Mrs. Sumner Sewall, the wife of the 
military governor in Wuerttemberg-Baden, founded one of the more successful 
women's clubs in Stuttgart. Mrs. Sewall's organization, the Stuttgart 
American-German Young Women's Progressive Club, had as its avowed purpose, 
"To share the spirit of democracy with young German women so that they not 
only can see it in us, but also can live it with us in our homes."36
The re-education and reorientation program alluded to above was 
another conscious effort to convince Germans that they should embrace 
democracy. It was intended to condition the thinking of German children 
through planned associations between them and American children. Beginning 
in 1948, American parents, along with the teachers and supervisors of the 
schools for American dependent children, were encouraged to:
promote desirable relationships between American and German 
children by sponsoring school visits, programs and occasional 
parties with German children and by recommending that American 
children make every attempt to play with German children and to 
invite them into their homes ... It is earnestly desired that 
all personnel ... foster good will with the German populace. 
Surely the school is one place to teach democracy in action; 
Germans are certain to be influenced in their estimation of the 
American way of life by observing the behavior of our children. 
All concerned realize that a proper understanding and rela­
tionship between German and American families is of fundamental 
importance in accomplishing the occupation mission.3?
All things considered, the first five years of the postwar period 
were profitable. By 1950, the recovery period was over, and Germany was 
back on its feet. The immediate postwar obstacles had been successfully 
negotiated. People were eating again, a viable, democratic government had
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been established, Germany was only a step away from being in control of
itself again, and the economy was approaching its pre-war production level
(it exceeded the 1936 level by about twenty percent in 1 9 5 0 ) . The foun­
dation for a profitable decade had been laid.
At the grass-roots level, those years comprised an eventful period for 
German-American relations. On the positive side, interpersonal relations 
had been free to develop after the initial attempt to restrict contacts had 
failed. Friendships had been founded between former enemies. Numerous 
marriages had taken place creating all the attendant familial rela­
tionships, and emigration from Germany to America had been reinstituted.
The American presence provided food, sustenance, jobs and security to the 
Germans. The impossible policy of nonfraternizatron had been turned 
around, and a more mature policy which not only allowed but encouraged
bonds to be forged had taken its place.
Both peoples benefited from the recovery period, but it was not
without its low points. The records from the period show that inter­
personal relations were punctuated by conflicts and scarred by crimes on 
both sides; Germans sometimes served Americans poisonous liquor, and 
Americans frequently raped German women, while nearly everyone dealt in the 
black market. There were racial problems, diseases, illegitimate children, 
and abandoned mothers. The Americans were the victors and the Germans the 
vanquished, but the German vitality was never really broken. The Americans 
needed the Germans as allies against Russian communism, and the Germans,
too, needed the Americans as allies. But more immediately, America was
needed for its economic aid. Thus, the two sides mended their fences,
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renewed their old family ties, and prepared for a future together. This 
spirit of cooperation was vividly demonstrated during the Berlin Airlift, 
when 2,343,301 tons of supplies were flown to Berlin by the Allies to feed 
and support the entire civilian population of the American, British, and 
French sectors of Berlin.39
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Chapter 3 
A New Political Life 
The Resurrection Of Democracy
Key to recovery was the reestablishment of a political framework to 
accommodate democratic institutions in all walks of life at all levels.
The Americans found competent help in some persons who had experienced the 
Weimar years, albeit such survivors were relatively few in number. The 
politics of the Third Reich had, ironically, grown out of a democratic 
setting. Democracy had lived briefly in Germany during the Weimar period, 
but its death knell had been sounded by the rise of the National Socialist 
Party and Hitler's seizure of power. The Nazi reign, which lasted twelve 
years, came to an end in 1945, and was replaced by the military governments 
of the Allies.
Originally, the Allies intended their zones of occupation to be admin­
istrative districts which would ultimately give way to an all-German 
government, but they soon had to take on governmental functions. In the 
West, the Americans ruled their zone through a military government until 
1949, when the American, British, and French Zones came under the nominal 
authority of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany. At that time, 
the U.S. Military Government was dissolved, and the U.S. High Commissioner 
of Germany assumed the responsibility of representing America's interests 
in Germany. The High Commissioner continued until 1955. In that year, the 
Federal Republic of Germany became a sovereign state, and the position of 
High Commissioner was converted to that of U.S. Ambassador to the Federal 
Republic of Germany; this arrangement has been in effect ever since.
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The U.S. Military Government and the High Commission both bore heavy 
responsibilities for reintroducing into Germany a democratic form of govern­
ment, and it was during their times that the political foundation was laid 
and the basic elements of democratic thinking infused into German thinking.
The Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945, stipulated that democratic 
institutions were to be installed. Article II.A.3. (IV). called for 
democratization of political life on the national level, and Article II.A.9. 
stated that changes would be directed at the state and local levels; there­
fore, it was necessary for responsible authorities to address the entire 
spectrum of German political life.^ Denazification was a high priority for 
the Americans at first; however, they backed away from that soon and 
emphasized the rebuilding process. The basic principle which directed 
American actions was that Americans would guide the development of self­
responsibility among the Germans and then allow the Germans to take control
of their own destiny as early as possible.^ The guidance provided by the 
Americans took several forms and was aimed at both individuals and institu­
tions .
A federalist arrangement was considered best. Strong state govern­
ments would preclude a strong central government with the potential for 
reviving authoritarianism. To achieve this decentralized form of govern­
ment, planners deemed it wise to build from the ground up. In the words of 
U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes:
In the American Zone, we have placed great emphasis upon the
development of a sense of local responsibility and have taken the 
lead in creating Laender or states so that the people will look 
to the states and not to a central government on all matters 
that do not basically require national action. We want to see 
the federal government of Germany created by the states and not 
the states created by the central government.^
37
Thus, the steps in the reestablishment of government were: In 1945,
the approval of codes for local municipalities (Gemeinden); in 1946, the 
approval of codes for rural counties (Landkreise) and the larger city- 
counties (Stadtkreise); in 1946, the approval of constitutions for the 
states (Laender), a move spearheaded by General Clay; and finally, in 
1949, the approval of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) for the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the final act in occupation involvement in German politics, 
except at the top level.^ The Basic Law was drafted by a Parliamentary 
Council of sixty-five members elected by the various state parliaments on 
the basis of one delegate for every 750,000 people. The Council was 
established in accordance with guidance provided by the London agreement of 
June 7, 1948, and advice from the American, British and French Military 
Governors. The Council had twenty-seven Christian Democrats, twenty-seven 
Social Democrats, five Liberals, and two each from the Communist, German, 
and Central parties. The document itself and the circumstances surrounding 
its creation bear several similarities to the U.S. Constitution. Both 
provide for a democratic system with a federalist structure. Both contain 
a Bill of Rights which guarantees individual freedoms. Both contain 
"precise legal norms rather than vague programmatic statements." Both are 
products of special constitutional conventions. Both were framed by 
delegates sent by the states rather than elected by the people. Both are 
products of elite members of society, many of whom were lawyers. Both were 
written in relative isolation from the general public where conscience 
rather than political posturing prevailed. And both provide for judicial 
review of state acts.5 The American authorities were particularly 
influential in the drafting and approval process. General Lucius Clay
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frequently found himself arbitrating within the circle of military 
governors. In this role, he was often able to influence decisions. For 
example, it was General Clay's firmness which overcame German determination 
to establish a more centralized government. The British Military Governor, 
General Sir Brian Robertson, was ready to give in to the German position in 
a crucial meeting with the Parliamentary Council on April 25, 1949, and the 
French Military Governor, General Pierre Koenig, agreeed to do whatever 
Clay decided. Clay stood fast, and Robertson also then decided to back the 
demand for decentralization —  the position which subsequently prevailed. 
General Clay also had the decisive voice in the matter of how much tax 
authority the central government would have for the purposes of health, 
education, and welfare. His precise words were adopted and included in the 
Basic Law.&
State Constitutions, too, felt the American touch. It was General 
Clay who urged the drafting of such documents.? The actual provisions of 
these constitutions were also directly influenced by the military governor, 
who insisted they contain a Bill of Rights specifying freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, and the right to form political parties.8
The Basic Law had the protection of individual citizens and the states 
as its main purpose. Its framers were acutely aware of the weaknesses of 
the Veimar constitution that enabled Hitler to rise to power legally.
The authors of the Weimar constitution had failed to recognize that indi­
vidual liberties could be imperiled under a popular form of government, 
just as under a monarchy. In retrospect, it was seen that the members of 
the National Assembly of 1919 were naive because they believed elected 
representatives would not infringe upon the liberties of the citizenry;
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consequently, elected officials were entrusted with extensive powers which 
ultimately were used to curtail, even eliminate, individual rights. For 
example, the now infamous Article 48 of the Weimar Republic's constitution 
allowed the democratically elected President of the Republic to suspend 
civil rights in an emergency. The Basic Law crafted in the wake of the 
Third Reich and under the watchful eye of the Western Allies placed no such 
provision at the disposal of the executive. A look at some of the provi­
sions of the Weimar constitution compared with the Basic Law is instruc­
tive. Under the Weimar constitution the Reichstag could pass laws which 
actually threatened the very existence of the states by changing their 
borders; or, the President of the Reich could compel the states, through 
federal military force, to abide by changes to the constitution forged by 
the Reichstag. The Basic Law, on the other hand, specifies what the 
federal government can do while leaving any responsibilities not enumerated 
to the states. Additionally, the states are constitutionally guaranteed 
the right to have their own constitutions, administrative organizations, 
educational systems, and church laws. And the Bundesrat, which was con­
ceived to protect the states, is empowered to block any legislation 
infringing upon states' rights. One of the most significant changes pro­
vided for in the Basic Law is the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungs- 
gericht), which exists not only to settle disputes between states or 
between states and the federation but also to protect private citizens 
whose rights have been infringed upon by the organs of government, as 
happened under the Weimar constitution. In some respects, the U.S. Supreme 
Court served as a model for the Constitutional Court.9
Following approval of the legal foundation of government at each
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level, the next step was the introduction of the respective popularly 
elected representative bodies.10 Elections for the Gemeinde councils 
occurred on January 20 and 27, 1946; the Landkreis councils on April 28, 
1946; the StadtkreiB councils on May 26, 1946; the Landtage on November 24, 
and December 1, 1946; and the Bundestag on August 14, 1949. At every step 
in the entire process, American advice was given, and approval by the U.S. 
Military Government was required before matters could proceed.
The first type of political activity which took place under American 
auspices was the appointment of German officials to carry out American 
directives in newly occupied areas. As a general rule, this was done by 
summoning local clergymen, school teachers, and a few other citizens and 
asking them for suggestions for a Buergermeister or Landrat. American 
officials questioned the nominees, conducted whatever investigations were 
feasible, administered political questionnaires, and then made a selection. 
The new Buergermeister, or however the administrative chief was titled, 
then appointed other officials to help him execute the duties of his 
o f f i c e . I n  the case of Zweibruecken, the man selected for the job was 
Ignaz Roth, a carpenter who was fifty-one years of age. Ignaz Roth was 
appointed as Oberbuergermeister on March 22, 1945, and the wisdom of his 
selection is attested to by his tenure; he remained in office until his 
retirement in 1959. He was, in many ways, typical of officials appointed 
by the Americans, a local man who had remained apart from National 
Socialism as much as possible and one who was dedicated to reconstructing 
his home town. Ignaz Roth's first thoughts were for the welfare of the 
people. A food rationing system was set up to ensure a fair distribution
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of what was available. Water also was a problem, as the city's water lines 
had been destroyed, along with the gas works and the electrical supply net­
work. As soon as the most critical needs of the citizens had been taken 
care of, Roth and the people of Zweibruecken began rebuilding the city.
The Americans, who remained in the city only until July 7, 1945, when they 
turned the city over to the French, disagreed with Roth's intentions to 
clean up and rebuild; they considered it a futile task, inasmuch as eighty- 
two percent of the city had been destroyed. Roth persisted and led the 
city in its reconstruction efforts until his retirement. The French 
encouraged the rebuilding but gave little material help. The Americans, on 
the other hand, did much after they returned in the early 1950s; their 
contributions will be addressed in Chapter 8. The reconstruction work 
lasted until 1972, when the museum was reopened largely with the help of an 
American grant.
As soon as the situation stabilized in the U.S. Zone, the matter of 
political parties arose. U.S. authorities authorized the formation of 
political parties at the Kreis level on August 27, 1945. However, it was 
not a blanket approval. Local American officials had final review author­
ity, and they could withdraw permission if the local Germans did not comply 
with all the stipulated provisions. Each party had to have a sponsor, a 
German who was identifiable and responsible to the Americans. Sponsors had 
to fill out Fragebogen and file statements of their party programs and of 
changes to the programs with the local military government officials.
It was also necessary during the early days to obtain approval before party 
meetings could take place. This was done by filing an application with
42
the Americans telling them the time, place, and purpose of the proposed 
meeting and providing a list of the names and addresses of all scheduled 
speakers. Soliciting funds was permissible, but periodic, sworn state­
ments had to be filed to show their sources and the purposes for which they 
were spent. Furthermore, all party literature was strictly controlled, 
and the use of party uniforms, armbands, or emblems was prohibited. If it 
was determined by the Americans that a political party was violating any of 
these rules, the permission to operate as a party was withdrawn.12
In order to succeed in a democracy, political parties obviously have 
to be able to attract votes, and the Americans defined who could and who 
could not vote in Germany. Nationality was the first requirement. A voter 
had to be German, and this meant, according to a U.S. directive, that a 
person had to have been a German national prior to September 1939, and not 
to have acquired another citizenship in the meantime. The second require­
ment was that of minimum age; every voter had to be at least twenty-one 
years old. Both men and women were given the right to vote. And residency 
requirements could not exceed one year. The right to vote could be denied 
based on insanity or a criminal record (other than those interpreted as of 
a political nature under National Socialism). Additionally, persons in a 
mandatory arrest category (unless already released); Nazi party members 
whose membership antedated May 1, 1937; active members of the Nazi party 
who joined after May 1, 1937; officials of the Sturmabteilung,
Hitlerjugend, Bund deutscher Maedel, National-sozialistischer deutscher
Studentenbund, N-S Dozentenbund, N-S Frauenschaft, N-S Kraftfahrkorps,
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N-S Fliegerkorps, and known Nazi sympathizers or collaborators were all 
barred from voting. The restrictions for Nazi Party affiliation remained 
in effect during the decade of the fifties for those individuals imprisoned 
for crimes, but not for those already r e l e a s e d . 13
Although there appeared to be a considerable amount of political 
apathy, four significant political groupings emerged. The pre-war 
socialists returned as the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The 
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) block derived 
from the former Catholic Center Party. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
developed as the heirs of German liberalism. The fourth group, was the 
Communist Party of Germany (KPD); it was later banned in 1956, as a threat 
to democracy.
Not everyone was anxious to become aligned with a political party or 
movement. In fact, many Germans rejected politics. The world of poli­
tics held too many pitfalls; Germany had followed the Nazis and then been 
made to pay a high price. Who was to say that a new master might not arise 
later and punish those who participated in the democracy installed by 
the occupying powers? Furthermore, to be active in politics required time 
and dedication. Although persons who chose not to become involved in 
public affairs probably did so for a variety of reasons, it was still 
disturbing, because citizen participation is the heart of democracy. The 
reluctance to become actively involved in political matters manifested 
itself in a movement called ohne mich (without me). The ohne mich movement 
was at its strongest in the early part of the 1950s, when controversy over
44
Che creation of a new German army was widespread. Those who subscribed Co 
Che ohne mich philosophy wanted no responsibility for either politics or 
rearmament. In 1950 and early 1951, the U.S. High Commission sponsored a 
survey to determine the extent of such feelings; it revealed that thirty 
percent of the German men said they would refuse to serve in a new German 
array.^ it should be remembered that this was only a few months after the 
outbreak of the Korean Var. Another survey taken a few months earlier in 
the summer of 1950, showed that sixty-six percent of the Germans were 
pessimistic about another world war. Thus, even though the majority of 
Germans feared they might be embroiled in another war, a sizable segment of 
the male population felt they would not serve in the military. Perhaps 
this can be explained by the fact that the vast majority of the Germans 
felt confident that America would come to their aid if they were attacked 
by the communists.15
Detailed American Influence
The American authorities exercised considerable influence at the lower 
levels of government, especially during the formative 6tages of the new 
democracy, a time when denazification and German enforcement of laws con­
sistent with the views of the Western Allies caused far-reaching changes in 
political, economic, and social structures.16 By the early 1950s, German 
government was functioning quite well with American ideas almost unnoti- 
ceably incorporated in the overall scheme.
At the hub of the democratization process was the need to gain the
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support and participation of the average German citizen. To build the 
necessary popular support, Americans urged the formation of citizens' 
groups to discuss public questions and seek information on governmental 
activities and policies. The Germans responded by founding organizations 
which encompassed a broad range of subjects. The existence of these organi­
zations caused the U.S. Military Government and the High Commission to set 
up programs to give aid and advice in the following a r e a s . ^
1. Citizen participation in government.
2. Local government.
3. The public employee, the citizen, and the state.
4. Civil liberties.
5. Police policy and administration.
6. Political parties and election systems.
7. Legislative organization and practice.
8. Federal-state relations.
9. Education in political and governmental affairs.
10. Public affairs.
It was believed that German citizens lacked an adequate understanding 
of the conception of "citizen." That is, the rightful place of the indivi­
dual in relation to the community and the state was not fully comprehended; 
this perception was, of course, based on American standards. German citi­
zens, it was held, had too long been accustomed to authoritarian types of 
government and felt as if they were servants of the state, rather than its 
masters. To alter this perception, the American Kreis Resident Officers, 
America Houses, and other officials and institutions organized forums,
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discussion groups, and lecture programs. As German groups developed, the 
Americans encouraged them to think about such things as government 
programs, citizen-official relations, and civil liberties. Particular 
attention was paid to German youth organizations and women's
associations.18 The German Youth Assistance Program (GYA), discussed
above, was one avenue used to influence the young. The GYA, with its 
voluntary nature, casual give-and-take relationships, and openness, 
contrasted sharply with the disciplinarian Hitler.jugend; it appealed to 
many young Germans and helped to demonstrate democracy at work at the 
lowest level.1^
Consultants were brought from America to help Germans adapt American 
techniques to German conditions and to demonstrate the practical aspects of 
citizen participation in government and politics. American media experts 
worked with local Germans to present governmental and political matters in
such a way as to gain public support and get results. Germans were sent to
America to observe life in American communities. And informative pamph­
lets were distributed to group leaders and participants. Pamphlets such as 
"Let's Hold a Discussion," "Citizens' Organizations and Rules of Order," 
and "Is Politics your Business?," were adaptations of publications put out 
by the U.S. League of Women Voters and served to interest German women in 
their rights as citizens. Another pamphlet entitled "The State and I" 
discussed the theory of the state and its relation to the citizen. These 
pamplets were distributed to hundreds of thousands of Germans.^0
The four areas of "local government"; "the public employee, the citi­
zen and the state"; "civil libertities"; and "police policy and 
administration" were seen as having a common denominator, in having an
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impact upon the daily life of the citizen. They also represented encoun­
ters with or were related to the first area, "citizen participation in 
government."
To help Germans realize that public problems were citizens' problems 
and affected each citizen personally, U.S. officials sponsored numerous 
consultants to work with German groups as well as lecturers to stress the 
necessity for citizen participation in the democratic process. Among their 
other efforts, the Americans established schools on local government to 
orient city council members on their rights and responsibilities. Numerous 
pamphlets on the facets of local government, e.g. municipal finances, were 
published, and films were produced as well.21
Combatting the long-standing view in Germany that public officials 
were superior to citizens was somewhat of a special problem, since it 
entailed not only educating the citizens as to their rights and the need to 
demand them but also convincing public officials that they were not 
superior. Towards these ends, new civil service laws were promulgated in 
all states in the U.S. Zone, the German Society of Personnel Administrators 
was founded to improve personnel standards and professional attitudes, and 
administrative court decisions which reflected the triumph of individual 
rights over the arbitrariness of public servants were made public. One 
German statute which generated very little sympathy from Americans made 
Beamtenbeleidigung (insult of officials) a legal offense. The Germans were 
urged to cancel it because it gave public servants special protection from 
criticism. The law went unchanged, but it came to be interpreted rather 
liberally so that only true insults were p u n i s h a b l e . 22
Americans considered the German conception of civil liberties to be in 
dire need of improvement, and authorities set forth some objectives to 
help rectify the situation. First, it was deemed necessary to engender 
public understanding and appreciation for the meaning of basic human 
rights. Second, it was thought appropriate to extend assistance to citi­
zens whose rights were violated by capricious or illegal official action.
In addition, Americans urged the Germans to review legislation and 
regulations and to change those that were repressive.
The objective of increasing understanding and appreciation of 
human rights was pursued through consultants, lecturers, newspaper 
articles, radio programs, pamphlets, and films. After the German courts 
became functional, there was very little the Americans could do to extend 
assistance to individuals, but Kreis Resident Officers, Land Resident 
Officers, and other U.S. officials were instructed to be alert to 
violations and to bring them to the attention of the German authorities.
As an indication of how well Germans accepted the idea of civil liberties, 
active civil liberties groups were formed in cities throughout the Federal 
Republic; Munich, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Mannheim, Stuttgart, and Berlin 
were among them. The various groups were tied together in a League for 
Citizens' Rights, with their headquarters in Frankfurt. The league 
published a periodic newspaper, and the Bavarian group reported on arrests, 
searches, and seizures.23
The recent past had shown how citizens can be victimized by the abuse 
of police powers. Hence police policy and administration merited close 
attention. It was a stated goal of the Americans to educate German 
citizens as to their proper relationship with the police and to organize
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Che police in such a fashion that the abuse of police powers would not occur 
again. The first requirement for control, as the Americans saw it, was to 
decentralize police organizations enough so that communities would have 
some authority of their own. This was accomplished throughout the U.S.
Zone. Concurrently, legal controls over the police were established to 
restrict arbitrary actions and confine their duties to maintaining public 
order, preventing crimes, and bringing offenders to justice. Also on the 
list of American priorities was the objective of freeing the police from 
political influence, so that they would be free to pursue their rightful 
duties without fear of political reprisals. As a consequence of the cam­
paign to improve police policy and administration, a number of changes were 
made. These improvements were not universal; some were widespread while 
others were localized. Some occured earlier and some later. But all were 
attributed to American influence on the German police system.
1. Juveniles were detained by welfare agencies or church homes, rather 
than in jails or prisons.
2. The incarceration of persons against whom no specific charges were 
made was prohibited.
3. Policemen lectured elementary school students on the police, 
problems of law enforcement, crime prevention, and traffic safety.
4. Schoolboy traffic patrols were established at street crossings.
5. Police chiefs visited the U.S. and on their return gave lectures 
to others on the advantages of the American police system.
6. Policemen started wearing numbered badges.
7. The use of firearms was restricted to cases where life was actually 
endangered or where it was necessary to prevent escape.
8. Relations with the press were improved.
9. Public participation in crime prevention via cooperation by
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community groups was encouraged.
Every available avenue was used to educate the German people.
Newspaper articles, pamphlets, radio programs, films, and lecturers were 
all employed as instruments to make the public aware of its rights and 
responsibilities. The net result was that citizens came to think of 
policemen as friends. Policemen themselves felt better integrated into the 
community. The image of the policeman as a "little god" was gone.2^
The remaining major areas of "political parties and election systems," 
"legislative organization and practice," "education in political and 
governmental affairs," "federal-state relations," and "public affairs," 
all involved aid to specialized groups working on subjects of a specific 
nature.
One major concern for the new republic revolved around the electoral 
system. The lessons of Weimar indicated it would not do to have too 
many parties; splintering had led to chaos and contributed to the downfall 
of the Weimar Republic. Beyond this shortcoming, there was an additional 
feature which needed changing: voters of the Weimar period voted for
parties more than for individuals, since seats were filled from party 
lists prepared by party committees. The Americans had little or no direct 
control over the way these problems would be addressed by the Germans, but 
through visits to the United States by German political leaders, advice of 
American consultants, articles in newspapers, and commentaries on the radio, 
the advantages of the American system were widely publicized. Exactly how 
the American view was accepted is a matter of conjecture, but in the end,
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party splintering was dealt with by establishing a "five percent hurdle" 
(only parties receiving at least five percent of the votes in a given elec­
tion are entitled to send representatives to the legislature), and it was 
decided that officials would be selected by both direct-vote and party-list
systems.25
Historically, the legislative process in Germany had been, to a great 
degree, in the hands of the executive branch of the government. It was 
staffed by professional, long-term civil servants who intentionally culti­
vated the idea that they were the experts in government —  not the 
untrained legislators. Moreover, the legislators lacked the staff and 
reference libraries to draft complex bills. As a result, most legislative 
enactments originated with cabinet ministers and the bureaucracy and were 
not necessarily representative of public views. Popular desires were 
further thwarted by the lack of public hearings on pending legislation. 
These conditions appeared to the Americans as undesirable; they undermined 
the concept of separation of powers and denied the citizen a voice in the 
law-making process. Setting the situation right was not a matter of 
legislation per se, but rather a problem of execution. The Basic Law and 
state constitutions contained the right words and provisions, but the means 
of implementation were lacking. The approach chosen by the Americans to 
address this difficulty involved four steps. These steps were: ,
1. Legislative reference services were established.
2. Thirty observers from the Bundestag were sent to the U.S.A. to
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visit the U.S. Congress, the Supreme Court, the TVA, and various cities to 
study congressional organization and procedures, committee work, public 
hearings, the Library of Congress, and relations between the public and 
Congress. Similar groups of observers from the Landtage (totally forty- 
two persons) in the U.S. Zone were sent to study comparable issues at the 
state level in the U.S.A.
3. Consultants from the Library of Congress came to Germany and 
assisted the Bundestag and the Landtage in setting up reference services.
4. A public information campaign was carried out to educate the 
public and governmental agencies on how the legislative process can 
serve the public interest. Pamphlets, radio, and newspapers were all used 
in the campaign.26
Concerning federal-state relations the CDU/CSU generally supported 
federalism while the SPD favored centralism. But on this issue, American, 
British, and French authorities stood fast. Extensive efforts were made to 
convince all Germans of the merits of a decentralized system of government, 
and where persuasion failed authority prevailed: the drafters of the 
Grundgesetz were specifically given permission to proceed only on the 
grounds that they provide for a federal state.27 As a result, Article 73 
of the Grundgesetz lists the fields in which the federal government has 
exclusive authority. In Article 70, it is specified that all legislative 
power not given to the federal government belongs to the state
governments.28
The last two major political areas specifically addressed by the U.S. 
officials were related. "Education in political and governmental affairs"
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and "public affairs" were different aspects of the same problem —  
educating Germans to grasp the significance of politics to the well­
being of the nation. To achieve this, the interdisciplinary study of the 
social sciences was encouraged at the university level, American spe­
cialists discussed issues with German professors and administrators,
Germans studied in America, and an Institute of Public Affairs was founded 
in Frankfurt. This institute was responsible for conducting research and 
conferences and publishing the findings. The topics covered a wide range 
of subjects within the social sciences with frequent references to the way 
things were done in the United States. Representatives of the High 
Commissioner's office participated actively and contributed to the emerging 
German view of society and government as Germany recovered from the philos­
ophy of National Socialism.29
There were other areas in which the Americans helped shape German
attitudes towards the individual, politics, the community, and government,
and together with those cited above, they had a sizable if not always
recognizable impact on the average German's life. In the 1950s, Germans
saw life in the political realm as not only different but far improved with
greater opportunities for personal growth and pursuits. One observer
stated it this way:
First of all, the big difference was we had political parties 
again. Pluralism was back. He were free to speak, and of 
course the newpapers printed different opinions. He were free 
to grow, but we felt stability and safety. People were prob­
ably happier than they are today, and although food was not 
as plentiful as now, it was healthier. Capitalism was some­
thing we were proud of; we all knew how different it was in 
the East. He knew what was happening in the rest of the world 
again. No forced obedience, food and shelter, our own opinions 
—  that is what it was like, but it was not new. It was new 
for those born in the 1930s or later, but the rest of us knew 
it was like Ueimar —  but with stability, and naturally some 
changes.30
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PART II
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Chapter 4 
Economic and Population Factors
Economic Overview
The decision to rebuild Germany as an economic power was a conscious 
one. There had been a certain amount of sentiment for the notion that 
Germany should not be allowed to develop its heavy industry, for fear of 
another war. Henry Morgenthau Jr., the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, had 
been a leading advocate of this idea which would have turned Germany into 
an agricultural nation, but in the long run, such voices were not dominant. 
The very fact that the Germans had to be fed, clothed, and sheltered mili­
tated against such a plan. As a basically agrarian nation, the Germans 
would not have been able to provide for themselves, and the Allies could 
not support Germany forever. Furthermore, the Allied Control Commission 
had not been able to carry out its plans to administer Germany as an eco­
nomic unit, as called for at Potsdam. Thus, it was decided that the 
dismantling of factories in the West should be stopped and the Germans left 
with the wherewithal to rebuild, to take care of their own needs, and to 
become a respectable, contributing member of the family of nations. This 
position was articulated by James F. Byrnes, the U.S. Secretary of State, 
in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946.
...The basis of the Potsdam Agreement was that, as part of a com­
bined program of demilitarization and reparations, Germany's war 
potential should be reduced by elimination and removal of her war 
industries and the reduction and removal of heavy industrial 
plants. It was contemplated this should be done to the point 
that Germany would be left with levels of industry capable of 
maintaining in Germany average European living standards without
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assistance from other countries...The conditions which now exist 
in Germany make it impossible for industrial production to reach 
the levels which the occupying powers agreed were essential for a 
minimum German peacetime economy...Germany needs all the food she 
can produce. Before the war she could not produce enough food 
for her population. The area of Germany has been reduced....[and] 
Armies of occupation and displaced persons increase demands while 
the lack of farm machinery and fertilizer reduce supplies....While 
Germany must be prepared to share her coal and steel with the 
liberated countries of Europe dependent upon those supplies,
Germany must be enabled to use her skills and her energies to 
increase her industrial production and to organize the most 
effective use of her raw materials....Germany must be given a 
chance to export goods in order to import enough to make her eco­
nomy self-sustaining. Germany is a part of Europe, and recovery 
in Europe, and particularly in the states adjoining Germany, will 
be slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and 
coal is turned into a poorhouse.l
Germany's ultimate division left West Germany to grow and prosper under the 
philosophy stated by Secretary Byrnes, while East Germany's development 
was stunted by the restrictive policies imposed by the Soviets.
The "Economic Miracle," as the West German economy came to be called,
provided unprecedented prosperity for the average West German and enabled 
the country to become a stalwart partner of the U.S.A. in its ideological
competition with the Soviets. The alliance was accepted by the West
Germans, and a series of polls conducted by the Allensbach Institute in 
West Germany during the decade of the fifties reveals some of the reasons 
why. Over half of the Germans, fifty-eight percent, believed in 1950 that 
America wanted to prevent Western Europe from becoming communist (sixty-six 
percent in 1952); and a considerable number of Germans felt that Germany 
was menaced by Russia. Nothing happened to change their minds either, as 
at the turn of the decade, sixty-one percent of those polled still felt 
America wanted to save West Germany and her Western European neighbors from 
communism. The vast majority of Germans said that, in addition to the
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economic differences, freedom was an attribute of life that distinguished 
the West from life in the East. By 1958, the German perception that 
America was needed had not waned; sixty-six percent said that, even if all 
Western European countries stuck together, Americans would still be needed 
to prevent Eastern domination. And in that same year, an additional reason 
for German-American alignment was identified when eighty-two percent of the 
Germans polled indicated they believed the modern Americans descended from 
Germans.^
The view of the Western Allies, led by America, that Germany should 
develop its industrial potential, led to jobs, which fed and clothed 
grateful Germans. An examination of the trade which flourished between 
Germany and America indicates the interdependence that developed between 
these two partners, who held both work and capital growth in high esteem. 
Throughout the decade of the fifties, the U.S.A. was the principal source 
of imports for West Germany, and only the Netherlands purchased more of 
Germany's exports than did the U.S.A. During the period 1950 to 1960, West 
Germans imported goods from the U.S.A. worth 38,389,000,000 German marks 
and exported to the U.S.A. goods in the value of 21,253,000,000 German 
marks.3 The U.S.A. was unquestionably West Germany's number one trading
partner, and Germans worked because of that trade. These figures are not 
intended to challenge the idea that America derived at least as much bene­
fit from the trade as did the Germans. But they are evidence of how rela­
tions between the two countries served to help Germany recover.
From a grass-roots point of view, the most significant aspect of the 
"Economic Miracle" was that individuals benefited. For the people, it was
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not simply a development with implications at the national level. Germans 
were working, eating, taking care of themselves, contributing to the world 
at large, and even saving. As early as 1952, there were 7,404,000,000 
German marks in private Vest German savings accounts.^ Instead of being a 
burden to the Western Allies, Germany joined them as a valuable partner.
The People Involved
As a gross indicator of the potential for German-American contacts 
during the eleven years under consideration, it is helpful to compare th 
resident population figures in both West Germany as a whole and the city 
Zweibruecken with the corresponding numbers for the American forces.
The resident population figures in the Federal Republic and in 
Zweibruecken for each year under consideration are shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
RESIDENT POPULATION IN THE FRG AND ZWEIBRUECKEN
1950-1960
Number of Residents Number of Residents
Year in the FRG_____  in Zweibruecken
1950 *45,400,000 26,180
1951 *45,400,000 27,134
1952 *45,400,000 28,270
1953 *45,400,000 29,428
1954 49,516,000 30,920
1955 49,995,000 31,756
1956 53,500,000 31,147
1957 53,339,000 32,616
1958 54,373,000 33,720
1959 55,009,000 33,770
1960 55,577,000 33,920
* 1946 Census was carried forward.
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The total numbers of Americans in Germany from 1950-1960, as a con­
sequence of the military, are shown in Table 6.^
TABLE 6
U.S. FORCES PERSONNEL IN GERMANY 1950-1960
Mil A Civ Employees Dependents Total
1950 88,706 44,337 133,043
1951 242,235 45,214 287,449
1952 317,500 69,992 387,492
1953 292,143 78,709 370,852
1954 249,693 109,871 359,564
1955 256,818 125,407 382,225
1956 259,572 145,360 404,932
1957 230,955 158,967 389,922
1958 220,337 • 157,704 378,041
1959 230,631 171,279 401,910
1960 225,694 183,896 409,590
The U.S. Military in Germany added to the economic recovery in no mean 
way by employing Germans and spending large sums of money. The details of 
employment will be addressed below; the point here is that the employment 
brought Germans and Americans together in the work place. Every German 
employee and every American associated with the U.S. forces, who was old 
enough, had the opportunity to get to know members of the other nationa­
lity.
At the beginning of the decade, only a handful of Americans were in
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Zweibruecken, but as time passed more Americans were stationed there, more 
dependents arrived, and more German employees were hired. Table 7 depicts 
the reconstructed numbers of Americans who lived and worked in Zweibruecken 
from 1950 to I960.6
TABLE 7
U.S. FORCES PERSONNEL IN ZWEIBRUECKEN 1950-1960
Year Assigned Dependents Total
1950 94 0 94
1951 99 0 99
1952 352 77 429
1953 383 103 486
1954 210 92 302
1955 744 357 1,101
1956 1,120 627 1,747
1957 1,410 973 2,383
1958 1,883 1,356 3,239
1959 1,256 929 2,185
1960 1,256 1,017 2,273
The "Assigned" line reflects the combined total of military personnel 
and Department of the Army civilians. These figures represent the number 
of people authorized in the Zweibruecken units. The real numbers undoub­
tedly varied somewhat from time to time, but since the reported strength 
figures are no longer in existence, the number of authorized personnel is 
the closest means of determining the strength for each year. In any event, 
it is unlikely that the real figures would have varied more than +_
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ten percent from what was authorized at any given time; over the span of 
eleven years, it most certainly would have balanced out. If there is any 
error, it is probably that more Americans were present, since Zweibruecken 
was a replacement center temporarily housing a few hundred soldiers on a 
constant basis throughout the period. The replacements were normally 
restricted to the caserne for control purposes, but frequently some were 
given passes for a few hours and ventured into town. The "Dependents" line 
is based on the ratio of American dependents to military personnel and 
Department of Defense civilians which existed throughout Germany in the
respective years, except for 1950 and 1951, when it is unlikely that depen­
dents lived in Zweibruecken.
Official U.S. Army records show units were assigned in Zweibruecken 
during 1950. However, it is questionable whether or not soldiers 
were physically in the city on anything other than a temporary basis 
until December of 1951, because the Zweibruecken newspaper, Die Rheinpfalz,
reported on December 21, 1951, that Americans had arrived only
two days before. In light of this contradiction, it is assumed that the
movement of units to Zweibruecken was in the planning stages in 1950 and
1951, with Americans coming and going to prepare for the arrival of the
main body of troops in December 1951. It is doubtful if any
dependents came with the initial units assigned to the town, due to the 
absence of living quarters. Furthermore, it required a period of weeks or 
even months to find apartments at that time. If dependents did arrive 
during the years 1950 and 1951, they were not apparent to the citizens of 
Zweibruecken.?
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Since Americans, French, and Canadians were all present in 
Zweibruecken during the course of the decade, it would be interesting to 
compare their respective population figures. However, this is not 
feasible, since none of the three nations ever publicly disclosed their 
strength figures. It was only possible to arrive at figures for the 
Americans by virtue of the fact that the author has an American security 
clearance and was given access to the official U.S. Army histories and was 
able to get pertinent data declassified. It is neither practical nor 
within the scope of this study to attempt to reconstruct the French and 
Canadian population figures. Nevertheless, city officials in Zweibruecken 
estimated there were about nine hundred French in the city at any given 
time until 1954, when the count was reduced to about five hundred. As for 
the Canadians, city officials estimated there were always about twice as 
many Canadians as Americans in the city.
Employment of Germans
America's influence was felt by all West Germans, whether indirectly 
through the booming economy or directly through employment by the U.S. for­
ces and through various business dealings with the U.S. forces or their 
members.
America's role in the reconstruction of Germany often has been 
demonstrated by citing gross figures for direct aid provided by such 
programs as CARE ($5,000,000,000),® the Marshall Plan $1,346,200,000> 
Government Appropriations for Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) 
($5,809,000,000)® and the Mutual Security Act of October 10, 1951 
($253,000,000).10
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But the U.S.A. also contributed significantly to the economic well­
being of a great many Germans through the creation of employment. The task 
of trying to count every dollar contributed to the West German economy by 
America is an impossible one. Corporations, private businesmen, churches, 
and tourists were spending money for which there is no way of accounting. 
But since the U.S. forces represented such a large portion of the total 
American presence in Germany, a look at the number of Germans who worked 
for the American military and the amount of money they received can add 
greatly to our total understanding of how the presence of Americans 
affected individual Germans.
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Table 8 depicts the number of Germans who drew their salaries from the 
American forces during the years 1950 to I960, throughout West Germany.H
TABLE 8
GERMANS EMPLOYED BY U.S. FORCES IN GERMANY 1950-1960
1950: 212,269
1951: 227,594
1952: 186,160
1953: 117,154
1954: 166,294
1955: 161,129
1956: 127,541
1957: 125,605
1958: 114,479
1959: 114,186
1960: 100,834
These statistics take on added importance when viewed alongside 
figures for Germans employed in major industrial sectors. One example will 
show how important the U.S. military establishment was as an employer: in 
1951, when the U.S forces had 227,594 persons on the official payroll and 
approximately another 20,000 private workers (not to mention the sizable 
but unknown number of Germans who were paid from nonappropriated funds), 
there were only five industries in all of West Germany that employed a 
larger work force. Table 9 shows the top ten sources of employment in West 
Germany in 1951.^
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TABLE 9
NEST GERMANY1S TOP TEN SOURCES OF EMPLOYMENT
IN 1951
Industrial Group Humber of Employees
1. Textile Manufacturing 592,288
2. Coal Mining 532,371
3. Machine Manufacturing 513,120
4. Chemical Industry 304,324
5. Electrical Industry 300,281
6. U.S. Forces *247,594
7. Garment Industry 222,034
8. Stone and Mineral Industry 220,276
9. Automobile Industry 212,919
10. Woodworking 185,524
*Nonappropriated-fund employees not included, but twenty thousand esti­
mated domestic employees are included.
By 1955, the U.S. forces had dropped out of the top ten employment 
categories, but they were still quite important and ranked in fourteenth 
place out of forty-seven major sources of jobs in Germany.- At the end of 
the decade, the U.S. forces ranked as the twelfth largest, because by then, 
nonappropriated-fund employees (41,475 of them) were accounted for in the 
total of their workers.
German employees of the U.S. forces were paid on scales in line 
with those prevailing in German industry. Furthermore, union mem­
bership, the concept of co-determination, social benefits, vacation
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policies, and working hours were all compatible. So the U.S. establishment 
was a competitive, desirable e m p l o y e r . 13
The fact that the U.S. forces and their employees were concentrated 
mostly in Hessen, Vuerttemberg-Baden, Bayern, Baden, Bremen, and Rheinland- 
Pfalz made the impact on the economy in those states even more dramatic.
In the areas where the U.S. forces were located, they employed more Germans 
than any single group of industries in 1951 (Table 10).^  In 1955, the U.S. 
forces represented the sixth largest source of employment in their area of 
Germany (Table 11).13 gy i960, the U.S. forces were still among the top 
ten in the states where they employed Germans; in that year, they were the 
eighth largest employer in the five combined states (Table 12).^
TABLE 10
TOP TEN SOURCES OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE COMBINED STATES 
OF HESSEN, VUERTTEMBERG-BADEN, BAYERN, BADEN, BREMEN,
AND HHEINLAND-PFALZ IN 1951
Industrial Group Number of Em
1. U.S. Forces *247,594
2. Textile Manufacturing 246,219
3. Machine Manufacturing 243,557
4. Electrical Industry 172,196
5. Chemical Industry 146,674
6. Automobile Industry 141,276
7. Stone and Mineral Industry 125,134
8. Garment Industry 95,936
9. Woodworking 92,892
10. Shoe Manufacturing 65,113
*Nonappropriated-fund employees not included, but twenty thousand estimated 
domestic employees are included.
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TABLE 11
TOP TEN SOURCES OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE COMBINED STATES 
OF HESSEN, BADEN-WOERTTEMBERG, BAYERN, BREMEN,
AND RHEINLAND-PFALZ IN 1955
Industrial Group Number of Em
1. Machine Manufacturing 380,535
2. Textile Manufacturing 328,917
3. Electrical Industry 303,531
4. Automotive Manufacturing 198,170
5. Chemical Industry 181,857
6. U.S. Forces *181,129
7. Dairy 165,751
8. Stone and Mineral Industry 157,396
9. Garment Industry 145,354
10. Metal Working 135,083
* Nonappropriated-fund employees not included but twenty thousand esti­
mated domestic employees are included.
TABLE 12
TOP TEN SOURCES OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE COMBINED STATES 
OF HESSEN, BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG, BAYERN, BREMEN,
AND RHEINLAND-PFALZ IN 1960 
Industrial Croups Number of Employees
1. Machine Manufacturing 504,915
2. Electrical Industry 462,699
3. Textile Manufacturing 335,241
4. Automotive and Airplane Manufacturing 253,641
5. Chemical Industry 227,492
6. Dairy 190,813
7. Garment Industry 179,188
8. U.S. Forces *162,309
9. Precision and Optical Instruments 116,498
10. Shoe Manufacturing 84,485
* Includes 41,475 nonappropriated-fund employees and twenty thousand 
estimated domestic employees.
Such employment statistics are not available for the city of 
Zweibruecken for the entire period, but similar statistics were compiled 
1957, and they are complete enough that an understanding of the signifi­
cance of the Americans as employers in the city can be seen for that yea 
The grouping of workers into specific employment categories was not done 
in the same way in Zweibruecken as was done at the state and national 
levels. Several categories of industrial workers and craftsmen were com 
bined, and tpgether they comprised the number one source of employment
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in the c i t y . 17 The U.S. forces stood in f i f t h  place. The rankings for 
1957 are depicted in Table 13.
TABLE 13
TOP FIVE SOURCES OF EMPLOYMENT IN ZWEIBRUECKEN IN 1957
Industrial Groupa
1. Industry and Crafts (includes machine 
and shoe manufacturing and construction)
Number of Employees
5,800
2. Public Employment 2,100
3. Sales, Finance, and Insurance 1,500
4. Agriculture and Forestry 600
5. U.S. Forces *495
*Includes an estimated three hundred private employees.
At this point, it is necessary to point to where the money came from 
to pay the German wages and salaries. During the early phase of the occu­
pation, there was no budgeting for occupation costs paid by the Germans. 
Whatever was needed was requisitioned locally, and it was up to the local 
Buergermeiater to pay the bills. Commencing in the 1951 fiscal year, 
however, the occupation costs paid by the Germans were budgeted at the 
national level, and thus they were recorded. These funds were spent by the 
U.S. forces in Germany in support of the occupation effort. Among other 
things, they were used to pay for the wages and salaries of German 
employees, care and maintenance of displaced persons, and governmental 
functions performed by the occupation force.1® Since the occupation marks 
were spent in Germany, the Germans contributed to their own recovery.
German marks paid by the German government to the Americans and then 
cycled back into the hands of individual Germans were in the amounts shown 
in Table 14 below.
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TABLE 14 
GERMAN MARKS PAID TO THE U.S.A.
FY 1951: 2,470,000,000
FY 1952: 2,760,000,000
FY 1953: 2,760,000,000
FY 1954: 3,179,820,000
FY 1955: 1,479,282,579
FY 1956: 1,022,700,000
FY 1957: 325,000,000
Note that in 1955 the amount of German marks paid to the U.S. forces 
dropped considerably. At this time, obligatory occupation costs ceased and 
defense support payments commenced. However, a sizable residual amount 
remained at the disposal of the U.S. forces, and this residual was spread 
out over the next two years. The amount dropped considerably again in 
1957, when the last of the German marks left over from the occupation were 
gone. Commencing in 1958, the wages and salaries paid to Germans came 
entirely from U.S. appropriated funds.
In the city of Zweibruecken, the Americans were barely noticeable in 
the year 1950. The city was still occupied by the French, but during that 
year it was decided that one caserne, Kreuzberg Kaserne, would be turned 
over to the Americans, and the lead elements of three units were assigned 
there. At various times during the year Americans arrived, and by the end 
of the year it is possible that close to a hundred Americans were in 
Zweibruecken. The hiring of Germans also commenced in 1950. In December, 
1950, 117 Germans were on the U.S. payroll in Zweibruecken.
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Throughout the eleven-year period under consideration, Germans worked 
for Americans stationed at Kreuzberg Kaserne. The number of employees 
ranged from 117 to 256. Thus, the U.S. Army was an important employer in 
Zweibruecken throughout the decade. The recorded yearly figures are shown 
in Table 15.20
TABLE' 15
GERMANS EMPLOYED BY AMERICANS IN ZWEIBRUECKEN 1950-1960
1950: 117
1951: 117
1952: 134
1953: 142
1954: 148
1955: 232
1956: 232
1957: 195
1958: 256
1959: 256
1960: 256
There were, of course, over and above the numbers reflected in the 
tables above, other Germans who derived their livelihood directly from the 
Americans: throughout West Germany, several thousand more received their
pay from nonappropriated-funds. That is, they worked in post exchanges, 
theaters, recreation centers, officers1 clubs, enlisted clubs, service 
clubs, snack bars, laundries, and various other concessions.
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At these concerns, the patrons paid out of their own pockets for what they 
got, and the proceeds were used to cover the costs of operating the con­
cessions, including salaries. Records for the numbers of nonappropriated- 
fund employees are not available for the years prior to 1959, but in 1959, 
there were 34,317; and in 1960, 4 1 , 4 7 5 . An example of how significant 
such employment was to a given area was highlighted in the Stars and 
Stripes newspaper on July 6, 1955. In the Heidelberg, Mannheim, Karlsruhe 
area, 3,500 Germans worked in nonappropriated-fund jobs and collectively 
brought one million German marks into the economy each month. Beyond 
these, there were another several thousand Germans who worked privately for 
American families as housekeepers, maids, cooks, gardeners, and nannies.
It is estimated that at any given time at least twenty thousand Germans 
earned a living by working privately for Americans. In Zweibruecken, 
approximately 150 Germans had private employment in American homes from 
1952 to 1954, and from 1954 to 1960 the figure was close to 300.
Investments Which Benefited Germans
Many Germans found themselves better off as a consequence of the 
American presence. The direct employment discussed above benefited some. 
Others profited through contracting for construction of buildings needed 
to suit the U.S. forces or for the manufacture of products used by U.S. 
personnel.
The American forces moved into casernes previously occupied by the 
German military, but such facilities rarely had houses and apartments to
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accommodate the ever-growing number of American families who came to 
Germany as dependents of the soldiers and civilians who comprised the U.S. 
forces. To try to meet this need, housing was built by German contrac­
tors using German labor, raw materials, and products. In addition to 
housing for families, other housing had to be constructed for bachelor 
officers and senior civilians. Schools for dependent children, chapels, 
signal sites (for communications), and'ordnance projects (ammunition 
storage and maintenance facilities) were other major construction projects 
required by the Americans.
The construction records for the U.S. forces in Germany are on a 
fiscal year basis and cover the period July 1, 1950, to September 30, 1960. 
During this time, 6,183,240,000 German marks were spent on building pro­
jects in West G e r m a n y . 2 2
The most important period of construction in Zweibruecken was short 
but intense. Some modification to existing buildings began in 1950, 
while major construction was done in two phases. The first phase started 
in September, 1951, and ended in late 1953. The projects are shown 
in Table 16.23
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TABLE 16
U.S. CONSTRUCTION IN ZWEIBRUECKEN
Projects Cost in German Marks
Bachelor Officers' Quarters 319,200
Dependent Housing 3,515,400
Signal Sites 1,096,200
Airstrip *1 ,000,000
Ordnance Projects 336,000
Dependent School 155,400
Chapel 126,000
*Paid for with U.S. funds but occupied by the Canadian Air Force
Essentially the second phase involved only dependent housing; 328 
family units were built from 1954 to 1957. The expenditure for this construc­
tion can not be documented but it was certainly substantial. Even assuming 
the same cost per unit that applied in phase one, 13,102,855 German marks 
would have been involved.
During that same time period, 1954-1957, the total amount of money 
generated by industry in the Landkreis of Zweibruecken (not just the city) 
was approximately 500,000,000 German marks. This means that American- 
sponsored construction represented nearly three percent of the total amount 
of money generated by industry in Zweibruecken during those four years.24
As in-all cases throughout Germany, the construction, renovation, or 
rehabilitation of buildings in Zweibrucken were accomplished by German firms
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and workers, and according to German specifications. Zweibruecken contrac­
tors did the work using local laborers. The effect was that Zweibruecken's 
streets were swept clean of the u n e m p l o y e d .25 This was only the second 
time in Zweibruecken*s long history that it had an excess of employment 
opportunities. The first period occurred during the construction of the 
West Wall in the late 1930s.26
As new buildings were constructed and damaged or sub-standard struc­
tures restored, the U.S. forces returned German homes and buildings to 
German control. Commandeering structures to accommodate the occupation was 
necessary, but it potentially damaged German-American relations. With 
the shortage of housing, Germans especially resented American use of apart­
ments. The Statistisches Jahrbuch for 1955 documents the number of German 
apartments held by the occupation forces from 1952 to 1955, when the occu­
pation officially ended. In the American area in 1952, 38,620 German 
apartments were held under occupation authority. When the occupation 
period ended in 1955, this figure had been reduced by 9,915. At that time, 
28,705 German apartments were still held, but the return of nearly 10,000 
apartments to German control had most certainly reduced one source of fric­
tion between the German people and the U.S. forces. A total of 56,230 new 
apartments had been built in the meantime, but the increasing number of 
Americans requiring government housing made it impossible to release more 
units for German occupancy.2? in Zweibruecken no apartments or buildings 
were returned, inasmuch as none had been appropriated by the American for­
ces. Eighty-six percent of the city had been destroyed in the war, and
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Americans first settled in Zweibruecken in late 1951. By that time, it was 
not considered wise or appropriate to commandeer German housing, which had 
been so laboriously reconstructed.
By the end of 1960, in spite of the vigorous construction program, the 
problem of adequate housing for Americans in Germany still had not been 
solved. In October of 1960, the U.S. forces in Germany needed 10,041 more 
sets of family quarters than they had available.28 This meant that many of 
those entitled to government quarters still lived in German apartments as 
private renters. In fact, many Americans had rented privately from German 
landlords since the late 1940s, since there had never been enough sets of 
government quarters to fill the needs of those entitled to them.
Furthermore, some Americans brought their families to Germany at their own 
expense, or married German women and then lived in German apartments. This 
resulted in several thousand Americans paying rent to German landlords. 
Whenever an American married a German, it was normal for the newly married 
couple to live with her family, due to the housing shortage. But, it was 
also normal for the couple to contribute to the household expenses —  rent 
included.
By the end of 1957, over two thousand apartments had been rebuilt in 
Zweibruecken. This did not solve the problem, however, because at the war's 
end the city had been short four thousand apartments, and in the meantime a 
thousand refugees from the east had been added to the population. And, of 
course, the Americans' needs compounded the problem. Americans were able 
to pay higher rents than the Germans, and so exorbitant rents were charged. 
The German landlords frequently used their rental income to build new
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houses, and some justified the high rents with the specious argument that 
the Americans should pay to rebuild the houses they had destroyed in the 
war.29 In Zweibruecken this rationalization was even less valid than else 
where, since the Canadian Air Force had bombed the city —  not the forces 
of the U.S.A.
Procurement (purchases) with appropriated funds was another practice 
which injected American money into the German economy and helped make the 
people more prosperous —  individually and collectively. As already men­
tioned, during the early phase of the occupation the Americans simply took 
what they needed without concern for budgeting or accounting for the value. 
But starting with fiscal year 1951, items procured from the German economy 
became a matter of record. During the succeeding ten years, procurement by 
the U.S. forces from German sources amounted to 95,760,000 German marks.30
Total Monetary Stimulation By The U.S. Forces
All sources considered, the fact that a large number of Americans were 
in Germany had a very definite impact on the economic life of Vest Germany 
and its citizens during the period 1950 to I960. Billions- of dollars were 
poured into Germany from the U.S.A. by the Americans stationed in the 
country and by the military as an institution. The official histories for 
the U.S. European Command contain data indicating the total amounts of 
money spent by the U.S. military in Germany during the years 1953 through 
I960.31
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TABLE 17
MONEY SPENT BY THE D.S. MILITARY IN GERMANY 
1953-1960
Year German Marks
1953: 1,024,800,000
1954: 967,680,000
1955: 1,009,680,000
1956: 1,325,940,000
1957: 1,783,320,000
1958: 2,290,260,000
1959: 2,879,200,000
1960: 2,872,800,000
Accurate yearly figures for the years prior to 1953 cannot be deter­
mined from the available records. Accounting procedures were rough, in some 
cases nonexistent, with expense categories which varied from year to year. 
However, it was estimated in 1953 that the total contributions from V-E 
Day to June 30, 1952, amounted to 1,239,000,000 German M a r k s . 32
Perhaps a look at what percentage of Uest Germany's GNP came from the 
U.S. military is a better means of assessing the impact on the "Economic 
Miracle." Using the figures from Table 17 and West Germany's GNP for each 
year the percentages are as shown in Table 18.33 it is interesting to note 
that the percentage of the American military's contribution to West 
Germany's GNP increased over the course of the decade.
TABLE 18
PERCENTAGE OF WEST GERMAN GNP FROM U.S. FORCES
Calculations: U.S. Forces' Spending - % West German GNP from U.S.
GNP Forces
1953: 1.024.800.000 - .7%
147.700.000.000
1954: 967.680.000 * .6%
158,600,000,000
1955: 1.009.680.000 - .6%
181.400.000.000
1956: 1,325.940.000 - .7%
200.500.000.000
1957: 1,783,320.000 » .8%
218.500.000.000
1958: 2.290.260.000 » .9%
234.300.000.000
1959: 2,879.200,000 = 1.1%
254.900.000.000
1960: 2.872.800,000 - 1.0%
302.300.000.000
The entire amount from 1945 through 1960 is 15,392,680,000 German 
marks. When this amount is compared with the 5,654,040,000 German marks 
contributed by the Marshall Plan, its significance is even more obvious.
Thus it can be seen that, when viewed as a single entity, the U.S. 
military was making a substantial contribution to the West German economy 
while at the same time serving as a protector of the country. It should 
also be noted that a multiplier effect was present. That is, the above 
figures represent only the "first use" of the money involved. The money 
was subsequently spent again and again after being put into circulation, 
thereby making more people wealthier and the end effect even greater.
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Chapter 5 
Reconstruction of Education
The Schools
During the period of the Third Reich, the schools in Germany had 
changed markedly. National Socialist educators made their first 
move to eliminate democratic thought from the schools by pasting slips over 
some of the pages of books which conveyed such free ideas. Sometimes the 
slips bore new passages in line with National Socialist doctrine, but on 
other occasions, they were simply blank strips of paper. As time passed, 
however, the offending books were removed from the classrooms and shredded. 
New books which purveyed Nazi ideology took their place in the German 
school system. These new books stressed the role of the Hitlerjugend and 
cultivated nationalistic and militaristic tendencies. Hitler, Goering, 
Goebbels and other Nazi leaders were idealized. History was twisted to 
convince students that Germany’s development had been perfected under 
Hitler's guiding hand; among other things, young people were taught that 
the ancient Greeks had really been Aryans and therefore the racial and 
intellectual ancestors of the modern Germans.* In other words, the books 
used by the schools in Hitler's Germany were little more than instruments 
for the politicization of German youth —  with little or no regard for hu­
manistic or scientific teaching.2 The books produced under the auspices of 
the National Socialists were the products of writers who conformed to Nazi
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ideology and who were effectively sealed off from the outside world; there 
was no chance for the books to reflect any other philosophy.
Even before the war's end, the Allies had decided to democratize 
Germany, so such books had to be removed from the schools.3 The decision 
was further cemented in Allied policy by the Potsdam Declaration which 
stated, "German education shall be controlled completely to eliminate Nazi 
and militaristic doctrines and to make possible the successful development 
of democratic ideas.
Thus a total purge of all National Socialist literature was required,
and replacements had to be provided. This proved to be a very large task,
but it was only one of several problems which had to be solved. The
schools themselves stood in shambles; in the U.S. Zone, one fifth of the
school rooms had been destroyed, and an equal number had been severely 
damaged. Furthermore, the teachers had to be screened to eliminate Nazis 
from the classrooms. Beyond the shortage of books, facilities, and teachers, 
there was insufficient food to provide students and teachers with a diet 
adequate for academic pursuits, while clothing was similarly in short 
supply.5
It actually took several years to replace all the books, but enough 
books were produced early to allow the operation of the schools. The 
replacement of books was accomplished by looking to a number of different 
sources. Since the Allies had anticipated the need for new books even 
before the end of the war, some had been located, printed, and stocked
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during the winter and spring of 1944 and 1945. Forty thousand sets of 
books were produced by reprinting, in Germany, texts dating from the Weimar 
period and purified versions of some books issued during Hitler's reign. 
This course of action had the advantage of providing German children with 
approved books written by Germans and published in Germany. Thus, the 
Allies protected themselves against accusations that they were importing 
propaganda. The Americans were particularly careful to support the idea 
that the Germans had to re-educate themselves based on democratic prin­
ciples.^ The books provided were somewhat dated, lacked the latest pedago­
gical ideas, were printed on poor-quality paper, and were insufficient in 
numbers, but they helped solve the problem.
In the spring of 1945, 5,328,616 copies of various books were printed 
in Munich for use in the U.S. Zone, the Bremen enclave, and the U.S. sector 
of Berlin. The Munich printing consisted of a series of twenty volumes 
containing eight readers, five arithmetic books, three history texts, and 
four books on nature study. With this printing, students throughout the 
American-controlled areas were able to return to their studies, but the 
books available still fell far short of the total requirements, so the 
search continued. Additional suitable texts were found in Switzerland and 
France —  and even in Germany, where some usable books had been overlooked 
in the Nazi campaign to divest German schools of democratically oriented 
texts. Whenever books which German authorities thought suitable were 
located, they had to be approved by the U.S. Military Government before 
being used.7
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As time passed, new books which met the standards of the American 
authorities were written in Germany. Each new book had to be approved and 
licensed for publication. Table 19 indicates the number of books licensed 
and published in Germany under the control of the U.S. Military Government 
for use in the U.S. Zone.®
TABLE 19
LICENSED TEXTBOOKS PUBLISHED IN GERMANY 
UNDER U.S. MILITARY GOVERIMS NT CONTROL 
1945-1949
Year T i d e s Copies
1945 3 38,000
1946 55 862,481
1947 172 5,395,116
1948 480 12,608,094
1949 949 14,002,520
To accelerate the writing of textbooks, the U.S. Military Government 
established curriculum and textbook writing centers. These centers pro­
vided German writers with American reference works, magazines, newspapers, 
textbooks, and other research aids. The centers were supervised by 
Americans, who directed the work of the German writers.9 Many of the books 
produced according to American wishes were used in German schools until the 
middle of the 1960s. One two-volume work on history written in 1952,
Damals Und Heute, used in the fifth through the eighth grades in the 
Volksschulen in Baden-Wuerttemberg, contained the following account of 
Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia:
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Hitler's Excesses Started World War II. Hitler had assured the 
English Foreign Minister: "Germany desires no additional terri­
tory. We do not want the Czechs." And what happened? German 
soldiers occupied Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, Moravians, 
Bohemians, and Slovaks, were all included. The German people 
did not feel good about this use of force. The government had 
broken the Munich agreement. After that, what other country could 
believe or trust Hitler and his government?^
And the horrors of Hitler's regime were given the following treatment:
German men and women wanted to overthrow Hitler. [In 1944,
Germans were saying] Hitler and his power must go. "He has 
misused the great industrious German people for objectionable 
purposes. He has caused millions to be in need and disgraced the 
state. The secret police (Gestapo) have murdered millions of 
Jews." They were Hitler's willing tools. At home and in the 
occupied areas, they herded Jewish men, women, and children into 
forced-labor camps and tortured them to death. Only a few Germans 
knew of this horror. Nobody wanted to believe in these atroci­
ties, even though a considerable portion of the German people had 
already turned privately from Hitler. But there was no free 
speech, no free press. Whoever spoke openly or preached was put 
in a concentration camp.H
While this rendition of history offered to the students excuses for 
the German people, it at least told them of Hitler's criminality and how 
the Nazi state repressed freedom. Through such lessons the German people 
were supposed to come to grips with their past. The Americans made certain 
that a reasonably accurate version of history was included in the books, 
but oftentimes the teachers did not cover the period of the Third Reich in 
class. Information was there, but it was up to the students themselves to 
read it.
The shortage of teachers called for drastic measures as well. The 
denazification process removed nearly seventy percent of the elementary 
school teachers in the U.S. Zone; this left only fifty thousand politically 
acceptable teachers, with the majority of them being close to sixty years
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of age.' To compensate for this massive loss, teachers were recruited from 
other professions, and an emergency training program for teachers was ini­
tiated. Forty training centers were opened where twenty thousand new 
teachers had been trained by 1948. This was in addition to those 
recruited from other professions, who also went through the training 
program.12 >fhe training centers concentrated on giving the teachers an 
appreciation for democratic ideals and teaching them the necessity of 
inculcating such ideals in German youth.
Another far-reaching change encouraged by the Americans was the reduc­
tion of social stratification in the German school system. The U.S. 
Military Government viewed as undemocratic the practice of allowing stu­
dents who were favored economically or socially to pursue studies at the 
university while others were essentially condemned to trade schools 
or menial careers regardless of ability or inclination. While serving as 
the Chairman of the U.S. Education Mission to Germany in 1946, George F. 
Zook, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, sent a report to 
the Secretary of State which described the break up of the caste system in 
Germany as "the hardest and the longest of all our responsibilities in 
Germany, and in the long run the most decisive." The system's fault, 
according to the U.S. Education Mission was that:
At the end of the fourth grade of elementary school, or about age 
10, a small group that is destined for the universities and the 
professions is set apart in secondary schools which then separate 
them for advanced work. In practice, the financial or social 
position of the parents is, to an overwhelming extent, the basis 
of selection for these secondary schools. The overwhelming 
majority of pupils, a large proportion of whom deserve university 
education because of their ability, finish elementary school and 
then go on to vocational education, their adult potentialities
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frustrated by the early and undemocratic division of the educa­
tional stream...this system has cultivated attitudes of 
superiority in one small group and of inferiority in the majority 
of the members of German society, making possible the submission 
and lack of self-determination upon which authoritarian leadership 
has thrived. Such caste distinctions in education, based on 
money and position rather than on promise of achievement, consti­
tute a violation of the fundamental democratic doctrine of equal 
opportunity.
To correct this situation, the mission advocated several changes.
The mission recommends for Germany a unified and comprehensive 
(although not over-centralized) educational system open to all up 
to the university level; with secondary schools, tuition free, 
following consecutively after the primary schools, and embracing 
vocational education.13
Thus, one of the principal changes originally advocated by the Americans was 
the introduction of a single school system, termed either an Einheitsschule 
or a Gesamtschule, which would provide all German students the same elemen­
tary and high school education. But this change was ultimately rejected.
Returning emigres and other German educators from the former opposi­
tion were willing partners in the effort to reconstruct the school system, 
but they often disagreed on the extent and nature of reforms. For example, 
they differed over whether or not to introduce guidance counselors, as 
recommended by the Americans. Some of the problems arose because many 
of the educators found their knowledge dated; a decade, more or less, had 
lapsed since they had last practiced, and they had not kept pace with the 
state of the art.l^ They distrusted radical innovation. On the other 
hand, some of the Germans had advocated greater democratization of the 
schools during the pre-Hitler days.15 The educators disagreed about the 
recommended unitary school organization, and in the end, the traditional
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system was retained. This result was influenced by the sheer weight of 
tradition both in education per se and in society at large. In spite of 
the democratizing efforts, Germany still had its elites.
When it became obvious to the Americans that German educators intended 
to retain the tripartite school system, the Americans sought at least to 
extend the common elementary school from four to six years; at the end of 
that time, students would decide for either a purely academically oriented 
high school or some type of vocationally oriented high school.^ This pro­
posal met with considerable resistance from German educators because they 
saw it not as a lengthening of the elementary school but rather as a short­
ening of the time available for gifted students in the academically 
oriented Gymnasium. T h e  six-year elementary school was accepted only in 
Schleswig- Holstein, Bremen, Hamburg, West Berlin, and H e s s e . *8 The 
Americans also advanced the idea of extending mandatory, full-time attend­
ance for the academically oriented students from twelve to thirteen years; 
in this matter they were supported by many German educators. During the 
Third Reich, the period of mandatory attendance for such students had been 
shortened from thirteen to twelve; thus, the change constituted a restora­
tion of the Weimar s t a n d a r d . j n the end, as far as school organization 
was concerned, all West German schools, except those in West Berlin, 
reverted to the Weimar practice of four years of elementary school followed 
by either nine years of academically oriented high school or some type of 
shorter, vocationally oriented school. In any event, it became necessary 
for most students to go to school on a full-time basis for nine years —  as 
opposed to eight years as required under the Third Reich.^0
The U.S. Education Mission also suggested that a program be set up to
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allow German students and teachers to travel to America to study and 
observe democratic principles in practice. The mission stated that young 
Germans should be encouraged to participate in group activities, largely 
self-directed, and that Germans should have expanded opportunities to study 
and discuss social, economic, and political affairs through adult education 
programs. The goal of having German students study in America was facili­
tated by the advent of the Fulbright Scholarship program. This program, 
which was enthusiastically received in Germany, involved over thirty 
thousand students and had .a very large impact on German views of the U.S.A. 
and the American version of democracy. Study in the United States con­
ditioned people, many of whom were later to be influential, to think in 
American terms or along American lines. Fulbright scholars subsequently 
returned to Germany and taught others who in turn taught still others; 
thus, the effect of American education on the Germans was multiplied.21
The U.S. Education Mission provided neither the first nor the last 
report on what America should do to reform the German school system. The 
findings of numerous American educators were printed in various journals, 
magazines, and newspapers, but the Mission presented basically the same 
themes found elsewhere. These views were accepted by the American authori­
ties, and changes were pursued on the basis of them.
The U.S. Military Government sought to remain true to the essential 
procedures for educational reform which evolved as a consequence of such 
early analysis. In 1950, the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner reaf­
firmed America's commitment to the philosophy of democratization in
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"A Guide to Education and Cultural Relations":
1. The only certain method of establishing a society based 
on the democratic ideal is to avoid terms which can be misunder­
stood, and by practice, precept, and demonstration lead the German 
people to accept this ideal.
2. The true reorientation of the German people will come 
from within. It will be spiritual and moral. The types of 
school organization or structure, for example, are of less 
importance to the future of Germany and the world than what is 
taught, how it is taught, and by whom it is taught. Reforms 
imposed from without are temporary and lead to a return to pre­
vious practices.
3. The solution to the so-called German problem will be 
more readily attained when we recognize that it is a European 
and, in many ways, a world problem - one of moral disorientation 
in an era of profound social change.
4. It will not be the purpose of Military Government to 
superimpose an American system of education on the German people. 
It is our purpose to influence the German people to an 
understanding that the education of children and youth should be 
so organized and developed that:
a. Each individual regardless of race, class, creed or 
economic status shall have equal access to education;
b. Each individual shall be allowed to pursue that form 
or type of educational opportunity for which he is endowed;
c. Each individual shall be so educated as to enable him 
to make his maximum contribution toward the maintenance of world 
peace and international understanding, law and order, and the 
development of social justice.
5. Provision for the training of a corps of democratically 
minded teachers and leaders is of primary necessity.
6. Effective and durable educational reform will come in 
Germany when the people recognize, and those who speak for the 
people realize, that free institutions and the natural rights of 
man can best be perpetuated through an educational system which 
places major emphasis upon the development of moral respon­
sibility, education for freedom, and education for responsible 
citizenship.
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7. Education for responsible citizenship involves not only 
the basic knowledge of the history of the past, but also the 
knowledge of how to act intelligently and independently in the 
solution of contemporary problems. It involves not only book 
knowledge but the opportunity to learn how to protect freedom by 
experiencing freedom in school organizations, in the free flow 
of ideas, and in the capacity and courage of the individual to 
make decisions.
8. We must not be guilty of attempting to develop the ideal, 
but must concentrate our efforts and resources on changes which 
have meaning to the Germans and which are possible to realize 
within the not-too-distant future.
9. The redirection of the goals, programs, or policies of 
social institutions must grow from the German people. Wide citi­
zen participation in community planning, in the discussion of com­
munity problems, and in the formulation of public policy is one 
guarantee that no single individual again can dominate their 
thinking and living.22
The American intention, as stated here, was virtually to rebuild the 
German school system along American lines with Germans carrying out the 
work but with Americans making the decisions on policy.23 This had the 
advantages of giving the Germans a measure of responsibility for their own 
development and making minimal personnel demands on the U.S.A. The reforms 
were intended to affect every level of education with the greatest 
influence being exercised at the lower levels. The reform measures were 
intended to make the school system more democratic. The desired degree of 
success was never achieved due to ingrained German resistance based on 
faith in traditional education.24 Nevertheless, the existing evidence 
indicates that some progress was achieved. The elementary school system 
was later judged to be thoroughly d e m o c r a t i c . 25 Moreover, a measure of 
democratization can be seen if the number of university students from 
wage-earning families shortly after the war is compared with those a 
generation later. In 1952, only four percent of German university
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students came from the wage-earning classes. By 1979, that figure had 
grown to seventeen percent.26
Early in the decade of the fifties, a British publication, the 
International Yearbook of Education, featured an assessment of the changes 
that had been wrought throughout Western Germany's school system. The 
assessment was submitted to the XIV International Conference on Public 
Education by Mr. E. Loeffler, a delegate from West Germany. Mr. Loeffler 
reported that, "Sole responsibility for the legislation and administration 
of schools and universities is in the hands of the various states (Laender) 
composing the German Federal Republic." This meant that the Allied goal of 
decentralizing the control of schools had been accomplished. The goal of 
decentralization had been articulated in the Aide-Memoire of November 22, 
1948, which advised the Parliamentary Council of Allied preferences with 
respect to the Basic Law. In addition, Mr. Loeffler indicated in his 
assessment that, "most schools and universities have been reorganized at 
the request of the occupation authorities." It should be noted that every 
Kreis had an American Resident Officer who oversaw the schools.27 The 
assessment claimed that among the reforms accomplished were:
1. Foreign language instruction commenced in the primary school.
This statement was somewhat misleading; at the time, primary schools in 
some states had been extended to six years; however, students were not 
learning foreign languages any earlier in life. Nevertheless, emphasis had 
changed. Before the war, French had been the leading foreign language in 
German schools, but after 1945, English replaced French as the first 
foreign language. It was taught in the fifth year of school as an elective 
in some institutions, while in others it was mandatory.26
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2. Mandatory attendance in primary schools had been extended to eight; 
or nine years with a minimum of two or three years of part-time study 
beyond that. The length of full-time study has already been addressed 
abovej but it can be added that, in actuality, German students had long been 
required to attend school on a full-time basiB for eight years, although 
this rule had not been enforced very well during the Hitler years since 
memberb of the Hitler Youth had often been excused from classes so that 
they could tend to their duties in that youth group. But the ninth year of 
mandatory full-time study was a real change.^9
3. All primary school teachers had to be at least enrolled in a uni­
versity, or to have passed an equivalent exam. The National Socialists had 
reduced training for elementary school teachers to only two years beyond 
the eight-year elementary school, with one of those two years spent in a
student-teacher capacity. During the Weimar years, elementary school
teachers had been required to have studied at least four semesters at a 
Paedagogische Akademie. So although this postwar reform represented an 
improvement over the Nazi standards, it did not restore the Weimar 
standard. In reality, newly graduated teachers were either approaching the
old, higher standard or exeeding it, as was the case at the Pedagogical
Institute of the University of H a m b u r g . 30
4. Special instructorships and academies had been established to 
train teachers on the problems of democratic education and to familiarize
them with advances in science and teaching.
5. Positions for school psychologists had been created in several
towns, and instruction in psychology and educational guidance established.
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The credit for change implied here was considerably overstated at the time. 
School psychologists and guidance counselors did indeed become standard 
features in German schools —  but not until the 1960s. When they were 
added, however, the addition was attributed to American influence.
6. Exchange programs for students had been set up between West 
Germany and the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.A., and Sweden.-*2
7. Education was free in all states for primary and vocational 
schools. In many schools, all education, materials, and texts were free.33
8. Adult education programs, the Volkshochschulen, had increased con­
siderably both the variety and number of courses.34
Beyond these advances, parent-teachers' associations had been founded, 
elected school boards had been introduced, schools had been rebuilt, 
libraries had been added, and slides, maps, and other teaching aids had 
been provided.35 Subject matter, too, was influenced by the Americans.
The most important reform in curriculum content was the introduction of 
social studies, defined as those subjects which deal with the problem of 
men living together in society. Although the subjects of history, 
geography, and civics had long been taught in German schools, the concept 
of social studies as known in America was first added to the curriculum in 
Germany in 1947, at American insistence. Social studies was such a novel 
idea that German educators could not agree on what to call it or where to 
place it in the curriculum; it was variously termed: Politische
Gemeinschaftskunde, Politische Bildung, Gemeinschaftskunde, Sozialkunde, 
and Politische Bildung und Erziehung. Under the rubric of "social 
studies," German educators were instructed to make certain that students 
learned about the Third Reich.36
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For the first several years after the war, teachers were reluctant to 
discuss the the atrocities of the Hitler regime; accounts were printed in 
the text books, but discussions were limited or nonexistent. Inquiring 
students were faced with the problem of either not getting a correct answer 
or being put off.37 Xo correct this situation, the Laender passed legisla­
tion which specified that the period of the Third Reich had to be covered 
in the classroom.38
How the school books were changed at the direction of the Allies has 
already been addressed, but it is important to point out that the impetus 
which originated during the time of the occupation carried forward, and by
1962 a number of books and other publications which treated the period of
National Socialism in a frank manner were in use in German schools. For 
example, in 1961, the city council of Frankfurt published a brochure for
Frankfurt schools which contained the following indictment:
With tiresome regularity in conversations about con­
centration camps and Jewish persecutions one hears the 
assertion, "But I knew nothing about it." . . . This is 
an absurd statement. Hundreds of thousands of Germans were 
involved, directly and indirectly. . . .  We will concede 
to our most naive fellow-citizens that they knew nothing 
of this before 1933. . . . But after the pogrom of 
November 1938 we can make this concession only to the 
weakminded. For in all of Germany the synagogues were 
burning, one waded in blood and debris, and even in the
smallest villages one heard the cry of the persecuted and
the tortured. . . • Everyone who lived in Germany at
that time must have seen this or heard of it . . . let us
not, I beg you, quibble whether it was really six million 
Jews who were murdered. . . . Consider rather that a 
single murder sanctioned by the state puts the right of 
that state to exist in question.39
The universities, too, felt the impact of America's guiding hand, but 
the reforms in higher education were less extensive than at the lower levels.
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At the beginning of the occupation, the Americans viewed the German institu­
tions of higher learning as breeding grounds for fascism. Re-education was 
seen as necessary, but just as elsewhere, the Germans were supposed to carry 
out the reforms based on general guidelines provided by the Americans. 
However, the guidelines were so broad that the Germans were left with a 
great deal of latitude, questions, and problems. The Americans never set 
detailed rules for reform of higher education because they hoped for a four- 
power agreement which would establish uniformity in a democratically 
oriented system. The Americans, however, did stress the release of person­
nel with a Nazi past and the purging of books; German educators agreed to 
these two measures, but they insisted on retaining the traditional forms 
of organization. When the institutions reopened, they had too few books, 
facilities, and teachers. The teacher problem was the most important since 
training time was so much longer than that required to replace books 
or facilities. The Americans had originally divided teachers and admin­
istrators into three categories and put them on black, gray, or white 
lists according to their previous degree of affiliation with National 
Socialism. Those on the black list were absolutely prohibited from 
employment. Those on the gray list could be employed if investigated and 
cleared. And those on the white list were accepted without further 
questioning. However, the teacher shortage proved to be too great, and 
more and more people who had been banned were reinstated. It has been 
estimated that by the middle of the 1950s, nearly all of the personnel 
banned earlier had been rehired. Nazi books were taken out of the univer­
sity libraries and classrooms just as in the rest of the educational 
system, and new books were provided. Some of those books were still on the
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shelves of university libraries in 1983.^
To ensure that the universities complied with the Allied dictum that 
democratization would take place, an American University Officer was placed 
in each university.
The universities went one step further than the other schools in that 
they used American professors to augment their own faculties, particularly 
in the social sciences. This was an exception to the American policy that 
American teachers would not be used in German classrooms.41
It is also worth noting that university students had to contribute 
labor to the reconstruction of the buildings. Each student was expected to 
work for a given period of time, usually about two hours each school day. 
This work was done without pay.
Other Re-educational Programs
The United States did not limit its efforts to the U.S. Zone alone. In 
order to assist on a broader scale, a Special Projects Program was 
inaugurated; it used GARI0A (Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas) 
funds, and reached into every state and the city of Berlin. This program 
increased the welfare, health, education,and general democratization of the 
people of West Germany. Schools, libraries, universities, youth and com­
munity centers, youth hostels, health centers, welfare institutions, and 
cultural centers all benefited —  and so did their patrons. By February of 
1952, when the U.S. High Commissioner reported on the extent of the Special
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Projects Program, 52,710,857 German marks had been contributed. Without 
the U.S. sponsorship, many of the facilities would not have been built, and 
the effectiveness of all the others would have been greatly reduced. 42 The 
facilities and institutions which benefited from the Special Projects 
Program contributed to the growth of democracy and the acceptance of 
America as a role model for a widespread segment of the German population.
In order to reach people who might not otherwise have heard the 
message of democracy, the U.S. authorities developed the Audio-Visual 
Educational Program; this was intended to provide large numbers of Germans 
in rural areas with the opportunity to gain a new insight into the demo­
cratic world. Traveling discussion leaders armed with projectors and films 
met with Germans in schools, restaurants, and churches and introduced them 
to democratic ideas. Records were kept which show that from April 1, 1948, 
to March 31, 1950, 23,579,607 Germans attended these film and discussion 
sessions.^3
As an adjunct to school reform, educational radio was reintroduced in 
Germany. It had been used earlier during the Weimar period with some suc­
cess, and Hitler had used radio rather successfully to spread propaganda. 
The reintroduction came shortly after the end of the war in order to hplp 
compensate for the shortage of teachers, classrooms, and books. U.S. con­
sultants came to Germany at the invitation of the military government and 
assisted German radio and education specialists in putting the program 
together. Certainly, there were German experts, but they were tainted by 
their Nazi past. During the early 1950s, about sixty percent of all the 
schools in the U.S. Zone used radio programs in their classrooms on a
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regular basis* Five radio stations in the U.S.-occupied area broadcast 
education programs totaling over 160 hours per month. Many of the radios 
used in the classrooms were donated by Americans. The military government, 
for example, purchased one thousand sets from a German manufacturer and 
donated them to the German schools.^
The school reform was never intended to stand alone; it was not an end 
in itself. The revised school system was intended to facilitate industrial 
prosperity and social solidarity in a democratic context. To complement the 
formal educational system, several other social institutions were revamped 
or introduced to reorient the Germans. Youth activities (such as those 
already mentioned), exchange programs, libraries, and trade unions were all 
instruments for education.
Youth activities were perceived by the American authorities as being 
particularly important because, if properly supervised, they would teach 
young people to accept the duties and responsibilities of citizenship; 
ironically this was the same basic philosophy that had guided the National 
Socialists. In addition to the help and guidance given through the German 
Youth Activities Program discussed above, the U.S. occupation forces also 
sponsored leadership training schools for German youths. Five of these 
schools were operational by 1950, and 10,740 young Germans had been trained 
in the principles of group organization and leadership. Besides these 
schools, the U.S. authorities also sponsored 130 youth hostels and summer 
camping programs that saw 435,000 young Germans take part.^-*
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Through the exchange programs, American experts on a wide variety of 
subjects came to Germany, and Germans (in search of American methods) went 
to America. Thousands of persons traveled back and forth between the two 
countries, observing, teaching, learning, and evaluating. The military 
government actively supported the exchange of persons, having been given 
the charter to do so on July 11, 1947, when the U.S. State, War, and Navy 
Departments sent to General Clay the following directive.
In furtherance of the programs of the reorientation of the German 
people and the revival of international cultural relations, you 
will permit and assist the travel into and out of Germany of per­
sons useful for this program within the availability of your 
facilities. You will also permit and assist to the extent of 
your facilities, the free flow of cultural materials to and from 
Germany.46
The first academic group went to the U.S.A. in September, 1948. This 
was a group of students who went there to study for one year. Professional 
people, technicians, businessmen, religious leaders, trade unionists, and 
leaders in women's organizations (to name a few) followed. The program was 
turned over to the State Department in 1950, and concurrent with the 
transfer from the U.S. Military Government to the State Department, an eval­
uation of the program was made. The evaluation concluded that the German 
participants had done, and would continue to do, a great deal of good once 
back in Germany. German exchangees returned to their home towns prepared 
to improve human relations, add to an active community life, support self- 
government, and cope with individual responsibilities.47
However, there was usually an element of caution involved, as the 
following example illustrates. One representative exchange visit of a 
group of German educators was reported in Social Education in 1950. The
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account tells how the German teachers were impressed with, "the informality 
and friendliness of the classroom procedures —  the degree to which 
democracy is actually practiced..." They were puzzled by the way in which 
teachers and students discussed issues without the students being told what 
to believe. According to their American hosts, "The concept of initiating 
the student's thinking but letting him reach his own conclusion had not 
before occurred to our guests." The lessons were evidently valuable, as 
the Germans stated they intended to put them into practice once back home. 
However, they cautioned their hosts, "We must work slowly and quietly; we 
must not attempt to Americanize German schools, but must adapt American 
methods to meet German needs." This was a way of pointing out that the 
Germans, once given the tools and the opportunity, were capable of 
reforming themselves. It also reflected the fact that the importation of 
cut-and-dried remedies was likely to breed resentment.^®
The exchange of persons was important enough that a Fulbright Lecturer 
in Germany, Or. Thomas N. Bonner, was able to describe it in glowing terms 
in 1957:
No other investment of American money abroad has paid such high 
dividends in understanding as the interchange of American stu­
dents, teachers and research specialists with their counterparts 
in other lands.
The America Houses
One of the means of re-educating the Germans most familiar to the 
public was the system of America Houses that made information on American 
culture and democratic life readily available to millions of Germans. Each 
house had an American cultural adviser as its director and a German staff.
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The basic feature in each house's operation was the library. Here Germans 
could avail themselves of American encyclopedias, dictionaries, and other 
reference works. Each library also had a collection of books on the 
various aspects of American and Western European culture; this usually 
included many of the books banned by the Third Reich. Most works were in 
English, but translations in German of American literary works were 
provided. About twenty percent of the available books were in German. In 
1951, when the program was in its heyday, there were twenty-seven U.S. 
Information Centers (America Houses) distributed throughout Germany, each 
with its own central library, and 135 branch libraries or, as they were 
commonly called, "American Reading Rooms." Collectively, these facilities 
were serving over one million patrons per month.50 in addition to books, 
they featured lectures, music programs, exhibits, films, theatrical 
productions, and discussion groups. The activities were designed to 
stimulate knowledge and understanding of and sympathy with American 
democratic ideals and cultural patterns. In 1952, an America House was 
established in Kaiserslautern. It served the Zweibruecken area as well.
The Kaiserslautern House is credited by the people of Zweibruecken 
with having done a great deal to enhance mutual understanding. It served 
the German community which housed the largest '• concentration of Americans in 
Europe, although in the French Zone, and the types of questions regularly 
referred to it indicated that the Germans were interested in knowing more 
about their guests. Questions on American government, American per­
sonalities, American homes, and American life and society were among the 
most common. The library in the Kaiserslautern America House contained
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12,907 volumes in 1959, mostly books on the social sciences, useful arts, 
fine arts and recreation, ancient and modern history, and fiction. The 
house featured all of the educational and cultural advantages of the 
America House program, and articles on it appeared periodically in the 
Zweibruecken newspapers.
It seems that the people of Zweibruecken took advantage of the America 
House itself only occasionally, due to the fact that it was about a forty- 
mile round-trip from Zweibruecken. However, the America House frequently 
brought programs to the people of Zweibruecken. The Volkshochschule in 
Zweibruecken worked with the America House to bring lectures, films, and 
concerts to Zweibruecken. From 1953 until 1960, events on such subjects 
as "The History and Development of American Literature," "A trip through 
the U.S.A.," "City Planning in America," "The American Satellite Project," 
and "Readings from Thomas Wolfe" were featured in Zweibruecken. The 
Bibliotheca Bipontina (library in Zweibruecken) also worked with the 
America House to inform the people of Zweibruecken on famous 
German-Americans.51
The America Houses were patronized by Germans of all classes and walks 
of life. In May of 1960, the U.S. Information Service produced a special 
report which revealed information on the nature of visitors to the 
America House libraries. The report, "The America House Libraries: Who
are the readers? What do they read? How well are they served?" was based 
on a three-month survey of six libraries in late 1959.52 Table 20 shows 
the professions of those visitors who borrowed books.
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TABLE 20
REGISTERED BORROWERS OF BOOKS BY PROFESSION
Borrower by Profession Z Total
Students 37.5
White Collar Workers 16.4
Young People 11.4
Workers 9*6
Housewives 7.2
Foreigners 5.8
Professionals 5.0
Educators 2.7
Government Officials 1.6
All others combined 2.8
Even though the libraries filled a vital need, the books were not 
always warmly received. The managers sometimes had to cope with indignant 
readers. Regardless of how much care they exercised to keep out books 
which contained offensive, name-calling, some slipped through, and occa­
sionally German readers were insulted by uncomplimentary references to 
Germans. But perhaps even more surprising to German patrons was the fact 
that the libraries even offered materials critical of the United States. 
The American libraries in Bavaria addressed both types of problems by 
posting in the libraries a disclaimer of sorts. Visitors to the libraries 
were advised that:
If a book is critical of us, our beliefs, our customs, or the 
beliefs or customs of other peoples...[it] does not mean that we 
are ignorant of its contents, or indifferent....The people of the 
U.S. who support this library believe that only when authors may 
freely write and readers may freely read, can all acquire the
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background and develop the understanding necessary to an intelli­
gent, mature, and constructive approach to the problems of the 
work and its people.53
Nor were the people in outlying areas neglected. The larger libraries 
operated mobile libraries by loading books on trucks and taking them to 
readers who otherwise would not have had access to them.
Germans used the libraries on their own initiative or as the result of 
having been introduced to them through schools, civic, social, or cultural 
organizations. Specialized bibliographies were often compiled and sent to 
doctors, housing officials, members of the press, and other interested per­
sons. Universities, too, took advantage of the services offered by these 
libraries. The office of the U.S. High Commissioner reported in 1950 that, 
"Collections of scientific, historical, and literary works are placed on 
loan to the many universities which have been handicapped by a critical 
shortage of these publications." Many struggling German students used 
these books at no cost. The availability alone was often significant, and 
the fact that they were free made them even more valuable to students who
were striving hard for enough money even to eat.
Another feature of the America Houses which cultivated good feelings 
among the Germans was the emphasis on young people. The larger houses had 
children*'s rooms, films, and libraries. It was not uncommon for German
schools to pay visits to the America Houses or to ask for help in
supplementing their classes with films or lectures. And the houses regu­
larly sponsored English conversation classes for both children and adults.
The America Houses had programs for women also. They conducted
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special "Women's Hours," supported women’s organizations with organizational 
help and meeting rooms and actively encouraged German-American Women's 
Clubs, Parent-Teachers' Associations, and parents' meetings.54
The American authorities believed that contact with American culture 
through the America Houses increased America's prestige in the eyes of the 
Germans. And indeed, next to travel to the U.S.A. itself, the America 
Houses provided Germans with the best opportunity to understand American 
culture and tradition. Besides literature, American art exhibits and musi­
cal programs were media through which Germans were taught that America is 
not a cultural wasteland. In these institutions, literally millions of 
Germans, male and female, young and old, from all walks of life came into 
contact with "America," and many were stimulated enough by the experience 
to return again and again or at least to be more open to the ideas of 
democracy and the merits of capitalism. On the other hand, some persons 
undoubtedly looked upon the America Houses as nothing more than another 
feature of the foreign occupation worthy of only a minor amount of 
curiosity. In late 1954, about half of the Germans in the West knew about 
the America Houses, and of those who were aware, eighty-four percent 
could give specific information on what the America houses offered.55
As an indication of how valuable the Germans considered the America 
Houses to be, in June, 1951, when the German press began to report that 
America was planning on reducing the size of the program, people throughout 
Germany protested vigorously. The U.S. High Commissioner reported 
receiving many letters "stressing the immense value and importance of the 
America House" to the respective communities. An expansion rather than a
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reduction was requested , and the U.S. officials in the different states 
similarly reported a public outcry of objection to the proposed cut-back on 
information from America. Nevertheless, the program was adjusted. Many of
the reading rooms were turned over to the Germans or phased out, while a
number of houses were converted to German-American Institutes, moved or 
closed. Some new ones were also opened, as the entire program was in a 
state of flux for several years.
On February 22, 1952, the Minister President of North Rhine-
Westphalia, Karl Arnold, described the importance of the opening of the new
America House in Essen in terms which echoed the sentiments of those who 
had voiced objection to the announced reduction a few months earlier:
Thanks to this America House and the media through which infor­
mation will be put at our disposal, we shall no longer be 
obliged to see the world through the eyes of foreign observers, 
but will be enabled to judge many aspects of world problems for 
ourselves. Here, American literature, American science, American 
music and American culture are made directly accessible to us, 
and documentary films will give us an impressive idea of the New 
World, its people and its activities. This House shall be a 
meeting place where ideas can be exchanged freely; it will show 
us the way to form opinions of our own, free from compromise of 
any kind.
During the same opening ceremony, Mr. Christian Fette, head of the German 
Trade Union Federation, stated that the house would "give its German visi­
tors a view of the democratic way of life." He went on to say that it 
"will be of great importance to the growth of democracy in our country.
Twenty-six years later, from an historical perspective, similar acco­
lades were still being heaped upon the America Houses by public officials. 
In December, 1978, Reinhold Zundel, the Lord Mayor of Heidelberg, penned
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the following words:
The city of Heidelberg has more than thirty years of good 
experience with the German-American Institute our "America 
House." In both quiet and less quiet times, the institute has 
served as an international meeting place. The transition to a 
German-American Institute has provided for special consideration 
of reciprocity and mutuality., it will always be a special con­
cern that the German-American Institute remains as a forum for 
German-American friendship, and for the deepening and broadening 
of the understanding between the United States of America and the 
Federal Republic of Germany.57
Re-education through the Trade Unions
The trade unions entered into the schooling process by developing 
their own programs for vocational education, influencing persons to par­
ticipate in more academic programs, and teaching the people to think in 
union terms. Adult trade schools were established in conjunction with 
industrial firms and the Volkshochschulen. The union schools provided 
courses in commerce and specific occupational subjects to fill the needs of 
industry. They also trained their own officials and shop stewards.
Workers were enrolled in the Volkshochschulen in classes of a general edu­
cational or cultural nature at the urging of the unions. German language 
and literature; politics; sociology; and the history, aims, and methods 
of trade unionism were the more popular subjects. The unions were even 
represented on local and zonal Volkshochschulen committees, to make certain 
that the workers' needs were met. Unions took little interest in the 
efforts to restructure the schools along more democratic lines and, con­
sistent with the attitudes of the working class, subscribed to the
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philosophy of Bildungsabstinenz (educational abstinence). They 
demonstrated this philosophy largely through indifference. The tripartite 
structure seemed appropriate since the acquisition of trade skills repre­
sented tangible achievement and security. Efforts to convince German labor 
leaders otherwise met with the argument that attendance at the Gymnasium 
would only lead people to migrate from the working class and thus deprive 
the unions of leaders. However, in 1948, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(German Trade Union Federation), commonly known as the DGB, announced it 
supported advanced technical training. In 1958, the DGB still sponsored 
such training because it strengthened the economy but kept people in their 
original social position.^8
Trade unions were first authorized on December 24, 1945, and local 
organizations started to take root, but collective bargaining for wages was 
not allowed until May, 1948. By advocating the rights of the individual, 
something they were forced to do if they were going to survive as local 
entities, the unions did much to further democracy. According to Current 
Affairs in 1950, "They provide the only mass school for democracy in action 
that is to be found in the Federal R e p u b l i c . " ^ 9
The Volkshochschulen introduced the worker-student to democratic 
ideas; this was totally in line with the desires of the Americans, but cue 
influence of the unions was seriously questioned and unions were reintro­
duced with caution. In the beginning, the U.S. Military Government prohi­
bited national unions and permitted local unions to function only after 
permission was granted to form them on a case-by-case basis. It was feared 
that the unions might become dominated by communists, and that once
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formed, they might try to break away from the democratic course charted for 
the German people. Such reasoning may not have been sound, but there was 
genuine concern for the growth of democracy, and the military government 
was not inclined to take what was seen as unnecessary chances. The goal of 
uniting Germany played a role also. General Clay took the position that 
until all four zones were economically united, a national union was simply 
out of the question.
The earliest attempts to organize German workers were disapproved 
because the U.S. Military Government felt that they were being organized 
from the top down. This indicated they would be large, centrally managed 
unions and thus carry many of the same threats to the democratization pro­
cess as national unions. The Americans wanted unions to "grow up" from the 
desires and needs of the workers rather than start off as large bodies 
capable of directing the actions of the workers toward the goals of a 
central committee. On the other hand, some Germans saw the immediate orga­
nization of large unions as necessary to forestall trade-union rivalries, 
as had occurred during the Weimar period. The advocates of large unions 
argued further that organized labor would do more to rebuild the economy 
than would small, impotent unions.
Americans were indeed cautious about unions, but they recognized a 
need for organized labor and agreed to Article 9 of the Basic Law which 
states, "The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working 
and economic conditions is guaranteed to everyone and to all trades and
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professions." The Basic Law also guarantees "free development of 
personality." With respect to the latter, German labor leaders reasoned the 
worker had to be more than a component in a production process managed 
exclusively by capital interests.60 In other words, German labor leaders 
were guarding against the "industrialization of the soul." The legally 
established rights to organize and develop the personality furthered the 
Germans' tendency towards collectivism, and the unions along with an asso­
ciated institution, the works council, ultimately gave German workers a 
sizable say in the economics and social development of the country. The 
works council dates from the Soviet movement after World War 1, and, as an 
institution with communist origins, it was viewed by the Americans with 
some suspicion after World War II. Through the works council, employees 
gained a share in certain managerial functions, such as hiring, firing, 
promotions, and the establishment of supervisory policies.6* This system 
of sharing in certain managerial decisions is called Mitbestimmung 
(co-determination) and was introduced only after much debate and in spite 
of American counsel. American officials had objected to co-determination 
because they saw it as a form of socialization similar to a directed econ­
omy, land reform, a socialization of key industries. The opposition to 
co-determination was strong enough in 1948 to cause General Clay to suspend 
a state law implementing co-determination in Hesse.6^ However, the Germans 
persevered, and co-determination became law in 1951, when it was introduced 
into the coal and steel industries; in the following year, it was extended 
to all other industries.6^
Initially the proponents of big unions were not happy with either the
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provisions of the Marshall Plan or the currency reform. They felt that the
Marshall Plan was intended to retard the growth of socialization, and that
the currency reform would virtually wipe out their financial holdings.
However, given the alternatives of either accepting the Marshall Plan and
the currency reform and seeing a speedy capitalistic recovery, or refusing
the measures and seeing a long, drawn-out process based on their own
64
resources, union leaders accepted the former.
Different Views
The events of the first few years of the Allied occupation in Germany 
were formative years for a society that had been devastated and was rebuilt 
according to a master plan designed and implemented to one degree or 
another by the conquerors. Each of the four occupying powers chose to do
things in its own way. The cultivation of "democracy" was supposed to be
the underlying principle; this was interpreted differently in the Soviet 
Zone, but America, France, and England proceeded along compatible courses. 
American programs were evaluated according to how much they would help
build "democracy" and facilitate the rapid turnover of affairs to the
Germans themselves. How successful the programs were can be measured by the 
fact that democratic principles have persisted. Certainly, the type of 
democracy which evolved in Germany differs from that found in America.
The Americans based the guidance given to the Germans largely on the 
American idea that individual freedom leads to individual achievement, but 
the Germans were given the freedom to work out details, and the
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collectivistic tendencies and traditions native to Germany came to the 
fore. For example, an elaborate, social-welfare state emerged to protect 
the individual. Such extensive, communal support is not exactly what the 
Americans originally had in mind when they spoke of democratization. But 
by providing comparable support to each individual, the German system gives 
each person the chance to develop to the fullest extent possible and is 
indeed democratic.
Americans were reasonably good teachers, but they were not without 
fault and not above reproach. The Germans knew this from the start. For 
instance, even while preaching democracy, individual freedom, and human 
values, they appeared hypocritical to some of their German students because 
of the racial discrimination practiced in America and the segregationist 
policies of the occupying military forces. Nevertheless, Germans con­
tended that they "could learn much from the Americans." In January, 1950, 
a survey in the U.S. Zone showed that fifty-seven percent of the Germans 
believed this to be the case. This belief increased with education; fifty- 
three percent of those with eight years or less of education subscribed to 
this theory while ninety-two percent of those with twelve or more years of 
education held it to be true.^
Since the French remained in charge in Zweibruecken until Germany 
regained its sovereignty in 1955, it is helpful to look at another, com­
parable city in the American Zone to see how the Americans actually carried 
out their reorientation efforts there.
Bruchsal, a city of thirty-four thousand people in present-day 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, has some characteristics in common with Zweibruecken 
and can be used for comparison purposes. Bruchsal was founded about one
118
thousand years ago and had traditionally been a city dependent on agri­
culture and small industries. Tobacco, hops, and lumber were the main pro­
ducts prior to World War II. There was also a modest leather-tanning 
industry there, and the railroad provided additional employment for the 
citizenry. After World War II, the Siemens electrical company established 
a plant in Bruchsal and quickly became the principal employer.
In April, 1945, the French captured Bruchsal and occupied it until 
July, 1945, when the city was turned over to the Americans. This is the 
reverse of what happened in Zweibruecken where the Americans took the city 
in March, 1945, and then relinquished control to the French in July. The 
citizens of Bruchsal gladly exchanged the French for the Americans because 
the French had confiscated nearly everything that was movable —  bicycles, 
radios, and the like. Furthermore, the Americans brought food and shared 
it with the citizens.66 When the Americans assumed control of Bruchsal, 
one of the first things they did was to replace the French-appointed mayor; 
then they proceeded with their denazification program.67 The denazifica­
tion program in Bruchsal amounted to little more than a temporary incon­
venience. One school teacher and the man who had served as mayor during 
the Third Reich were the only persons permanently branded as N a z i s . 6 8  
Several other individuals were considered to have been associated with the 
Nazis, but after investigation they were released and allowed to return to 
the city and their work. This is not to say that there were no penalties 
imposed, because there were. Direct fines, demotions, adjusted pay scales, 
reduced pensions, frozen promotions, and job transfers were some of the 
forms of punishment. The Americans established a small military government
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detachment to insure compliance with their overall reorientation plans, but 
that administrative function was gradually reduced until, in early 1951, it 
was completely abandoned.69
In the beginning, Americans commandeered five or six entire houses; 
this was a source of irritation between the Germans and the Americans in 
Bruchsal until the houses were returned in 1946 and 1947, when the troops 
left. In this respect, the French fared better than the Americans, since 
the French had taken possession of only a few apartments or rooms. However, 
the commandeering of houses was ameliorated somewhat by the fact that the 
owners were allowed to continue using laundry facilities, kitchens, 
basements, and gardens.70 Another aspect of the American occupation which 
caused extraordinary resentment was that they prevented some of the local 
teachers from meeting and organizing; presumably, this was to prevent any 
type of organized opposition to American policies and decisions. The 
teachers became bitter and refused to show any outward sign of friendship 
for the Americans for the duration of the American stay in Bruchsal.?1
Initially, the city officials were required to get approval on nearly 
everything they did, but they carefully complied with American directions, 
and soon the process of requesting became one of consulting, and that 
rapidly turned into a process of i n f o r m i n g . ^2 The Lord Mayor and other 
officials met regularly with the Americans and even made special pleas on 
behalf of the citizens. Beyond the commandeering of houses and the infer­
nal Fragebogen (questionnaire) and associated punishments, the Americans 
rarely imposed their will.
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The people of Bruchsal received CARE packages well into the 1950s, 
and additional food was distributed in the schools.73 English replaced 
French as the first foreign language in the schools, and although students 
in the 1950s did not notice that democracy was at work in the classrooms, 
later reflection brought them to realize that the patience and give-and-take 
attitudes exhibited by their teachers were real changes brought about by 
the Americans.^
The Americans organized, constructed, and ran a youth camp near 
Bruchsal. At this camp, American soldiers provided food, shelter, games, 
and leadership training for about one hundred and fifty young people who 
later used the democratic principles learned there in various youth groups 
in the c i t y . American speakers visited the Gymnasium and talked about 
life in a democracy and the responsibilities of citizens. And parent- 
teacher associations were organized in the city's schools. In the latter 
part of the decade, a few students from Bruchsal were sent to the United 
States to study, and in 1964 the first Fulbright Scholarship in Bruchsal 
was awarded to Lioba Grillenberger, a language teacher in a local 
Gymnasium.^6
The reforms and institutions deemed necessary for reorientation in 
Bruchsal were established in the period 1945-1949, and then left in German 
hands. Gustav Loeffler, a local architect and member of the Stadt- 
Krei_sra_t, (city-county council) characterized the American presence 
in Bruchsal in the fifties as "hardly n o t i c e d . " 7 7  Lioba Grillenberger 
described the American influence on democracy in Bruchsal as definite but 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l . 78 The impetus was supplied and the framework established by 
the Americans, but the Germans filled in the details.
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These observations are similar to Peterson's overall interpretation of the 
American Military Government's success, or lack of it: that Americans suc­
ceeded most where they tried to regulate the l e a s t . P e t e r s o n ,  of course, 
was talking about official attempts to influence —  not the influence from 
daily contacts between Germans and Americans at the grass-roots level.
French Re-education Efforts
With the essential knowledge in mind of how America went about 
reforming German education, it is worthwhile to look at some of the poli­
cies and practices employed by the French, the policies and practices to 
which the people of Zweibruecken were exposed.
The French encountered the same basic problems as the Americans; 
textbooks had to be replaced, politically acceptable teachers identified, 
and facilities reconstructed. And while the French had the same ultimate 
goal of democratizing the Germans, they viewed the process somewhat dif­
ferently. Specifically, the American position on German guilt was that 
Hitler and the Nazi conspirators were largely responsible for the war and 
its consequences; the German people had been led astray but bore no special 
responsibility for the horrors of the Third Reich. Of course, some form of 
punishment was imposed on individuals whenever responsibility for crimes 
could be established, party membership determined, or other overt support 
to the party proven. The French, on the other hand, were not so willing to 
blame only the leaders. The bitter memories of the German occupation, the 
invasion, inter-war differences, World War I, and even the War of 1870 
influenced French thinking. This view was bluntly stated in 1946, by Cesar 
Santelli, a French official involved in educational reform in Germany.
122
Santelli, while commenting on the influence of National Socialism on the 
German population, concluded that, "the generation of those aged over 
twelve, is almost completely lost."80
Such a philosophy left little room for denazification per se. The 
French, according to F. Roy Willis in his book The French In Germany 
1945-1949, chose more to follow a course of "degermanisation." That is, it 
was not feasible simply to remove the Nazi element and leave Germany to the 
Germans. National traits themselves had to be reformed. As a consequence, 
the removal of Nazis took a different course in the French Zone, a course 
which led to charges by the Americans and British that denazification was 
not being vigorously pursued there.81 Ostensibly, the French argument 
went something like this: since most Germans were genuinely guilty,
the hope of finding innocent Germans to fill responsible positions was 
futile. Thus, the French made little effort to identify anyone other than 
the most avid Nazis. The national character had to be restructured anyway; 
so for the vast majority of Germans, there was no reason to go through the 
motions of denazification.
The elimination of Nazis from the teaching staffs took its toll in 
numbers in the French Zone as well. Whereas the French were relatively 
lenient in allowing former Nazis to stay on the job in some areas, their 
policy for educators seems to have been almost as strict as the Americans' 
p o l i c y . 82 Nearly sixty percent of the teachers in primary and secondary 
schools were removed. As a consequence of denazification, twenty-nine 
teachers in Zweibruecken were punished but most managed to continue 
teaching. Only one teacher was released outright. One was forced to retire 
with a full pension. Two had future retirement incomes reduced. Four were
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forbidden promotions for specified periods. Thirteen were demoted. And 
existing pensions were reduced or stopped for eight retired teachers or 
their widows. Teachers' training colleges were set up in the French Zone 
along the lines of the French ecoles normales, to help replace teachers.
The teachers' colleges offered a two-year program, but briefer courses were 
made available to produce teachers in a short t i m e . ® 3
To alter the German way of thinking, to bring them more in line with 
the French philosophy of life, the French Government chose Raymond 
Schmittlein, an experienced Germanist. Schmittlein chose a staff of 
Germanists to help him so that the decisions affecting the course of German 
education would be made by people who understood both countries.
The French reopened both the primary and secondary schools in their 
zone on September 17, 1945, two weeks earlier than the Americans. 
Zweibruecken's Volksschulen were the first to reopen. In September, 1945, 
seven classrooms, all that remained of the seventy-five which existed 
before the destruction, opened their doors. Even these seven had required 
some repairs. Next, also during the month of September, came the high 
schools; these were the Oberschule fuer Jungen, the Lyzeum (the girls 
school), and the Altsprachliches Gymnasium. The Oberschule fuer Jungen had 
been severely damaged so classrooms were limited. The classes were limited 
to five students per class until more room was made available, at which 
time they expanded to ten students in each class. A bit later they 
were able to accommodate twelve per class. The curriculum was very 
limited, and only French, English, and mathematics were offered. By Febru­
ary, 1946, more space was available and the curriculum enlarged to include a
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wider range of classes. The reconstruction was partly done by the students 
themselves. The students in the Lyzeum were more fortunate. The school 
itself was the least damaged of all the schools. It opened, and offered 
the full range of classes, on October 1, 1945. The Altsprachliches 
Gymnasium had been so heavily damaged that it remained closed until 
December 6, 1945, but even then its operations were greatly restricted. By 
1950 much had been done, but much remained to be done; forty-one rooms in 
the Volksschulen had been brought back into service, and twenty-six 
Gymnasium rooms had been restored to usefulness.
The textbook problem was less significant for the French than for the 
Americans. First of all, there were only 900,000 school children under 
French control, whereas the Americans had 3,000,000. Secondly, there 
were more paper mills available to the French, so paper was in better 
supply there than in the American area. Many textbooks were rewritten to 
exclude Nazi views and others were brought in from Switzerland, Luxembourg, 
and America. Others were supplied from France, in the French language.
The local characteristics of the zone were stressed, and so the books used 
in one area differed from those in other areas. In Freiburg, for example, 
students used books from Switzerland written in German. In.Zweibruecken, 
books from France written in French and translated into German were used; 
these books sometimes included statements which denigrated the Germans as a 
people. The following article appeared in a reader used in the high 
schools in Zweibruecken.
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The German Children
"One has to recognize and obtain for oneself the advantages gained
by other nations in order not to fall behind one's rivals. Well,
you little Frenchmen, so what if German children learn a little 
slower than you do. The northern races are usually of slower 
wits. Nevertheless, they work with great courage; they con­
centrate all their diligence on what they are doing and are not 
distracted by a humming fly or by an opening door. Their heads, 
with their square foreheads, are bent diligently over the books 
written in gothic lettering. They know that it is not suf­
ficient to try to understand too quickly; they are serious about 
learning, and they are trained early to obey their teachers 
promptly and to the letter.
Later, when they enter the army, they retain this discipline; 
discipline is the first characteristic of a soldier: they do not 
march into battle with enthusiasm, but in total obedience to the 
orders of their corporal.
Finally, those children are the same in life as in school.
They work hard, live in a colder country than we do, and need
more coal and warmer clothing in winter. In addition, the
workers are not paid as well over there as they are in France, 
and they toil hard. No matter, they have the strength and 
patience of a steer which step by step draws his furrows and 
makes the field fertile. The ones who do not wear themselves 
out totally by the hardest bodily work replace this lack of 
exercise through sports. There are three thousand sport clubs 
which include 300,000 members. That means there are 300,000 
men, hardened in all possible exercises, who if necessary, will 
be untiring soldiers.
Dear children of France, you are just as well off and better 
than the children in Germany. Most of you are just as strong 
and have a livelier understanding of things. You have better 
and gentler teachers. Your country is much more beautiful and 
richer. These are the reasons you can look forward to an easier 
time, but you must learn to work during your early youth; you 
must have courage and determination, as only he who tries the 
hardest will succeed the most."86
By 1948, ten million new books had been printed in the French Z o n e . ® ?  
They were not all so blatantly prejudiced, but the message that France was 
superior was regularly conveyed in the schools.
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School organization, too, underwent a change. Like the Americans, 
the French advocated a system which allowed students to transfer from one 
school to the next and wait longer before deciding on whether or not to 
attend a university. Under the French system, Latin was suppressed in the 
three lowest grades in the Gymnasium. Thus a student could wait until the 
eighth year before making the d e c i s i o n . T h i s  reform was later discarded, 
and all the schools in the former French Zone switched to the tripartite 
system used elsewhere in Germany, with the decisive point being the end of 
the fourth school y e a r . ® 9
In the universities, none of which was in Zweibruecken, the French 
replaced books and teachers, as did the Americans, but whereas every univer­
sity in the American Zone had one University Officer to encourage change, 
the French placed in each institution four French assistants who worked 
directly with the German professors, usually in the a r t s . 90
A somewhat different view was taken by the French officials on food 
rations, as long as rationing existed. In the American Zone, students 
and teachers alike received fewer rations than workers, but the French 
authorized full, manual-labor rations for persons in the academic environ­
ment. 91 It should be noted, however, that even at the reduced level, stu­
dents in the American Zone were authorized more calories per day than manual 
laborers were authorized in the French Z o n e . 9 2
The results of the French re-education efforts have been termed both a 
failure and a success. These totally different conclusions can, at least 
partially, be attributed to the fact that the French did things differently
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in different areas. Their approach left room for individual initiative on 
the part of the French education officers. This room, according to one 
view, was not due to any formal plan but rather due to the fact that the 
French achieved the status of occupier rather suddenly and with little 
forethought. Hence, they had to improvise at every turn and regularly made 
compromises. There was disagreement among the French as to their goals 
vis-a-vis Germany. Some Frenchmen advocated using Germany as a source for 
rebuilding France, while others believed working together was the best 
course of action. Some supported the idea that France should cultivate a 
sympathetic political sphere, and yet others spoke for the establishment of 
little more than a cordon sanitaire (guarded line). As a consequence of 
differing approaches, there was no consistency in either the way the 
French operated or the results they achieved. The French attempted to 
impose their cultural values by degermanizing the Germans, but they were 
less strict in their denazification process than were the Americans and 
British. As far as the Germans were concerned, they knew that France had 
thrown its army together at the last moment; therefore, it was difficult 
for the Germans to view the French as rightful victors. The realities of 
French presence and French rule were accepted, but there was more resent­
ment toward the French than toward either the Americans or the British. 
America was respected for its power and the British for the way they con­
ducted themselves, but the French were more tolerated than respected. In 
fact, the reforms imposed by the French were rescinded as soon as
possible.53
On the other hand, F. Roy Willis concluded that, "there can be no doubt 
of the success of the French educational and cultural programs."5^ And
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Alfred Grosser described the French methods as "the most fruitful" of all 
the re-education p r o g r a m s . 95 The success enjoyed by the French has been 
attributed to a sense of individuality which made them willing to treat each 
situation on its individual merits. Furthermore, the French have been cred­
ited with having had a true insight into the different ways the Germans 
viewed themselves and National Socialist ideology. There was a cleavage be­
tween the young and the old in postwar Germany; some youthful Germans 
distrusted politics and older people, while the older Germans held that the 
younger citizens either still used Hitler's ideas or were ineffective and 
did too little to help their country back onto its feet. It has been 
argued that French insight into these problems enabled French education 
officials to make truly positive cultural and educational changes.96
Willis also states, "Day-to-day association with French people and 
with the cultural achievements of France undoubtedly created a friendliness 
toward France which was not felt in the other zones toward their 
occupiers."97 This observation needs qualification. The bonds forged 
between the Americans and Germans in most communities in the U.S. Zone
appear to have been at least as strong. Furthermore, research in the
Zweibruecken area, where both French and American forces were located, 
indicates that there was a distinct preference in the minds of Germans for
the Americans, as compared with the French.98
This conclusion is substantiated by polls taken by the Allensbach 
Institute in 1962 and 1965. In 1962, fifty-four percent of those polled 
nation-wide stated that they "liked" the Americans, while only forty-four 
percent gave this same accolade to the French. By 1965, fondness for the 
Americans had increased, with fifty-eight percent responding that they
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"liked" the Americans* This same poll revealed that the French had slip­
ped; only thirty-nine percent of the Germans said they "liked" the 
French. In both polls, which involved at least two thousand people, "like 
them" was the highest accolade with the other possibilities being: "not
particularly," "undecided," and "no opinion." Similar polls were taken in 
1957 and 1961, to measure German attitudes vis-a-vis the Americans, but the 
French were not included. In those two polls, the Americans were "liked" 
by thirty-seven percent and fifty-one percent, respectively.99
British Re-education Efforts
For the sake of comparison, it is interesting to look also at events 
in the British Zone. The British encountered the same shortages as did the 
Americans and French in their respective zones. Teachers, buildings, 
books, materials, and food were all in short supply. All the Allies based 
their policies on the same basic philosophy, which had evolved during the 
final years of the war and eventually was articulated in Allied Control 
Council Directive No. 54, a document issued on June 25, 1947.100 Since the 
challenges and the guiding philosophy were essentially the same, it should 
come as no surprise that British aims and methods were, in many ways, simi­
lar to those employed by the Americans. But there were some distinct dif­
ferences in p o l i c y . 101
At the end of the war, there were seventy thousand teachers in the 
British Zone. As a consequence of denazification, sixteen thousand, or 
twenty-three percent, were s u s p e n d e d .102 Ultimately, the vast majority 
was reinstated, but their immediate loss made it all the more necessary
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for an emergency teacher-training program to be established. Two programs 
were set up to meet the requirements. A one-year program was used to train 
temporary teachers, and a two-year program was established to prepare per­
manent teachers. To augment teaching staffs, radio lectures were widely 
used.103
Buildings were a crucial, immediate problem due to both destruction 
and the needs of the occupation forces and displaced persons. One example 
can serve to illustrate the seriousness of the problem. In 
Schleswig-Holstein, there was only one classroom for every 123 children. 
Before the war, there had been only 37 children per classroom. To get by, 
classes were conducted in s h i f t s . *04 One expert assessment of the British 
role in reconstructing Germany's education system holds that Field Marshal 
Montgomery's decision to stop commandeering schools for other purposes was 
one of the most important steps taken.1®^
Textbooks were replaced using the same philosophy as in the U.S. Zone. 
Indeed, many of the first books were even identical, having come from the 
same sources. The British set up textbook writing centers where books were 
written by Germans under British supervision, and the rate of books 
produced per student in the two zones did not differ significantly. By 
1947, the British had distributed 8,090,100 books to 4,100,000 students, or 
1.97 books per student. About that same time, the Americans had given 
6,295,600 books to the 2,441,750 students in their zone, 2.58 books per 
student. It was a somewhat different story for other school materials. 
Pencils and paper were in shorter supply in the British Zone.
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To alleviate the food problem, school lunches of three hundred 
calories were served in the British Zone. This program, which started in 
February, 1946, eventually grew until 1,750,000 students and thousands of 
teachers received such a daily m e a l . 106
British reformers attempted few administrative changes in the primary 
and secondary schools apart from "the destruction of the Nazi Party 
machine." They watched over the reconstruction of the schools and curricu­
lum, replaced books, and approved programs, but most actions (not unlike 
the situation in the U.S. Zone) were in the hands of Germans. However, the 
British were more cautious, more aloof, and less committed to reform of 
primary and secondary schools than were their counterparts in the U.S.
Zone.107
Some of the matters on which the British caution was pronounced merit 
discussion here because on the surface the British agreed with the 
Americans but they did not offer much pratical support to achieve American 
objectives. The British sided with those who wanted to lengthen the pri­
mary school to six years. But their commitment was weak. They had greater 
concern for the more pressing problems of improving the physical conditions 
under which the schools and universities were opening and operating.1®® 
Another reform issue on which the British and Americans agreed but yet 
disagreed was that of free secondary education. The British were convinced 
free secondary education would not work, but they publicly supported if 
inasmuch as the idea was included in the four-power compromise document 
published on June 25, 1947, Allied Control Council Directive No.5 4. 1 ^
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The British saw eye to eye with most German educators on a tripartite 
division after the primary years. The division into practical, technical, 
and academic branches was consistent with the 1944 Education Act in 
Britain.HQ The Americans, as related above, opposed the tripartite divi­
sion as undemocratic.
Many Germans, especially in the Catholic areas, wanted to reestablish 
their denominational schools. The British Military Government opposed this 
idea at first, due to limited facilities. But, based on popular demand, 
such schools were allowed again beginning in February 1946.H I
As for the universities in the British Zone, all six were conducting 
classes by the end of 1945, and by the spring of 1946 teaching had been 
resumed in the eight specialized colleges on the university level. A major 
attempt was made to reform German universities by way of a special com­
mission variously called "The German Commission on University Reform," the 
"Lindsay Report," the "Lindsay Commission," or "The Blue Report." This 
was an effort to put German universities "in step with the social changes 
of the times." The author of the report recommended establishing a 
studium generate for the first year in each university, giving students 
training in democratic life, and forming a University Advisory Council with 
broad powers. The recommendations of this commission were not adopted due 
to opposition from the universities' rectors and senates.H2
British authorities tried to mandate a specific set of controls to 
regulate who could attend these institutions of higher learning. The spe­
cific academic criteria were left up to the Germans, but political realism
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played a role too. According to British guidance, ten percent of the 
students had to be refugees; after that, priority was given to men and 
women who had never been members of the Nazi Party or any affiliated 
organization. The remainder of the student body, if any spaces were left, 
could be persons who had been members of these now-prohibited organizations 
—  but not officials; personnel in this category could not exceed ten 
percent of the total student body, exclusive of the ten percent reserved 
for displaced persons. The selection process hinged on the Fragebogen 
system, but the applicants were too numerous for the admissions personnel 
to check, and oftentimes persons were admitted without having completed the 
Fragebogen.113 In any event, it was not long before many formerly 
restricted individuals were given unrestricted access as a consequence of 
the Exoneration of Youth Act in 1946, which applied to persons born on or 
after January 1, 1919.
Volkshochshulen were reestablished in the British Zone along the same 
lines as those which existed prior to 1933. For the first few years, the 
emphasis was on courses with little practical application. One study in 
1947 stated that, except for a demand by young people for language courses, 
"the Volkshochschulen are largely a refuge for middle-aged and middle-class 
men and women anxious to study history of art, art, philosophy, music or 
literature." Modern history, economics, and international relations were 
in little demand. An exception existed in Hamburg where foreign languages, 
courses concerned with Weltanschauung, civics, economics, history, and 
sociology were popular —  in that order.
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The trade unions in the British Zone participated actively in the 
adult education programs. Union representatives sat on local and zonal 
committees for adult e d u c a t i o n . T h e  relationship between the unions and 
the Volkshochschulen grew and assumed particular importance with the advent 
of a jointly sponsored movement called Arbeit und Leben (work and life). 
This movement, which was based on the Workers' Educational Association 
(WEA) in Britain, began in Lower Saxony and spread to all the states in the 
British Zone, Bavaria, Hesse and Berlin. Its influence was also noted to a 
degree in the French Zone. "Arbeit und Leben" encouraged students to study 
German, mathematics, current events, business management, economics, labor 
problems, psychology, and sociology.
Many Anglo-German discussion groups were formed where, as in the 
U.S. Zone, democracy and life styles were often topics on the agenda. 
Exchange programs for teachers and students were also quite common.
British information centers, also known as Die Bruecke (the bridge), served 
much the same function as the America Houses. At their height, 1947, there 
were over sixty of these centers, but by the middle of the 1950s only four 
remained intact and another ten had been changed to Anglo-German
centers.
The British information control policy, as a whole, differed from that 
of the Americans, but the British authorities had to operate under more 
hardships due to limited resources. For example, the film situation was 
far better in the U.S. Zone, since the Americans (and Russians) had 
inherited the German movie studios. The studios enabled the Americans to 
produce, reproduce, and synchronize films for distribution to the 
Germans.120 in addition, America was able to equip its information centers
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and libraries with a more complete array of reading materials and audio­
visual equipment. While the Americans were translating, providing 
copyright privileges, and distributing books by American authors, the 
British were not able to move on anywhere near the same scale. By late 
1947, the British had been able to produce only twenty-three of their 
native works in translation. The slow production of acceptable books had a 
negative impact in numerous areas, but the impact on history classes was 
remarkable. History courses were taught for at least two or three years 
without textbooks in many schools in the British Zone. Consequently, in 
1947 inspectors found history being taught by "medieval" methods —  on old 
"political" and "heroic" lines which furthered nationalism and cultivated
an aversion to international affairs and current events.121
In many of the reform efforts, there was a definite kinship between 
the approaches cfiosen by the British and the Americans. As a general rule,
the British efforts were on a lesser scale than those made by the
Americans, as a result of limited resources. It was in youth activities 
that the differences appear to have been the greatest. The British, 
at least in the early stages, apparently placed too much emphasis on 
formal re-education and paid too little attention to what was "needed 
outside school hours." It was often said that the British Military 
Government had a "colonial attitude."122 The responsibility for executing 
youth programs was given to the Germans with coordinating control retained 
by the occupation authorities. However, when compared with the American 
youth program (GYA), there were few controls or regulations and almost as
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little in the way of resources. Where American soldiers and even families
were actively engaged with German youth, the British remained apart. The
Americans reinforced the GYA by setting up troops of Boy and Girl Scouts,
but the British prohibited these organizations based on the history of the
German Pfadfinder (scouts). A contemporary assessment of both the American
and British youth programs stated "The vitality and generosity of the
average American is nowhere more clearly seen than in these GYA
activities." The description continued:
The impression in the American Zone is, broadly speaking, 
that German youth is being catered for, not wisely, but too 
well. In the British Zone, it is that German Youth is suffering 
from a sense of isolation,of being in a vacuum.
This feeling of abandonment may have been encouraged by the attitude of
some British officials. Long after the Americans had made a commitment to
work with the former enemy, British officials tended to have contact with
the Germans only during office hours or as needed for control purposes.
These officials, it was reported, were not interested in contact and made
no attempt to learn the German language. *^3 decades later, British
conduct during the occupation period was characterized as "aloof." But in
the words of one German scholar, "The British education officers came with
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the also typically British idea of simply doing what was necessary."
In the end, both the British and the Americans enjoyed less success 
than desired with their educational reforms.^25 German educators were more 
tradition-bound than had been expected. Education had served the elite 
well in the past, and the determination to return to that situation proved 
to be dominant. This predilection, coupled with the leeway afforded Germans
137
in guiding their own future and the limitation of funds, stood in the way 
of radical changes. Certainly some alterations were made, and with respect 
to varying influences, it is worth noting that the British point of view on 
teaching English in the German schools prevailed. German schools tend, 
overwhelmingly, to teach British pronunciation, vocabulary, and idioms —  as 
opposed to the American versions. Furthermore, "Anglistik" is a more com­
mon area of study in German universities than is "Amerikanistik.11 This has 
been attributed to geographic and cultural proximity. It is easier and 
less expensive for Germans to go to Britain than to America, and 
Anglo-German relations have a much longer history than do German-American 
r e l a t i o n s . 126 Other factors have influenced the attitude as well. One 
must acknowledge that, at least in Europe, the British are considered more 
sophisticated than the Americans, and German teachers have been known to 
tell their students as much. Thus, status-conscious Germans prefer the 
British style. Additionally, and perhaps of greater importance, British 
English was taught in Germany long before America's ascendancy on the 
world's stage. Given the German educator's penchant for tradition, it is 
not surprising that the old way prevailed.
Even though the British style of speaking is preferred by Germans, and 
even though "Anglistik" is the more popular area of study, it should not be 
assumed the British presence had the larger impact on Germany. On the 
contrary, it was the Americans who succeeded in propagating their "way of 
life."127
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Chapter 6
The Rehabilitation Of The Information Media
Like virtually everything else in Germany, the information media came 
to a halt at the end of the war. Perhaps "pause" is a better word to 
describe the situation, because the press and radio were started again as 
soon as new rules could be established. The publication of books and 
magazines and the resumption of theatrical productions followed somewhat 
behind broadcasting and newspapers, since the latter two were more valuable 
to the occupation authorities for communicating with the German public.
The number and frequency of printings and broadcasts were greatly 
restricted at first due to the shortage of every type of resource, but the 
interruption was kept as brief as possible.
Newspapers
In defining the role of the newspaper in a new, democratized Germany, 
Americans set out to correct what were seen as deficiencies stemming not 
only from the Nazi era but also from earlier periods. Traditionally,
German journalists had mixed hard news with opinions so extensively that 
readers could not tell the difference. The privately owned, decentralized 
press of the Weimar period had been "weak on objective news coverage, as 
compared to Anglo-American journalism."1 These earlier papers often had 
served local, religious, or political interests. Many of the papers had 
earned the epithet of Kaeseblatt (useful mainly for wrapping cheese), due 
to the emphasis on special interests. Indeed, the political
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papers had been "political instruments rather than purveyors of news." On 
the other hand, the traditional, mass-circulation papers had been 
"politically colorless" "business ventures," which had "sought to please 
everyone and offend no one."^ These mass-circulation newspapers, known as 
the Generalanzeiger press, had carried stories on crime, catastrophe, 
divorce, and human interest, but, in the words of one analyst, "the public 
interest was scarcely discernible."3 Certainly, there had been good 
papers. German papers before Hitler's regime contained a wealth of 
cultural and educational material as well as competing political views, but 
the special-interest, small-circulation press and the bland, mass- 
circulation Generalanzeiger press had been dominant. With these histori­
cal conditions in mind, it was reasoned that if newspapers were going to 
take their rightful place at the head of the democratic information media, 
clear distinctions would have to be made between facts and opinions, and 
news would have to be written to inform the masses on important issues.3
The newspaper had to be a tool for informing the average citizen so 
that he could act responsibly in a free society. To guarantee that 
newspapers would be properly oriented, the U.S. Military Government 
enforced certain guidelines.
1. No dissemination of nationalist, militant, or anti-democratic 
materials was allowed.
2. No dissemination of materials disruptive to the occupying 
powers or hostile to occupation authorities was allowed.
3., Facts and editorial opinions had to be separated.
4. No affiliation with political parties was allowed.
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5. Writing had to be understandable to the average German.
Before any newspaper could be published, it was necessary for the military 
government to approve it and issue a license. These controls lasted until 
May 2, 1949, when licensing ended. The first two guidelines were specifi­
cally stated in the licenses granted to German newspapers, while the last 
three were practiced as matters of principle.**
The enforcement of the guidelines proved to be relatively easy. Only 
on rare occasions did the newspapers stray, and then the punishment was 
rather slight. The Sueddeutsche Zeitung, for instance, was once required
to reduce its size from six to four pages for one month for criticizing the
Soviets.? Scrutiny of the newspapers' practices was accomplished on a 
popt-publication basis. There was no censorship in the U.S. Zone.
Editors were free to print, but they knew they would be held accountable
for what appeared in their papers.
In addition to the guidelines identified above, newspapers were 
encouraged to emphasize news of an international nature, rather than con­
centrate too much on local events.
The first newspapers which appeared after the war were U.S. Military 
Government papers. These were the so-called "overt publications," through 
which the Americans disseminated information to the population. The most 
significant overt publication was Die Neue Zeitung. although it commenced 
publication rather late. It first appeared on October 18, 1945, and 
remained an accepted paper throughout West Germany and Berlin until the 
American officials decided to cease publishing it in January, 1955.
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By the time it was first printed in 1945, many of the earlier overt publi­
cations had already ceased to exist, and some German papers had been 
licensed. Die Neue Zeitung was printed twice each week and enjoyed con­
siderable success. Its circulation was regularly 1,500,000, but for a 
time, the number of copies reached 1,900,500. It was so much in demand 
that Germans routinely stood in line to buy a copy. Die Neue Zeitung was 
intended to be a model for the licensed press. The editors were determined 
to show the Germans that news, sports, features, and editorials could all 
be reported on separately and in an interesting, readable way. In the 
beginning, the subject matter tended to be mostly German. Some of the 
paper's early critics accused it of being "too German," and in fact its 
readers frequently did not know that it was an official U.S. Military 
Government paper. The Zeitung, as it was commonly termed, had to rely on 
the same press services as the licensed newspapers for its content.
However, the Zeitung1s editors did have the advantages of the best quali ty 
ink, paper stock, and photographic and engraving equipment in Germany. The 
Zeitung was published in Munich on the presses of the Nazis' Voelkischer 
Beobachter; this was another advantage, since those presses came through 
the war almost unscathed. So it was, by most accounts, the best paper 
available.
Evidently the U.S. authorities took the criticism that the Zeitung was 
"too German" to heart, because, in 1948, they changed the paper to bring it 
more in line with the guideline recommending an international flavor. It 
began to feature articles on America and happenings outside of Germany. 
Stories about American literature and music appeared. English lessons were
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printed, and articles such as, "Some Kind Words for Uncle Sam," by Bernard 
Baruch were offered.8
The first German paper licensed by the U.S. officials was the 
Frankfurter Rundschau. Its first edition came out on July 31, 1945. Then 
came the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung in Heidelberg on September 6 , 1945; one of 
its publishers was Theodor Heuss. At least a dozen others followed during 
that same month. By the beginning of October, German papers were available 
from Bremen in the north to Garmisch-Partenkirchen in the south. It is 
interesting to note that during this period of sudden growth, the lead from 
the type of Mein Kampf was ceremoniously melted down and recast to print 
the first edition of the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, the first American-licensed 
paper in B a v a r i a .9 All of these newspapers were plagued by paper shor­
tages, inadequate equipment, and a lack of qualified personnel. Membership 
in the Third Reich's Federal Press Chamber had tainted nearly all newspa­
permen in Germany, and so they were not considered eligible for work on 
postwar papers. This was not necessarily the case with ownership. The 
military governments in the West did not expropriate the old Nazi 
publishers. The occupation authorities were criticized for this apparent 
lack of evenhandedness; however, complaints had little or no effect.
The Americans, British and French all seemed to agree that it was suf­
ficient to control the editorial, writing, and production staffs. The U.S. 
Military Government thus had the challenge of developing technical com­
petence in the inexperienced personnel who emerged to run the new, democra­
tic press in the U.S. Zone. American press control officers had to give 
advice on virtually every aspect of the newspaper business from basic jour­
nalism to general management.^ Experts came from America, and German
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journalists went to America to learn not only techniques but the democratic 
approach. One German editor who visited America, Dr. Annemarie Langens,
placed the problem in perspective when she wrote:
One of the outstanding differences between newspaper work in 
your country and in Germany to me seems to consist in the fact
that you do have a free press in a democratic country and a long
tradition of freedom and democracy behind you. With us this is 
entirely different. We are struggling for something we have 
hardly ever possessed, something we longed for but did not 
visualize too clearly. To have watched from so very close a 
free press in action means a confirmation of immeasurable value 
to our faith in the importance and workability of a free press.^
There was, of course, some difficulty with credibility. Some readers 
distrusted the licensed press because they knew the newspapers had to con­
form with the opinions of the occupying power.^ But in spite of this
14
shortcoming, the licensed press was widely accepted as independent.
The newspapers were serviced by several news agencies. The Associated 
Press, United Press, International News Service, and Reuters had outlets in 
the U.S. Zone. However, the most important news agency was the Deutsche 
Nachrichten Agentur (DENA). This agency began as a U.S. Military 
Government office in June of 1945, but quickly changed hands so that by the 
middle of 1946 it was completely owned and operated by Germans. In spite 
of this, one could not say that it was free of American influence. Its 
policies were those of the U.S. Military Government. The Information 
Control Division of the Military Government provided guidance and routed 
copy to DENA from the U.S. Reorientation Branch Press Unit in Washington, 
D.C. and the U.S. State Department. On an average day, DENA passed on to 
the German papers approximately 30,000 words of news. Additionally, 25,000
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words of feature material were disseminated weekly and 20,000 photos 
monthly. The German press used the copy from DENA on a regular basis. 
Through DENA German readers received information on such things as Boys' 
Town, the PTA in America, agriculture, and i n d u s t r y .
Even though the U.S. Military Government ended the practice of 
licensing newspapers in 1949, controls continued. It was still against the 
law for papers to print the type of materials previously banned. This 
prohibition remained in force until the Korean War, at which time cen­
sorship by the Americans was ended so the Soviets could be criticized. The 
end of licensing meant that the newspapers were essentially in German hands 
less than four years after the war had ended. A whole host of German 
papers sprang to life as soon as licensing ended, but some lasted for only 
a very short period of time. These papers took some of the circulation 
away from those established under the licensing procedures; nevertheless, 
five years later, virtually all of the previously licensed papers were 
still publishing.^
In Zweibruecken, the revival of newspapers followed an almost parallel 
pattern as far as controls were concerned. For example, affiliation with 
political parties was prohibited. The French Military Government licensed 
the publishers, established a news agency, and practiced censorship. The 
French-controlled news agency which provided the German papers with 
approved copy was the Sueddeutsche Nachrichtenagentur (SUDENA); however, 
papers in the French Zone also had access to the American-sponsored news 
agency, DENA, as well as Reuters and the Associated Press. In 1949, DENA 
and SUDENA merged with DPD (Deutscher Presse Dienst. the press service in
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the British Zone); combined, they became known as DPA (Deutsche Presse 
Agentur) and served West Germany throughout the decade of the fifties.
Where the Americans practiced censorship by reviewing what had been 
printed, the French censored the copy before it was printed. French cen­
sorship continued, albeit on an ever-diminishing basis, until 1955.^
The Zweibruecken Mitteilungsblatt was the first postwar paper. It
appeared on August 11, 1945, and was an instrument of the French Military
Government. The French Commander used the paper to convey his message to
the citizens of Zweibruecken.
As General Eisenhower has already said, we come not as oppressors 
but as administrators, agents of justice, and as educators.
Together with the healthy elements of the German people, we will 
eliminate the remnants of Nazism, an ideology whose theory of a 
chosen people has been defeated by an alliance of nations. We are 
coming to teach the German people the utilization of freedom and 
democracy [a form of government] which they used only as a dominant 
force. I was appointed to this position by the Allies, and I will 
treat all persons equally regardless of religion, race, or color.
1 am asking your cooperation in this formidable task, and I will 
overlook the suffering you have caused my country.
A few weeks after the Zweibruecken Mitteilungsblatt was printed, the 
Amtsblatt der franzoesischen Oberkommandos in Deutschland was published for 
the first time, on September 3, 1945. This publication served chiefly to 
communicate laws and instructions to the people. It was followed, also in 
September, 1945, by the first licensed newspaper available in Zweibruecken, 
the Pfaelzische Volkszeitung. which came from Kaiserslautern. Immediately 
on the heels of the Pfaelzische Volkszeitung came another licensed paper, 
Die Rheinpfalz. In 1946, these two papers merged under the name of Die 
Rheinpfalz. This paper was the principal newspaper in Zweibruecken until
18
June 1950, when the Pfaelzischer Merkur joined it to serve the community.
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On balance, the Americans had considerable influence on German 
newspapers. By encouraging factual reporting, freedom of the press, and 
private ownership, they helped establish an enduring set of principles 
which have served the German people well.
Of these three principles, factual reporting is perhaps the hardest to 
assess, but neutrality and objectivity were unquestionable features in the 
German newspapers of the 1950s. Political alignment and subjectivity 
began to reappear in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s, but in a much milder 
form than existed in the Weimar years. American insistence on objectivity 
has been termed the most decisive part of American influence on the German 
press. Even with the renascence of special-interest papers and the greater 
subjectivity of later years, the separation of fact and opinion has 
remained largely "eingefleischt" (engrained) in German journalism, as com­
pared with the Weimar p e r i o d . 19
Aside from the specific guidance to be factual, American influences 
were felt in other ways by the German press. Whenever political activity 
by one of the major parties was reported, equal coverage for the opposition 
was required —  and generally given. Through the American-fostered press 
services, ever-faster means of communications, and modern business tech­
niques, a common press was furthered. The general cultural milieu was also 
altered —  aided by American ideas. This alteration was due, at least 
partly, to the faster pace of life which accompanied the economic growth; 
occupied with their new goals, the consumers of information became less and 
less patient with reading. Consequently, the so-called Boulevard Zeitungen 
with their snappy headlines prospered, and the public turned more and more
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to radio and the new medium of television.^0
Freedom of the press, with private ownership, was successfully 
reintroduced. German politicians, institutions, businesses, and prominent 
personalities were, and are, praised or criticized by the press much the 
same as in America, Great Britain, or France. Party newspapers were 
reinstated, although with relatively little effect. The insignificance of 
party papers can be attributed to how well the independent press has pro­
vided a full range of political views. Large-circulation, independent 
papers with different political philosophies are available throughout the 
country. Die Welt (right) the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(right-center), the Sueddeutsche Zeitung (left-center), and the Frankfurter 
Rundschau (left) are examples of papers which together cover the political 
spectrum.
Since the middle of the 1950s, the tendency has been towards fewer 
papers with ever-widening circulation for those that survive. Small local 
papers have been discontinued, while the remaining ones have been inclined 
to consolidate newsrooms. In 1954, there were 225 "full newsrooms" (manned 
by independent staffs). At that same time, there were thirteen million 
daily readers. By 1982, there were one hundred fewer full newsrooms, but 
the number of daily readers had grown to over twenty million. These 
changes are, to a large extent, the results of economic circumstances. 
Businessmen prefer to advertise in large papers, but by doing so, they put 
smaller papers out of business and thus risk silencing some of the weaker 
voices in the democracy. This, it should be recalled, is in conjunction 
with the consolidation of newsrooms. In other words, louder and more
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homogeneous voices are being heard by more and more people. This trend may 
be viewed as harmful, but in 1982 there were still 1,250 daily editions in
West Germany.22
Radio
Like newspapers, radio was seen by the Americans as an immediate 
necessity for the control and reorientation of the German people. Two 
million radio sets existed in the U.S. Zone. They provided an obvious 
channel for communicating with the millions of people whose activities were 
of concern. Some war-damaged stations were actually repaired and func­
tioning under U.S. control even before the fighting was over. Radio was 
also returned to German management early. By June 30, 1949, every state 
in the U.S. Zone had approved radio laws, and on that date, when Radio 
Stuttgart was turned over to German management, the Germans assumed control 
of their own airways. American Radio Officers stayed on as consultants and 
observers until 1955, but effectively the Germans were masters of their 
own broadcast m e d i a . 23
In spite of the fact that the transfer of responsibility was 
accomplished rather quickly, it had not been a simple task. The initial 
requirement to put out information to the conquered Germans had been 
satisfied by using German-speaking Americans and jerry-rigged transmitters 
made up of the remnants of German stations with American parts ajtd genera­
tors. Sufficient experienced personnel could not be found among the poli­
tically unobjectionable Germans, so the Americans trained acceptable Germans 
in every aspect of broadcast journalism. Technicians, broadcasters, and
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writers all had to be prepared. Most of the training took place on the job 
with Americans doing the initial training, but the Germans quickly accepted 
the responsibility, trained more people, and successfully formed the 
nucleus of a free radio system which, although not individually owned and 
operated (as Americans would have preferred), nevertheless provided coverage 
of the significant elements of community life. Politics, culture, reli­
gion, agriculture, industry, labor, youth organizations, and women's 
groups were all represented. The American Military Government carefully 
cultivated the growth of radio and insured that the stations would be free 
of government control by having the appropriate safeguards written into 
each state's laws before relinquishing control; the states had to incor­
porate broadcasting codes which would guarantee objective news reporting on 
divergent views of public interest. The codes had to prohibit broadcasts 
of a nature considered to be harmful (prejudical to the occupying powers or 
supportive of militant nationalism or totalitarianism). With these few 
exceptions, commentators were able to express their opinions on the air.
The American officials desired the radio stations to be under 
decentralized control to prohibit any future seizure by a centralized 
regime. The evil use of the radio for propaganda purposes, as had been 
achieved by Goebbels, was never to be repeated.24
The U.S. radio officials influenced both the style and content of 
German programming and helped form the tastes of the postwar listener by 
the nature of the offerings. German audiences became acquainted with 
American-type broadcasts. Programs emphasizing democratic processes ("Town 
Meeting of the Air"), religious values, and political responsibilities were
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broadcast regularly. And the Voice of America (VOA), produced by the U.S. 
State Department, was a nightly feature. This thirty-minute program nor­
mally presented news, commentary, educational features and music to German 
listeners during the evening mealtime. The broadcast came via short wave 
from New York. It was in German and carried on every German station. In 
1951, the program length was reduced to fifteen minutes and the frequency 
of broadcasts changed from nightly to six nights per week. By then, VOA 
was directed more at the audience behind the Iron Curtain than at the West 
Germans. Three years later, in 1954, seventy-five percent of VOA broad­
casts were aimed at listeners either behind the Iron or Bamboo Curtains.
West Germans could continue to listen to the broadcasts, however, isasmuch 
as broadcasts were still in German to reach people in East Germany.25
The American Forces Network was another source of influence. German 
listeners often tuned in to hear the swing music; but those who understood 
English had the opportunity to hear news, commentary, and entertainment 
intended for the troops. One of the more popular American programs was "The 
Ten of the Week." It featured the top ten American songs —  songs which 
Germans learned to like as well.26 For those Germans intent on learning or 
improving their English, the American Forces Network was also an 
educational tool.27
From a technical point of view, the Americans went beyond showing the 
Germans how to operate. U.S. radio officials encouraged the development of 
frequency modulation to cope with the shortage of frequencies.
Furthermore, they prohibited the operation of radio stations by special 
interest groups, such as political parties, labor unions etc., due to the
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shortage of frequencies and the advantages which would accrue to any group 
that succeeded in getting its own station.
But the U.S. representatives were not able to impose all their views
concerning the organization of the radio system. Organizational issues had 
to be worked out through discussions with the Allies and with the Germans 
themselves. To be their representative in these deliberations the British 
Military Government appointed Sir Hugh Greene, a bilingual official of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation, as the Radio Control Officer. He worked 
extensively with both state officials and Radio Hamburg, which became the 
Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk in 1948, the zonal radio network. The American 
position was formulated and advanced by the U.S. Military Government's 
Information Control Division. These officials had various discussion part­
ners, since they negotiated with Landtag committees in the various Laender.
One area where Americans were unsuccessful had to do with the genera­
tion of revenues to offset operating expenses. Americans urged the Germans
to emulate the American system of broadcasting commercials and charging for 
the advertising services, but the Germans wanted instead to collect a 
listener's fee from every radio owner. This method was already in use 
elsewhere in Europe, and it had been used in Germany before. The British 
supported the idea of a nationwide network with users' fees. The 
Americans, after encountering resistance to a privately owned and 
commercially financed system, recommended that each state determine how the 
stations in its area would be operated.
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Both the Americans and British opposed the idea of a state-run radio 
network, but the Germans preferred state management. The German argument 
was that if they placed radio broadcasting in the state's hands, it would 
be controlled by elected officials and therefore democratic. A compromise 
was needed. The Germans conceded on state controls but insisted on a 
control mechanism that would guarantee a balance.^8 The resulting compro­
mise, as set up between 1948 and 1956, established nine broadcasting cor­
porations that are publicly owned and regionally operated.29 These 
corporations derive most of their revenues from users' fees but are 
authorized to broadcast commercials on a limited basis. Each corporation 
is governed by: A Rundfunkrat (broadcasting council), which functions as
a parliament; a Verwaltungsrat (administrative council), which supervises 
the daily operations; and an Intendant (director-general), who, as the 
chief executive, is responsible for the control of program contents.30 
Each broadcasting council has members representing various components of 
the population it serves: political parties, church groups, unions, 
employees' organizations, agricultural groups, newspaper publishers, 
welfare societies, sports confederations, refugee organizations, educa­
tional societies, women's groups, and youth services. These represen­
tatives are either elected by the respective state parliaments or appointed 
by the particular groups they represent. The administrative councils are 
appointed by the broadcasting councils. The French did not have a decisive 
part in formulating broadcasting policy, but they agreed to the compromise. 
Thus broadcasting in all the states in West Germany came under a common set 
of rules, but it was managed regionally with a dual based means of 
financing operations.31
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To guarantee the broadcast councils would pursue democratic goals, 
courses of indoctrination were established and every council member had to 
attend such a c o u r s e . 32 These councils continued throughout the decade 
of the fifties with many of the managers originally selected by the 
Americans. The provisions established between 1948 and 1956 still exist 
and have been expanded to include television as well.
Books and Periodicals
The paper shortage which plagued the newspaper business until 1948 
had a somewhat greater impact on the book and periodical industry.
Because the newspapers were of more immediate value, they received a higher 
priority for the scarce printing materials. Also, distribution channels 
were paralyzed in the immediate postwar days. Nevertheless, it was not 
long before books and periodicals were again on the market. The first 
publisher to be granted a license by the Americans was Hermann Meister of 
Heidelberg, who published works of general interest. One of his first pro­
ducts was a German translation of Benjamin Franklin's autobiography.
The restrictions applied to the publication of books and periodicals 
essentially mirrored those applied to newspapers. Anything harmful to 
Allied policies or supportive of National Socialism or militarism was pro­
hibited. Forbidden works were collected, pulped, and then turned into new 
paper. Most bookdealers readily complied with Allied policies, and their 
cooperation enabled the U.S. authorities to allow bookdealers to operate on 
an honor system. As long as they did not offer prohibited items they could 
stay open. This system worked remarkably well, and only a few warnings or 
closures were imposed.
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The political reliability of the publishers had to be established, since 
they made the written works available. In contrast, authors were not sub­
jected to the same s c r u t i n y . A t  first Americans depended on the so- 
called "white publishers" (publishers who somehow had avoided contamination 
by the Nazis), but in October 1945, the Boersenverein (the German book- 
trade association) was reestablished in Wiesbaden. This institution 
served as an instrument of the U.S. occupation regime by controlling German 
publishers and funneling American guidance to them. Licensing of a 
publisher was accomplished only after the applicant satisfied the American 
authorities that the license would be used to produce works serving 
democratic ideas and principles. Each applicant had to answer questions 
relative to his political views and to file a publication plan for one year in 
advance, complete with all titles to be published.
As a rule, all editions were limited to five thousand copies due to 
the paper shortage. There was no censoring prior to publication. As in 
the case of newspapers, all monitoring of content was done on a post­
publication basis. The Americans did help control the content, however, 
through an information service program which provided news, features, and 
editorials from America. Through this service, Amerika Dienst, and the 
right to reprint American magazine articles, the U.S. authorities channeled 
American views into German publications and into German minds.^ As a 
result of governmental urging, more than one hundred American periodicals 
gave free reprint rights to German publishers. Senior Scholastic,
Farmer's Digest, Science Newsletter, Catholic News, The Christian Science 
Monitor, New York Times Magazine, Atlantic Monthly, and the Saturday 
Evening Post were among those who allowed free use of their a r t i c l e  s . ^5
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Naturally, not all of the articles recommended for use were printed, but a 
large number were. The articles covered a wide range of interests.
Popular science, social and political science, agriculture, education, art, 
religion, philosophy, psychology, and labor were some of the more common 
topics. Some of the more notable German periodicals were: Die Wandlung, a
literary and scholarly publication in Heidelberg; Sie, a magazine for 
women; Ulenspiegel, a magazine modeled on the earlier Simplicissimus; and 
Per Penguin and Per Horizont, both of which were magazines for young 
people.
The Americans also imported American books in translation; 35,000 
copies of twenty-five works were imported during the first six months of 
the occupation.36 This was only a temporary measure, as the right to print 
American works in Germany soon obviated the necessity for importing books 
from America. German publishers printed such things as biographies of 
Abraham Lincoln, Daniel Boone, and Benjamin Franklin. They also turned 
out some of Margaret Mead's writings, and various works on democracy. In 
the fiction area, Ernest Hemingway, Thomas Wolfe, James Thurber, Herman 
Melville, and Nathaniel Hawthorne were all made available to German 
readers.37
To promote the translation of American books, the American Military 
Government set up and ran the Book Translating Unit, a part of the 
Information Control Division. Even after commercial channels were opened 
between American and German publishers in 1950, the unit continued. By 
March, 1953, 341 American books had been translated under this program. As 
an additional bit of assistance to further the translating of American
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books, the Book Translating Unit published a monthly bulletin, Buecher aus 
Amerika. This bulletin, which went to both British and U.S. Zones, 
explained how German publishers could acquire translation rights and 
suggested books thought suitable for use in Germany. The Americans made 
special issues of paper stock to German publishers to print translated 
American works and then recouped the costs of the stock by buying the 
printed books at a fifty percent discount. The books purchased by the 
Americans were resold, some through the America Houses.38
The American authorities gave the translating process the necessary 
impetus and offered American works to German readers, but that was only a 
start. The process continued, and in the years that followed, thousands 
more were translated, and, as Germans became more proficient in English, the 
flow of American books to Germany grew even stronger. By 1965, Germany was 
importing over 800,000 American books per year, and by 1970, the figure was 
close to three 3,000,000.39
Just as there were overt U.S. newspapers, there were overt U.S. 
periodicals. Die amerikanische Rundschau was a somewhat scholarly publica­
tion which aimed to cultivate interest in Western values; it existed from 
1948 until February 1950. The Neue Auslese had a larger circulation than 
the Rundschau, 650,000 monthly as compared to 120,000 monthly. It was 
rather like the Reader's Digest and featured articles on politics, econo­
mics, society, and culture. The Neue Auslese remained available until 
August 1950, when it was stopped, due to declining circulation and financial 
difficulties. Heute. which was published from 1945 through 1951, was a
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bi-weekly magazine which used photographs extensively. It was much like 
Life magazine, and devoted considerable space to American institutions and 
customs; articles on the corner drugstore, county fairs, and elections were 
typical offerings. In the beginning, Heute had stressed collective German 
guilt and responsibility for suffering, but those themes were at odds with 
the American view that the Nazi leaders rather than the people at large 
were guilty.40
Publications crossed readily over zonal boundaries in the West, and two 
excellent examples of early German periodicals that succeeded are Die Zeit, 
a weekly paper with liberal inclinations, and Per Spiegel. Both originated 
in the British Zone. Die Zeit was the first non-union weekly paper printed 
in the British Zone and was the derivative of a daily, Per Tag, which 
suited the tastes of the British Military Government. Die Zeit was 
suspended on two occasions for violating rules, one of which involved 
criticism of the Morgenthau Plan. Per Spiegel was modeled on Time in the 
U.S.A. and Social Review in Great Britain. In the beginning, Per Spiegel 
was called Diese Woche and was published by Germans under the auspices of 
the British Military Government. The magazine soon irritated the occupying 
powers, especially the British, and after only five issues, the Crown 
served notice that either the editorial staff would have to find private 
financing or be shut down. (The British took action when the magazine 
published an uncomplimentary photo and article on the Netherlands' royal 
family. Since both Britain and the Netherlands held their monarchies 
in high esteem, something had to be done.) Private financing was arranged, 
the name changed to Per Spiegel, and publication continued. The first
edition under the new name appeared on January 4, 1947. The editors chose 
to pursue a critical line, complaining about mistakes of the occupying pow­
ers and searching out graft and corruption wherever they could find it.
Per Spiegel was often a thorn in the Allies' side, even though the 
publisher once concluded, "It is not our task to denounce every Allied 
mistake." The French once labled Per Spiegel as "the magazine of militant 
nonconformism." Both Pie Zeit and Per Spiegel were published throughout the 
1950s and remain popular today.^1
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Chapter 7
Other Influences On The Cultural Milieu
How the Germans spent their free time was also of concern. Opinions 
which could be influenced during periods of leisure were just as important 
as those which were formed during the hours of work. The motion picture 
industry, the theater, musical productions, and literature all received 
their share of American attention. The Information Control Division was an 
instrument for affecting what the Germans saw, heard, and read during the 
crucial rebuilding phase. The Information Control Division was an element 
within the Office of Military Government for Germany; it was the focal 
point for the implementation of Information Programs and Cultural Policies 
established by the U.S. Military Government. Decisions made in this divi­
sion were based on pertinent guidelines from the U.S. Government and Policy 
letters, such as those issued by General Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. Military 
Governor.
In 1948, the Information Control Division underwent the first of 
three changes in terms of title and intensity of control, but its basic 
function, i.e., guiding information disseminated to the German people con­
tinued. In that year, the Information Services Division (ISD) was founded 
with a subordinate office located in each state in the U.S. Zone. The ISD 
had eleven branches staffed by over two hundred Americans and more than 
two thousand Germans. In 1952 the ISD was renamed the Information 
Division, and the state-level offices were disbanded. The dissolution of 
those offices did not mean the function of information guidance was
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abandoned; it was more of a relaxation, with the Public Affairs Regional 
Centers assuming the necessary monitoring and coordinating functions. The 
Information Division and the Public Affairs Regional Centers existed until 
the end of the occupation.^ At that point, the Office of the High 
Commissioner was converted to a U.S. embassy with a public affairs office.
Motion Pictures
There were two large motion picture production studios in the U.S. 
Zone. One of these was in Munich and the other in Berlin. The Munich stu­
dio, Bavaria Film Kunst, was captured in good condition while the one in 
Berlin was seventy-five percent destroyed. Both studios were reopened 
under American supervision, and their facilities were used initially to 
adapt films sent to Germany from America for reorientation purposes. The 
studios were soon turned over to German control, but they continued to 
operate under U.S. Military Government policy. German producers were 
licensed by the Americans, who approved the scripts, monitored production, 
and reviewed the finished products. On the business side, the U.S.
Military Government broke up the motion picture cartel (Universal Film 
Allianz) and prescribed the reorganization of the industry into four 
separate entities: production, studio operation, distribution, and exhibi­
tion. The German-made films were placed on the market in competition with 
those which were imported, mainly from the U.S.A. Additionally, American 
commercial films with German sound tracks were widely shown. The German 
sound tracks were added in Germany under the supervision of Americans.
The Bells of St. Mary's, One Foot in Heaven, and Holiday Inn were some of
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the more popular films.2 Attendance records kept until February, 1946 
show that 13,980,952 Germans had seen American-made films.3
Educational films from America were also frequently shown to German 
audiences. The Library of Congress, Tuesday In November (a film on the 
American election process), The Great Lakes, New England, and The Rural 
Co-op were all seen in both the U.S. and British zones. Other films 
included discussions on such diverse subjects as nursery training, music, 
and soapbox derbies. It is perhaps significant that at a time when 
luxuries were at a premium and going to a motion picture was a luxury, 
Germans were conditioned to associate times of enjoyment with American 
ideas. They also formed concepts of standards of living by watching films 
which featured a country endowed with riches and populated by people free 
to indulge in all that their land had to offer. This situation reinforced 
the democratic and capitalistic ideas espoused by the Americans in Germany 
and no doubt kindled desires for the good life.
American films served as a standard for German producers. The newly 
licensed producers had to compete with American movies, and so they 
adopted American techniques, processes, and approaches to production. The 
first films produced by Germans after the war tried to be realistic by 
describing conditions and attempting to deal with the past. This came to 
be called the Truemmer (rubble) phase. The film Die Moerder sind unter uns 
(The Murderers Among Us)(1946) is a prime example of a Truemmer film. It 
depicted the quest for Nazi criminals in postwar Germany. The Truemmer 
phase was replaced by a wave of films, nostalgic in nature, which were
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referred to as Heimat films, a picture postcard portrayal of happy country 
life. Romy Schneider's Sissi films, set in an idealized imperial Austria 
fall into this category.
These Heimat films were a variation of what was known as the UFA 
(Universal Film Allianz) cliche. The UFA cliche was, for all practical 
purposes, a standardized formula which had long been used in the German 
film industry, but it was not strong enough to hold off changes from 
Hollywood.
Germans had been sealed off from American-made films for several 
years, and the Hollywood style proved to be very attractive; there was a 
newness, a freshness about it which appealed to German audiences. Thus the 
UFA cliche was diminished by the Hollywood cliche, which lasted into the 
1960s. This American formula usually called for a story somewhat divorced 
from reality, "a dream factory," or a cultural hero. One such film was 
The Big Chance, which featured an aspiring German pianist who finally got 
the chance to play with Louis Armstrong.^ Within a few years, the 
Hollywood cliche was fully integrated into the German film industry, and 
German films had gained in popularity. In 1954, seventy-eight percent of 
the Germans preferred German-made films, many of which employed American 
techniques, but American films still exceeded by far the number of films 
from any other country. By the time the decade of the sixties dawned, the 
German film industry was producing in excess of 140 films a year, some of 
which were American. Kirk Douglas' The Vikings; Interlude, staring June 
Allyson; and the Werner von Braun story, I Aim at the Stars, were all pro­
duced in Germany for American audiences. This quantity paralleled
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Germany's largest pre-war production year of 1930, when 146 films had been 
produced. Even after German films had returned to favor, American film 
stars remained popular. For example, in 1964 two of the top ten female 
stars were Americans. Elizabeth Taylor and Doris Day ranked eighth and 
ninth, respectively, and Rock Hudson was in ninth place among the favorite 
male stars. A year later, Doris Day was number ten in the female category, 
while Rock Hudson had risen to the number two spot among the male perfor- 
mers.^
The motion picture field had its "overt" production, as did the 
newspapers and magazines. The U.S. and British Military Governments com­
bined their efforts in a weekly newBreel called Welt im Film. This 
newsreel, which ran in over two thousand movie houses, was produced in the 
studios of the Bavaria Film Kunst in Munich and served to inform German 
audiences on international events and other major news stories.** A survey 
in 1950 revealed that seventy-seven percent of the filmgoers saw Welt im 
Film every time they went to the movies, and almost all of them rated it 
"good" or "fair."7
To augment Welt im Film and the controls exercised over the other 
films shown to Germans, the U.S. Military Government produced special docu­
mentary films to educate German youth on Nazi crimes and postwar American 
aid. A special, animated film called Races of Mankind depicting 
understanding and brotherhood was particularly well received —  a ninty- 
three percent approval rate.® These films were Bhown to assemblages of the 
Army's GYA program. By the middle of 1947, 200,000 youths per month were 
watching these special films.^
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Theater
Further influence on German cultural affairs was exerted by the 
Americans in the world of the theater. This was done largely by 
encouraging the German theater to present American plays. By portraying 
American life on the stage, the theater added another dimension to 
America's influence on the lives of individual Germans. The Information 
Control Division assisted in getting the necessary permission to produce 
American plays in Germany. Once a clearance was granted, the play was 
translated into German and frequently performed in all zones. American 
plays constituted a sizable portion of the plays presented; for example, 
during the month of January, 1947 there were twenty-seven American plays 
presented in Berlin. This amounted to fifty percent of all the plays in 
all of Berlin at that time.^®
In the years that followed, American plays continued to comprise a 
significant percentage of the productions staged in Germany. A special 
report prepared at the American Embassy in Bonn in June of 1962, for the 
years 1956 to 1961, showed that almost ten percent of the professional 
plays performed during those years were American. In addition to quantity, 
quality was also present. In every year but one, there were at least three 
American plays among the top twenty-five in terras of performances. The 
Diary of Anne Frank, by Goodrich and Hackett, was the single most popular 
play; it was performed four thousand times during the period. Other popu­
lar American playwrights were Eugene O'Neill, Thornton Wilder, Tennesse 
Williams, and Arthur Miller. The special report concluded, "evidently the
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American 'Modern Classics' have become an integral part of the German 
language theater's repertoire.
The America Houses played an important role in introducing American
plays into the German repertoire. The America House personnel cultivated
close personal contacts with theater people, recommended titles, provided
copies, furnished critical reviews, publicized the plays, printed programs,
conducted discussions on the plays, and gave guidance on such things as
12backgrounds, costumes, and props.
Music
Americans made no pretense of being culturally superior to the Germans 
from an historical perspective, particularly in respect to music. The 
timeless contributions of the great, classical composers remained 
unchallenged, but works which conjured up feelings associated with the 
Third Reich were banned. In their place, the Americans introduced the 
works of American composers. American chamber music, orchestral works, and 
opera were all performed. To encourage the acceptance of American music, 
the American authorities in Germany obtained permission for several cate­
gories of German musicians to perform American works at no expense. German 
students, conservatories, and critics had free access to American works. 
However, those Germans who chose to use such compositions for commercial 
reasons had to pay modest rental fees for copies of the scores.
American experts came to Germany and lectured on music as well.
178
Typical of the lecture topics were: "Trends in Contemporary North and
South American Music," "American Folk Music," and "American Popular Music 
or Jazz During the Past 30 years." Germans were certainly no strangers to 
American music. Swing music was favored by some Germans even before the 
Americans arrived as conquerors, but through concerted efforts to show 
the wide variety of music offered in America, the number of fans of 
American music grew considerably. It was the intent of the U.S. authori­
ties to demonstrate that the sociological climate in America encouraged 
musical education and development, and thus musicians who had fled Nazi 
Germany and taken up residence in America received special attention. 
American musicians went on tour in Germany, U.S. military bands played
countless concerts, and the music of the American Forces Network (AFN) was
13popular with many Germans, particularly the young.
The American Forces Network always had a large shadow audience. It 
was perhaps the single greatest source of American influence on the 
Germans' taste for music. As stated above, AFN was also educational; it 
was a common practice for Germans to listen to AFN to improve their 
understanding of the English language. The net effect of America on popu­
lar German music was overwhelming. Jazz and rock and roll became integral 
parts of German music. Nowhere was this acceptance more evident than in 
the reception given to Elvis Presley and his guitar. He was recognized 
everywhere in Germany and had the same kind of frenzied fans as he had in 
America.
American music and films were but two aspects of the popular culture 
transferred from America to Germany. A whole host of material things which 
symbolized America were accepted in Germany, more so by the young than the
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old. American cigarettes, chewing gum, comic books, Coca Cola, and blue 
jeans were among the more obvious i t e m s . S o m e  of the initial acceptance
may have stemmed from the sheer availability of American items and the
dearth of comparable German items, but in the long run other, more signifi­
cant factors also influenced it. By accepting these material things, the 
Germans were accepting the "good America."^ They were accepting a new 
life style, one of freedom, individuality, and abundance —  all consistent 
with the lessons of democracy preached by Americans.
Literature
Where literature was concerned, the Germans were at a crossroads. The
authors of the late 1940s and the 1950s searched for new frames of
reference. The recent past provided little of which they could be proud. 
Henry M. Pachter, the author of Modern Germany: A Social, Cultural, and
Political History, wrote that they had to seek roots or affinities in the 
"modern development of the western countries...[they] found... cultural 
orientation in western literature." German authors adopted a mind-set 
which led them to view their task "first of all as a political mission: 
overcoming the past, preaching new attitudes, reorienting the mind of 
Germany."*? They chose social and political themes to serve this end, but 
these themes were not very popular. The immediate postwar period was so 
dreary that the German people sought to forget the past. Surrounded with 
rubble in their daily lives, they looked for relief in their literature.
The German authors of this time were too serious and moralistic, so German 
readers turned to the classics or to foreign works which had been
180
prohibited during the Third Reich. As time passed, the Germans were caught 
up in the process of making the economic miracle succeed. They rebuilt 
their homes and lives and wanted to be comfortable. They repressed the 
past and reveled in their new-found prosperity. Art and beauty began to be 
appreciated again, along with old values. The new German writers needed 
time to establish themselves, so foreign writers continued to be popular. 
American writers had the highly desirable quality of "world openness," so 
German writers imitated them. Hemingway, Faulkner, and other Americans 
served as models for German writers who copied their narrative style and 
use of everyday language.^
But not everyone greeted the American influence with open arms. There 
was some resentment. For example, one commentator found it "not flat­
tering to us [Germans] that America, on which we like to look down a
little, should have created the idealistic literature of our times, novels
19
born of an idealistic concept of the world and of values." Furthermore, 
literary critics sometimes observed that German readers were subjected to 
mediocre German imitations, as an avalanche of pulp literature and the 
fifty-pfennig thriller modeled on True Story and the Wild West Story poured 
into the market. Eventually there were complaints that German readers were 
becoming both weary and wary of American l i t e r a t u r e . I n  time, German 
authors came to be popular in postwar Germany, but throughout the decade 
of the fifties, American influence was pronounced, and American writers 
remained popular. In fact, Horst Oppel stated in Studies in Comparative 
Literature in 1962 that American writers were still preferred in Germany.
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Oppel commented:
Around the middle of the 19th century Edgar Allan Poe made 
the well-known statement in his "Letter to Mr. B.": "You are
aware of the great barrier in the path of an American 
writer. He is read, if at all, in preference to the combined 
and established wit of the world." And now, a hundred years 
later, it is tempting to change this to read: "You are
aware of the great barrier in the path of a German writer, 
he is read, if at all, in preference to the combined and 
established wit of America.". . . There is not the slightest 
doubt of the preferences of the general public today.21
Art
To reorient an entire society is no easy task. In the case of 
Germany, not only the building blocks of society (educational and political 
institutions, economic system, and class structure) had to be modified, but 
daily experiences as well. Thus, even the casual experience of viewing a 
painting or visiting a museum had a significance larger than usual and 
became a matter for the attention of the American authorities in Germany in 
the postwar period. They were not blind to such opportunities to reorient 
German thinking. Efforts were made to free contemporary German art from 
Nazi influence and to make the German museum a democratic institution.
Since the creation of a work of art is a subjective process, no attempt was 
made to manage it, but the Americans were able to encourage free 
expression, provide support, open the door to new ideas, and offer oppor­
tunities for growth.
As far as the preservation of existing works of art and historical 
items was concerned, the Americans left their mark on the many museums in 
German towns and cities. Americans contributed to the restoration and 
safeguarding of structures, monuments, and other works of art. These
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were important things to culturally minded Germans who were not preoccupied
with the search for food and shelter, and as the necessities became less of
a problem, Germany's monuments, art collections and museum pieces came to
mean more and more to a wider segment of German society. Wherever
possible, cultural reorientation was addressed, but those in charge
realized it was a long-term project. Dr. William G. Constable, a special
consultant to the U.S. Military Government in 1949, predicted the desired
changes would take at least fifteen to twenty years. Authorities
acknowledged real change would come about only by influencing the young
people and waiting for them to move into positions of responsibility. The
22
older generation would, it was believed, resist change.
The overall program for the rejuvenation and preservation of art
was approached with a certain degree of caution. It was not simply a
matter of allowing artists to do as they chose or of saving articles of
cultural value, because the Americans felt that while these things were
important there was also the danger of rekindling intense nationalism and
23
building the German ego too high.
As with the rest of the reorientation program, it was held that the 
American role of control and direction should be replaced as quickly as 
possible by one more oriented towards advice, assistance, and supervision. 
The Germans were to shoulder the responsibilities and reconstruct their own 
world of art —  but in consonance with American aims. The American approach 
suggested that the previous emphasis on nationalism in art had stymied the 
growth of liberal and nonnationalistic elements in Germany. To regenerate 
creativity, the great names of the past (Duerer, Bach, Goethe et al.) were
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celebrated. But to avoid developing overwhelming pride in Germany's 
accomplishments, it was considered wise to stress how democratic and 
liberal ideas inspire cultural activities and how democracy and liberalism 
would strengthen Germany's best elements.^
U.S. policy makers in Germany sponsored exhibitions of art from nations 
other than Germany to emphasize the achievements of non-German artists and 
to help correct the German bias for German art cultivated by National 
Socialism. American artists frequently were featured to influence German 
thinking along democratic lines, but attempts at direct and deliberate pro­
paganda were avoided. Simply seeing the products of talented, free minds 
was considered a valuable experience. Exhibitions included photographs and 
drawings of American architecture and commercial and industrial items of 
art which had the potential to influence the life and outlook of Germans as 
they rebuilt their country. Exhibitions of American art appeared in all 
areas of West Germany, and American money, organization, or sponsorship 
contributed to numerous other exhibitions; the American share was generally 
made clear by notices in the exhibitions or in newspaper articles about 
them. The exhibition of good, contemporary works by German artists was 
encouraged by the Americans to stimulate rivalry, raise standards, and 
encourage experimentation. It is interesting that the American exhibits 
usually did not include artists of German birth who had moved to America. 
This was to prevent claims that they were really German artists. Why this 
argument was considered valid for artists but not musicians was never made 
clear.25
Other efforts were made by American officials to advance art in
184
Germany. The appointment of liberal-minded men as art professors was 
urged. University curricula were altered to include the study of art. 
University museums were established where students could study and actually 
handle works of art. Libraries were equipped with books, photographs, and 
slides to facilitate learning. Help in obtaining art materials was given. 
And art teachers were trained, some in America and some in the Teachers 
Training Centers by American art teachers. Generally speaking, the empha­
sis placed on art by the Americans was intended to benefit the masses.
A widespread appreciation of art and art history was a goal, as was the 
provision of the tools and training for average artists. Beyond this type
of concern, there were no special provisions to accommodate men or women of 
26genius.
Museums
Closely related to the rejuvenation and reorientation of art was the 
American regard for museums. During the years 1933 to 1945, museums in 
Germany had served the National Socialists1 cause. In the process they had 
lost their worldwide preeminence, and, due to isolation, their curators had 
failed to keep abreast of the changes that had occurred elsewhere. 
Traditionally, German museums had been regarded as places for educated 
people; they had not served the cause of democracy. The state of the 
German museum in 1949 was described by Dr. Constable, the special con­
sultant to the U.S. Military Government for cultural affairs.
[The] hours of opening are rarely convenient for those who work 
all day and most of the week, at least one museum I know being 
closed on Saturdays and Sundays. The charging of entrance fees 
is practically universal. Exhibits are tidily arranged but are
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apt to be overcrowded, and are not as a rule grouped to give 
accent and meaning; labels give the minimum of information and 
are useful only if the visitor has some previous knowledge.
There are exceptions to all this, but for the most part there is 
little idea of making the museum friendly, attractive and 
comprehensible to ordinary men and women.
Little is done or intended to be done to make museums part of the 
educational system by such means as lectures, a "docent" ser­
vice, collaboration with schools, and through publications.
There is little attempt to vary the arrangement of exhibits 
except to make room for new acquisitions. The ideas of special 
groupings, frequent loan exhibitions, and short loans among 
museums, are rare. Even when they exist they may be marred by 
faulty carrying o.ut. In one museum an "Exhibit of the Week" was 
put out on a screen in the middle of the gallery, but no infor­
mation as to the artist, the subject, or the significance of the 
work was given. In consequence, few people gave it more than 
a passing glance.
Though most museums are state or city owned, little is done to 
foster the idea of their belonging to their community, and being 
responsible to that community. Rather, the^are regarded as 
part of the sacred machinery of government.
To correct this state of affairs, Dr. Constable recommended the 
U.S. take an active role in the reconstruction of the museums and that the 
entire plan of operations in German museums be oriented towards making 
them more democratic. Dr. Constable's recommendations covered three 
broad areas: (1) curator qualifications, (2) operations, and (3) physcial
facilities.
Curators, according to Dr. Constable, should be trained in America 
with American experts brought to Germany to teach other German curators.
It was suggested that the total concept of museum operations be 
revised to accommodate the average person. Displays should be attractively 
arranged, well lighted, and labeled with adequate explanations so that
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visitors would be able to understand the displays. The cost of admission 
should be low enough that the masses could afford to frequent museums, and 
admission should even be free at times, with hours of operation being 
extended to include weekends or evenings. This would allow workers to 
visit. Preservation and restoration techniques also needed improvement;
Dr. Constable urged that American techniques be adopted.
The physical facilities needed to be different in order for them to 
serve the communities. In Dr. Constable's estimation, the museums should 
not be reconstructed in a "brick-for-brack fashion" (not exactly as they 
were before), but rather in a manner which would make them useful contribu­
tors to cultural growth and understanding. Lecture halls, study areas, and
28explanatory pamphlets or guides should all be features of German museums.
The American officials took the consultant's recommendations. Some
elements of the plan progressed faster than others. For example, the
exchange of curators did not take place until the 1970s in some places and
in many not at all. But, in principle, all of these recommendations were
carried out in West Germany as a whole. Display techniques, lecture halls,
labeling, guide books, weekend hours, and low-cost or free admission in
today's German museums are all attributable at least in part, to American
influence. In sum, the American influence on German museums contributed to
an increased understanding by the average German of the past and of
29cultural achievements and relationships.
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Churches
Historically, the churches had played an important role in the life of 
the German people, and American policy towards religion in Germany con­
sidered this historical role. While Hitler had been in power, the churches 
had been forced to make compromises. It was America's goal to allow the 
churches to become a moral and spiritual force once again. To an extent 
this required passive guidance, but it also necessitated establishing and 
articulating the rules.
American policy prescribed freedom of worship, protection and fair 
treatment for the various religious elements, and respect for churches and 
religious institutions. The authors of the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic codified the American policy of freedom of religion. Article 4 
states:
Freedom of faith, of conscience, and freedom of creed in religion 
and in philosophy of life are inviolable. The practice of 
religion without interference is guaranteed.
The American goals were to eliminate Nazi influences, prevent the 
recrudescence of nationalism and guarantee fair play for all competing 
interests. Other than that, American control was to be held, to a minimum. 
Toward these ends, the American authorities established a Religious Affairs 
Branch. But to illustrate how little attention was given to the subject of 
religion, paragraph 8.33 of the Guide to Education and Cultural Relations, 
published by the High Commissioner, simply stated that the Religious 
Affairs Branch:
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a. Assists church organizations and inter-faith groups 
in formulating programs to utilize their spiritual and 
moral resources in the establishment of a free society 
based on social justice and the dignity of man.
b. Assists and encourages all German elements promoting 
freedom of religion, interfaith understanding, and coop­
eration in international religious relations.30
To accomplish this mission, the Religious Affairs Branch had only a handful 
of staff. Originally there were eight professionals in the central office 
and six field representatives spread out over the U.S. Zone and Berlin. 
When the High Commission was established in 1949, the numbers dropped to 
three professionals in the Religious Affairs Branch and four in the 
field.31
The Americans who made the most frequent and most direct contact with 
German church leaders were not from the U.S. Military Government or High 
Commission but rather representatives sent to Germany by the churches in 
America. The visitors fell in two categories. The first category was 
comprised of individuals sent, at the behest of General Clay, by the three 
predominant religious faiths in America to provide liason with German reli­
gious communities. Each faith (Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish) 
sent one such representative to Germany and paid that person's salary. The 
U.S. military in Germany afforded the liaison representatives limited 
logistic support but no formal assistance. They provided information on 
religious developments to the occupation authorities and served as a chan­
nel for passing on to the Germans any information on religious matters from 
the occupation officials deemed appropriate, but they were not part of the 
occupation establishment.32
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While religious agents working directly for the occupation authorities 
were relatively few, voluntary church agencies existed in substantial num­
bers, and through them American congregations provided a second set of 
emissaries to help German churches recover* The National Catholic Welfare 
Conference, Church World Service, Lutheran World Relief, the Mennonite 
Central Committee, The Bretheren, The Unitarians, the American Friends 
Service Committee, and the Mormons were the major voluntary organizations. 
In order to operate in Germany, such agencies had to be licensed in the 
United States by the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in 
Germany (CRALOG) and to have the approval of the U.S. Military Government, 
but they operated throughout West Germany and Berlin.
The exchange program managed by the Americans included church person­
nel and visiting consultants. And the U.S. High Commsission cooperated with 
the World Council of Churches on numerous conferences on international and 
ecumenical matters in the three zones in the West. These conferences were 
complemented by social action programs set up with the permission of the 
occupation authorities, and collectively they made important contributions 
to progress in the religious affairs field.
All things considered, the most emphasis was placed on helping church 
groups establish themselves as community-oriented service organizations 
which encouraged individuals to accept social and political respon­
sibilities along with their moral responsibilities as members of a 
church.34 xn Zweibruecken, the American church organizations set an 
example by sponsoring activities such as dinners, games, picnics, and 
Christmas parties for German children. Specific examples of these church 
activities are provided in Chapter 8 below.
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American relief agencies frequently worked through the German churches 
to channel gifts from America to needy families, orphanages, and other 
institutions; this was the case in Zweibruecken, as well as elsewhere. And 
groups from American church congregations in the military communities often 
had contact with German church groups. But Americans did not control the 
German churches. To be sure, there were times when the U.S. decision 
makers attempted to make use of the churches. For example, the American 
authorities encouraged the churches to exert influence on the trade unions 
to temper their tendencies towards socialism, which sometimes brought the 
unions dangerously close to communism, but how much influence the churches 
had was always questionable. The trade unions often were in the hands of 
the socialist party (SPD), and the SPD and the churches had a history of 
being adversaries. The number of organized efforts made by the U.S. 
Military Government and High Commission dropped significantly in 1950, due 
to budget cuts. At that time, voluntary efforts took on even greater
importance.35
German Awareness
Some of the American impact on cultural life was seen second-hand by 
most Germans. The average citizen was not informed on the specifics of how 
textbooks were cleansed, newspaper features provided, museum standards 
redefined, or radio programs organized. Germans knew such things were 
controlled, but the details were not obvious. On the other hand, they knew 
American movies when they saw them. By the same token, lectures by 
American speakers, performances by American orchestras or bands, displays 
of American art, and stage events with American performers were clear indi­
cations of the intent to acquaint Germans with American ideas. This was the 
case in Zweibruecken. Food and shelter came first, but after that the
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people were starved for cultural events. Zweibruecken1s Festhalle reopened 
in 1953, and American-sponsored activities often took place there. The 
America House in Kaiserslautern helped with some of the arrangements, as 
related above. American military personnel and their families helped orga­
nize clubs. Joint German-American functions were common, and these deve­
lopments are related in detail in Chapter 8 , but the essence of these 
happenings was that the people of Zweibruecken recognized they were being 
presented with something new. They listened to the American radio station, 
and at first it seemed strange, but they welcomed the music even though 
"it was not to be compared with tfagner." Some said it was vibrant and 
should be seen in that light. It was even suggested their own 
Abendlaendliche Kultur (occidental culture) had grown stale, and the 
Americans were offering something refreshing. Americans were seen as 
relaxed, open, and confident. It was a time for Germans and Americans to 
get to know each other. They did just that with the result being that 
American cultural influence progressed over the years. American products 
such as films, music and clothes were accepted as part of life. Material 
comforts (television, automobiles, and appliances) evident through the 
American presence helped the Germans to modify their tastes.^6
These are views of persons who lived through the decade of the fif­
ties as adults. They directly benefited from the democratic way of life 
that succeeded National Socialism, and they acknowledged this influence in 
the 1950s. In order to get an assessment of how enduring and cumulative the 
American influence has been, it is perhaps instructive to leap forward
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three decades and measure the attitudes of the successor generation, people
who were either very young during the time addressed by this study or were
born later. In 1983, the U.S. Information Agency commissioned an opinion
survey to gauge German attitudes toward their own and American society.
That portion of the survey pertaining to American influence on Vest German
society concluded the following:
Given the part played by the U.S. in the Federal Republic’s 
post-Vorld War II history, successor generation members, un­
surprisingly and overwhelmingly (86 percent), point to the 
U.S. as exerting a greater influence than any other country 
on the West German way of life. By comparison, only a hand­
ful (2 percent) think that one or another West European country's 
influence is most telling.
American influence is seen as touching many aspects of West German 
society. However, it is most widely perceived to impact on 
economic aspects, concretely, on the economy itself and, philo­
sophically, on people's materialistic outlook on life.
And exposed daily to highly visible expressions of popular cul­
ture, many also see American influence as "cultural," identifying 
fashion, pop music, eating habits, leisure time activities, 
including jogging and aerobics, and language.
Some one in five detect American influence in the political 
sphere but, in this context at least, only one percent mention 
U.S. post-war aid including the Marshall Plan.
Surprisingly perhaps, successors' perceptions of U.S. influence 
on West Germany's way of life do not materially differ from 
those of the older elites.
The survey showed that Germans felt greatly influenced by America; 
however, that influence was not always viewed favorably. The influence was 
seen as negative because of economic matters and values; seventy-three 
percent of the respondents deplored the "excessive emphasis on material 
striving in the F R G . " 3 7
Material striving was encouraged by the Americans, but they should not
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get all the blame or credit, since material things naturally appealed to 
the Germans of the 1950s, a people who had lost so much in the war. It 
appears that the successor generation grew up without the real needs 
experienced by their predecessors and therefore allowed themselves a dif­
ferent form of idealism. Nevertheless, American influence is still a fact 
of life in West German society.
Changes In Society
At this stage, it is worthwhile to recount and to reflect on some of 
the changes in German society as a whole during the decade of the fifties, 
because the American influences related above were integral to altered 
attitudes and new practices. By 1950, people were beginning to be able to 
live the way they wanted to live. While only a fraction, 9.3 percent, said 
they were happy, a majority, 60.9 percent, considered their lives to be 
satisfactory. Most were still toiling six days a week in the work place, 
but a reduction in work hours was sought. During the course of the decade, 
the five-day, forty-hour work week became a reality for some, and by 1960, 
most workers were on a forty-five hour per week schedule. Basing their 
conclusions on the American example, sociologists recognized that Germany 
was becoming a highly industrialized, leisure-time, consumer-oriented 
society.
Families generally spent their time together. Reading and listening 
to the radio were popular pastimes. Movies with romantic, uncomplicated 
themes were popular. Handicrafts, painting, and music returned to the 
average German's life. People tended to avoid politics, except at the
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polling place. And vacations were usually spent at home or with relatives 
(until the latter part of the decade when mass tourism returned). In 
short, the decade was a time for normalization and modernization, which 
included a reestablishment of traditional values.
But comfortable living was a major goal for the average German, and 
modern technological improvements, as known in America, were introduced to 
facilitate comforts. Super highways, bridges, skyscrapers of glass and 
steel, factories, and television all became features of the new German 
society. These features were not necessarily new to Germany because super 
highways and glass and steel structures were known in Germany, before World 
War II, but the rate of construction was faster and more extensive in the 
1950s. It was a period of rapid modernization comparable only with the 
decades of industrialization between 1870 and 1914. By the 1960s, the face 
of the cities had been permanently changed due to city planning, new 
construction, the growth of suburbs, and a sizable shift of population from 
the country to the city. In 1950, 25 percent of the population was 
agrarian. In 1960, only 13.3 percent of the people were left in country or 
village settings. There was also a measurable decline in religiosity.
The church became but one of many organizations, and religion became more 
and more an individual matter. In 1954, 19 percent of the Protestants and 
61 percent of the Catholics were regular churchgoers. Ten years later, in 
1964, those percentages had declined to 15 percent and 58 percent respec­
tively.
A process of homogenization took place. There was an increasing 
interdependence between urban and rural segments of society. Earnings for
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publicly and privately employed persons and men and women drew closer. And 
the middle class grew rapidly with the old middle class becoming only a 
fraction of the whole. There was also a shift in elites. At the beginning 
of the decade, the leading figures in the learned professions were by and 
large individuals who had their professional roots in the Weimar years, but 
as the years passed, this changed in the universities, in literature, and 
in the theater as influence streamed in from the West.
This cultural current came mostly from America. The British and 
French certainly contributed with the likes of T.S. Eliot and Jean Paul 
Sartre, but it was primarily the Americans who contributed to the changes 
wrought in German society in the 1950s. This American influence took many 
forms: literature, theater, films, music, styles, city planning, traffic 
management, architecture, production management, marketing methods, and 
even election campaigning. Everything American served as an example.38 In 
effect, America was an "ersatz nation" for the Germans in the 1950s.39
One pronounced result of the infusion of imported ideas and technology 
was an alteration in values. Ralph Dahrendorf expressed it, in 1967, in 
his book Society and Democracy in Germany in the following way:
Discipline, orderliness, subservience, cleanliness, indus­
triousness, precision, and all the other virtues ascribed 
by many to the Germans as an echo of past splendor have 
already given way to a much less rigid set of values, 
among which economic success, a high income, the holiday 
trip, and the new car play a much larger part than the 
virtues of the past.^®
What Dahrendorf described is nothing more, or less, than an intense desire 
to acquire material things and the pleasures of life. At the same time, he
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pointed out that the developments In Germany all but precluded the rebirth 
of the kind of authoritarianism which produced Hitler, People accustomed 
to seeking and finding individual happiness are, as he put it, "unlikely 
candidates for totalitarian o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I n  their pursuit of indi­
vidual gratification, Germans, on both the left and right, rejected any 
significant opposition to democracy.1*2
In spite of all these changes, German society was not turned upside 
down by modernization. Germany reconfirmed its preferences for some 
traditional (premodern) aspects of life. Family ties were still 
encouraged, even promoted by the state by anchoring parental prerogatives 
in the Basic Law. The Laender were given greater rights than before, and 
particularism was furthered through the social acceptance of dialects.
These tendencies moderated the modernization process. As an additional 
impediment to modernization, as Ralph Dahrendorf pointed out, the govern­
ment's policies in the fields of subsidies and social services seem 
"designed less to lay an effective basis for citizenship rights than to 
bring about a welfare state in the traditional sense." These extensive 
social services discouraged, and continue to discourage, social mobility. 
People are secure in their inherited social classes. Peasants tend to 
remain peasants and merchants tend to remain merchants, etc.**3 Certainly 
many sons and daughters of working-class parents went to the university (as 
mentioned in the discussion of education above), and the middle class had 
many new additions, but such changes occurred in spite of a welfare state 
which rewarded stagnation.
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PART III
POLICY, PRACTICES AND ASSESSMENT 
Chapter 8 
Interpersonal Relations
Introduction
Across all factors —  economic, cultural, social, and political —  
was a vast network of interpersonal German-American relations. These 
factors supported the interpersonal relations and, in fact, were integral 
to them. But the day-to-day happenings were the most obvious to both 
sides. Germans and Americans lived together in harmony and co-existed in 
estrangement. Love, anger, envy, admiration, compassion, resentment, and 
detached acceptance were all present at all times. The perceptions of the 
people involved and the fruits of their labors are the things of which 
grass-roots relations are made.
Americans were seen regularly by most Germans in the areas where the
American forces were stationed. Obviously, being in such close proximity,
the two nationalities formed both positive and negative impressions.
It was the official American desire that Americans create positive 
impressions wherever and whenever possible. This was reflected in the 
numerous classes, orientation efforts, and policy statements organized, 
conducted, and promulgated by the Americans. The American officials were 
always aware of the American image in the mind of the German people and 
were anxious to make the best possible impression. Thus it was that in 
February 1950, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army in Europe issued a 
set of instructions to the field commanders on release of information to
the German press. The instructions stated:
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It is important that the German press in the U.S. Occupied Zone 
is made cognizant of the fact that crimes of violence by 
occupation personnel against German nationals are thoroughly 
investigated and appropriate disciplinary action taken by this 
command•
All commanders and court-martial authorities will insure that 
the German newspapers in their respective areas are promptly and 
fully informed of the results of investigations and court- 
martial trials of members of their commands who have been 
involved in any alleged crime of violence against German 
nationals.1
German-American relations were always a matter of concern for respon­
sible officials at every level, and statements to that effect were regu­
larly entered in the official historical files for the U.S. forces. A 
typical entry, this one from 1951, states:
The betterment of German-American relations was the object of 
continuous and ceaseless effort throughout the year .... In 
October, for example, a letter was sent to all EUCOM subordinate 
commanders requesting that they submit a list of present and 
potential sources of friction between the U.S. and civilian 
populations, together with their recommendations for corrective 
action.2
In that same year, 1951, a survey sponsored by the High Commissioner, 
but conducted by German pollsters, showed that seventy-five percent of the 
West Germans judged relations between the occupying forces and the Germans 
to be from fair to good. A small fraction (eight percent) of the Germans 
in the U.S. Zone felt that American soldiers behaved badly, and a majority 
(fifty-three percent) expressed the opinion that there should be either 
much or very much social contact.^
The official position was represented by more than just guidance. 
Community Advisory Councils made up of Germans and Americans existed in 
most communities where Americans were located. Orientation classes were
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given to advise Americans on how to get along with the Germans. These 
classes were mandatory for the military and were given to all soldiers. 
German language programs were offered to teach soldiers the fundamentals of 
conversational German, although participation was generally less than 
desired. Understanding of the Germans was further promoted through 
regular features in the Stars and Stripes newspaper. The features 
described customs, traditions, government, and items of interest to 
tourists* Radio programs over AFN offered information on such topics as 
the European Coal and Steel Community, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and the impact of Europe upon Americans stationed there and 
the American influence on Europe. Town patrols composed of senior non­
commissioned officers roved the streets during off-duty hours to apprehend 
drunken soldiers before they got into greater mischief, and soldiers' pass 
privileges were tightly controlled. All of these measures, plus swift 
punishment, were used to control the number of incidents.^
On the German side, compliance and survival were the essential con­
cerns of life in the early days after the war. However, after the nature 
of the occupation became clear to the Germans, their attitudes tended to 
take on a more cordial air. Since every effort was being made to help them 
get back on their feet and since it was widely believed that the Americans 
were essential as protectors, it was only right for them to cooperate.
Even under the best circumstances, it was obvious that the Americans were 
going to be around for a while. Realism became the guiding principle.
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The Negative Side
Complete records on the numbers of legal infractions by Americans 
during the occupation no longer exist, and in some cases those that do 
exist are expressed in different terms, but a review of the records 
available shows that, by far, the single largest problem, as far as numbers 
are concerned, involved traffic violations. Speeding, reckless driving, 
and drunken driving were the most common violations, and accounts of these 
dot the pages of German newspapers and the Stars and Stripes. But the 
incidents that caused the most consternation were those involving crimes by 
Americans against Germans. The official historical files for the years 
1952 through 1956 reflect the numbers of crimes per one thousand members of 
the U.S. forces per month. The rates ranged between 0.32 and 0.39 crimes 
per one thousand per month for the years 1952 through 1955, but then in 
1956 the rate went up to 1.04. The reason for the sudden increase is that, 
in 1956 all crimes committed by Americans against Germans, even minor 
offenses, were included. Prior to 1956, only serious crimes were reported, 
e.g. assaults, robbery, rape, and murder. Only in the years 1954 and 1955 
were the rates for crimes committed by Germans against Americans recorded 
in any files. Those rates were 0.80 and 0.61 crimes per thousand members 
of the U.S. forces per month for 1954 and 1955, and primarily represented 
thefts, burglaries and assaults.5
The military's historical summaries for the period portray the greater 
American concern for offenses perpetrated by Americans as opposed to offen­
ses committed against them. However, accounts of both types of cases 
appear in both German newspapers and in the Stars and Stripes.
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One case which received wide coverage pertained to a German girl who, 
while riding in a jeep with an American soldier, was killed by an angry, 
stone-throwing mob of Germans near Nuernberg in December 1949.8 Other
accounts show Germans were sentenced for such things as beating Americans.? 
Yet the vast majority of crimes by Germans against Americans centered on
the theft of personal or government property.
The archives of the Zweibruecken newspaper Pie Rheinpfalz contain 
numerous references to incidents between Germans and Americans. Certainly 
many minor confrontations, such as verbal altercations, never made the 
papers, but confrontations of any real consequence, e.g. robberies or 
rapes, were reported. The majority of incidents reported were relatively 
harmless; these consisted of matters such as damage to doors, windows, 
lights, fences and other types of property which resulted from the antics
of intoxicated soldiers. Other incidents, unfortunately, were more
serious.
Fights often occurred in bars and restaurants. Sometimes they were 
limited to only two persons but on other occasions larger groups engaged in 
fisticuffs. In July, 1953 two Americans accosted two German women outside 
a Gaststaette. One woman was struck in the face, and the other ran into 
the Gaststaette to get her husband. The husband went to a nearby military 
police station but was followed by one of the Americans who hit the German 
man and injured his ear.8
It was worse when weapons were involved. Chains, bottles, knives, and 
pistols were sometimes used. In August, 1952, two Americans tried to
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sell some cigarettes to Germans. They failed to peddle their goods and 
became engaged in an argument. One of the Americans pulled a knife and 
stabbed a German man in the neck.9 On another occasion in 1955, an 
American soldier used a knife to stab and severely injure two German men at 
a festival (Kirchweih) in the nearby town of Bubenhausen.10 Truly serious 
fights were relatively few and far between, but in January of 1960 two 
Americans, who had already had too much to drink, attempted to steal a 
bottle of cognac from a restaurant. The proprietor tried to stop them and 
was attacked with a chair and a knife. In the ensuing struggle, furniture, 
ash trays, and a window were damaged.H The participants in fights were 
generally apprehended by the German police or the American military police, 
punished, and made to pay for damages; however, the Germans were not always 
satisfied that the punishment was sufficient. One incident took place in 
which the police's job was made very simple. Nine Americans in search of 
excitement stopped a car and threw a beer glass through the window —  it 
turned out to be a German police car. The offenders were caught red- 
handed. 12
Before the Americans came back to Zweibruecken, there was very little 
demand for taxi services. After the Americans arrived, however, the taxi 
business boomed. Occasionally, the American customers who thought that the 
fares were too high or that they were being cheated assaulted the drivers 
or refused to pay —  or both. Such disturbances received a lot of atten­
tion, and periodically feelings ran high in the community.13 Some taxi 
drivers took to carrying weapons, and in March, 1958 one driver shot at but 
did not hit an American who argued over the f a r e . 14 The taxi drivers'
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problems came to a head in 1960; over a truly grim incident. An American 
motorist hit a taxi driver with his car and killed him. The German taxi 
drivers subsequently organized a demonstration in which they drove through 
the city to protest the way Americans drove and to honor the memory of the 
deceased driver.15 After this demonstration, the American and Canadian 
commanders in the city met with Zweibruecken1s Lord Mayor and Police Chief 
to discuss what could be done to alleviate the situation. After much 
discussion it was decided that the officials were already doing everything 
possible. Drivers licenses were being revoked, violators were being 
punished, and reasonable controls were in effect. The commanders promised 
to continue to do everything possible to minimize the problem, but it was 
generally acknowledged that regardless of how strict the commanders were, 
there would always be some difficulties. The spokesman for the taxi dri­
vers asked that in the future the military police be available to help them 
collect their fares. Help from the military police was given, but at times 
the confrontations took place where there were no military police, and on 
occasion the incidents even involved military policemen who were off 
duty.16
Some episodes of an unprovoked, brutal nature took place which hurt 
German-American relations far more than many minor ones combined. In 1953, 
a German pedestrian dropped a briefcase in the street and caused an 
approaching American car to brake suddenly to avoid hitting him. An 
American got out of the car in a rage and fatally beat the German with his 
fists. The American was identified and caught, but such incidents contri­
buted to bitterness and resentment that burned in the minds of some Germans 
for an extended period of time. On another occasion, a German doctor
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enroute to a house call where he was to treat a sick child was stopped, 
beaten, and severely injured by four Americans. When they were tried and 
sentenced, two of the culprits received sentences of six months at hard 
labor and fines of one thousand German marks each. The remaining two 
Americans had to pay six hundred German marks each and serve three months 
at hard labor. The Germans felt the sentences were far too light.^
Americans committed two known rapes in Zweibruecken during the 1950s. 
In July, 1952 two American soldiers raped a teen-aged girl. Both men were 
convicted, sent to prison for ten years, and given dishonorable discharges 
from the military s e r v i c e . T h e  second rape was in April 1954. Three 
American soldiers attacked a married couple who were on their way home from 
the movies. They beat the husband and raped his w i f e . 19 Whether or not 
the rapists were ever caught was not reported in the press. It was a com­
mon occurrence for American soldiers to call out to passing females, 
whistle, or make rude gestures as they drove by in their vehicles; these 
acts were generally dismissed as boorish behavior, but they did not help 
German-American relations.
It is perhaps a universal fact of life that wherever large numbers of 
young males are gathered together, prostitutes will follow. Prostitution 
was legal in some parts of Germany throughout the 1950s, but it was 
controlled by licensing and restricting the prostitutes as to where they 
could ply their trade. In Zweibruecken, both prostitution and procuring 
were illegal. That is not to say that it never happened, but since the 
city was relatively poor, there were few customers. When it was first 
announced that Americans were coming back to Zweibruecken in numbers, the
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citizens expressed their concern that prostitution would soon become a 
problem.
As early as August, 1952 accounts of problems with prostitution and 
procuring appeared in the local paper. The practitioners were referred to 
as "Frolleins"Veronikas," or "Amizonen," and they seem to have found 
ample employment. They were regularly brought to court and fined, as were 
the hotel managers and others who rented rooms to them. Most of the 
prostitutes came to Zweibruecken from places such as Kaiserslautern or 
Landstuhl, but some local wives and daughters offered their services and 
took their customers home with them. Most of the traffic seems to have 
taken place in the first half of the decade, but isolated violations con­
tinued later on. One case aroused considerable ire amongst the local citi­
zens. In the nearby town of Winterbach, an underaged female refugee 
conducted business with a number of Americans. She was temporarily housed 
with her parents in makeshift quarters on the upstairs floor of the local 
school. The parents of the school children protested this flagrant viola­
tion and organized a boycott of the school. The girl's parents were con­
victed of procuring, but she continued her b u s i n e s s . 20
Crimes of breaking and entering or theft by Americans were rare in 
Zweibruecken. Only three cases received any notice in the papers. In 
June, 1952 an American soldier was convicted by a military court for 
attempting to burglarize a German house. He was sentenced to one year in 
prison and given a discharge from the military service for bad conduct.21 
In June, I960 an American sergeant was sentenced to seven years in prison 
and given a dishonorable discharge for his part in an otherwise German ring 
of s a f e c r a c k e r s . 22 The periodic German festivals in Zweibruecken, as
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elsewhere, always provided ample alcohol and opportunities for conflict.
As a rule, festivals in Zweibruecken were remarkably free of fights, but 
the beer vendors were regularly victimized by patrons who stole their beer 
mugs. In June 1960, over 1,500 beer mugs were stolen during one festival. 
The Americans and Canadians were largely blamed for the loss.23
This combination of Americans and Canadians brings to the fore the 
difficulty of identifying the problems caused by Americans in Zweibruecken. 
It was often not possible for the local citizens to distinguish between 
Canadians and Americans, and the Canadians normally outnumbered the
Americans two to one. Canadians and members of the U.S. Forces had dif­
ferent license plates, different types of identification, and lived and 
worked on opposite sides of the city, but when on the street in civilian 
clothes, it was hard to tell them apart. Casual observers could easily 
attribute offenses to the Americans that in reality had been done by the 
Canadians.
Traffic offenses were a real source of irritation. Americans had 
large cars which were envied by many Germans. The Germans were critical of
the way Americans drove, and perhaps rightfully so. They often drove too
fast for conditions, and driving while under the influence of alcohol, 
although prohibited by both the Americans and Germans, was not an unheard- 
of problem. While most violations were minor in nature with few or no con­
sequences, some proved to be deadly. In 1952, one accident caused by an 
American resulted in a death. In 1953, three more persons lost their lives 
in wrecks for which Americans were found guilty, and in each of the years 
1957, 1958, and 1960, a total of four additional deaths was caused by 
negligent American driving. A sample survey of accidents 
in Zweibruecken for the year 1957 shows that of the 546 accidents which
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occurred, 40 were caused by Americans. The Canadians were responsible 
for 51 and the French 10.2^
In 1957 there were 2,383 Americans in Zweibruecken. That means there 
was roughly one accident for every sixty Americans. There were 32,616 
Germans in the city in that same year, and 438 accidents were attributed to 
that population group; so there was one accident for every seventy-four 
Germans. A better method of comparison would be to base the calculations 
on the number of vehicles, but there is no way of knowing how many 
vehicles were in operation at that time. This is especially true for the 
Americans because military vehicles as well as privately owned vehicles 
were in use and involved in accidents.
The very presence of the Americans and their military mission created 
some frictions. It was necessary, for instance, to requisition some 
German properties such as fields and buildings, although living accom­
modations were not t a k e n . 25 Farmers were particularly hurt by the requisi­
tioning. Land was taken to build a housing area for the families on the 
Kreuzberg and more was taken for an airbase which the Americans built for 
the Canadians. Several farmers had to curtail their operations due to the 
loss of land.26 Construction, although it provided work for the unemployed 
people of Zweibruecken, was a handicap to others. Crops and fields were 
damaged when poles for high wires were erected. Access to farm land was 
impeded due to construction on Kreuzberg.27 Erosion of fields was blamed 
on the American construction, which on occasion changed the water flow.28 
And the construction required so much manpower that agricultural workers
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were hard to f i n d . T h e  situation developed to the point where citizens' 
committees were formed and demonstrations organized to protest the activi­
ties of the Americans, and the police had to be called in to control the 
demonstrators.3^ The American construction had brought prosperity to the
city as a whole, but at the expense of a minority, and some bitter feelings 
were created in the process.
Black marketing was practiced to one degree or another in Zweibruecken 
throughout most of the decade of the 1950s. Although it was not nearly as 
severe as in the first few years following the war, it was a cause for con­
cern to the authorities. It was, generally speaking, more important to the 
Germans than to the Americans. Every item sold on the black market repre­
sented a loss in tax revenues to the German government and deprived German 
merchants of the profit from selling a comparable item —  if available.
Nevertheless, black marketing was a two-way street; both the seller 
and buyer had something to gain. Germans interested in making purchases 
could go to Kreuzberg Kaserne. usually at night, slip through the fence, do 
their business, and leave again. Or they could find Americans who had 
something to sell in the bars, restaurants, or side streets of 
Zweibruecken. Cigarettes, coffee, tea, sugar, alcohol, and gasoline were 
still favored black market items in the 1950s, due to high German taxes.
The Americans could buy these products on a rationed but tax-free 
basis in the exchanges and commissaries. They then sold the items for 
several times what they had paid. Some individuals made a handsome profit 
on a regular basis —  until they were caught. Soldiers who did not use
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their rations were not allowed to transfer them to others, but they often 
did for a fee.
The Germans bought black market items for their own use or for resale 
at a yet higher price. Entire smuggling rings operated in the vicinity of 
military bases and even crossed over international boundaries. While the 
occupation was still in effect, American cars were allowed to travel back 
and forth between Germany and France exempt from searches by customs offi­
cials. At least one team of German smugglers based its operation in 
Zweibruecken and used an American car, with the consent of its owner, to 
take black market goods into France.31
Customs officials periodically seized items and conducted surveillance 
operations, but black market traffic did not really slow down until taxes 
were lowered.32 Penalties varied depending on the value of the goods. But 
even small-time or occasional smugglers could expect rather severe punish­
ment. In 1954, a German employee of the Americans was caught buying five 
packages of American cigarettes and received a three-month jail sentence 
for tax evasion. American violators usually were reduced in grade, fined, 
or in some cases given jail sentences.
The last incident of black marketing reported in Die Rheinpfalz in the 
decade of the 1950s was in 1958, when two Germans were fined for buying 
American cigarettes. One had to pay twenty German marks, and the other one 
paid fifty German marks.33
Although all types of problems occurred throughout the decade, the 
predominant nature of the difficulties changed. In the early years, the
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conflicts tended to involve person-to-person contacts, such as black 
marketing, barroom fights, robberies, and rapes or attempted rapes. By the 
middle of the decade, automobile accidents, rent squabbles, and property 
damage were the dominant sources of trouble. And by 1960, policies were 
becoming a cause of friction as Germans demonstrated against the continued 
presence of Americans, or as works councils took issue with American efforts 
to reduce the gold outflow by releasing German employees. In short, as the 
material situation improved for the Germans, and as Americans became more 
settled with families and privately owned automobiles, the relationships 
became more regulated, civil, and sophisticated, and the problems became 
more depersonalized.
The Americans brought a problem to Germany and to Zweibruecken in the 
form of a racially integrated army. Blacks were viewed first of all as 
items of curiosity to be kept at a distance. Some of the older citizens 
remembered the French occupation by black troops from North Africa after 
World War I and the bad experiences associated with them. These memories 
were combined with alarming stories about the behavior of blacks during the 
last months of the war; therefore, suspicion as well as curiosity high­
lighted the attitude of the average person in Zweibruecken. This was par­
ticularly the case where women were concerned. The blacks found that they 
could go wherever they wanted. They were not restricted from any 
restaurants or public places, but they were shunned by the local women, 
who believed the stories.34 This belief was undoubtedly reinforced when 
the black soldiers began to associate with the prostitutes from Landstuhl 
and Kaiserslautern. Blacks were noticed wherever they went, and whenever 
they engaged in unseemly conduct, it added credibility to the negative side 
of their reputation.
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Naturally, not all of the experiences with blacks were bad. Gradually 
they were accepted as members of the U.S. forces. They were particularly 
friendly to children, and friendships also developed with adults. The men 
made friends first, and after women observed that no apparent harm came to 
those who associated with the black Americans, they also began to change 
their attitude. Blacks were accepted as members of the American forces, 
but they still had trouble finding German apartments, and the Germans con­
tinued to be wary of meeting groups of blacks on the street at night. Such 
fears were more imagined than real, but they existed.35
A lingering reluctance to accept blacks on the same basis as white 
Americans was not unique to Zweibruecken. Most Germans who came in con­
tact with blacks were also in contact with white soldiers and discerned 
that, in spite of an integrated military force, social mixing was more of 
an exception than a rule. With white Americans setting the standards, it 
was common for Germans to prefer not to associate with blacks on anything 
other than a casual basis. Marriages between black soldiers and German 
women presented special difficulties. In addition to acceptance of the 
couples, the inter-racial aspects promised problems because of the stresses 
that would be placed on their off-spring. Furthermore, antimiscegenation 
laws in the U.S.A. made marriage less than practical at times. In light of 
such barriers, the military discouraged inter-racial marriages.36
The German image of Americans was not enhanced by the fact that
numerous American soldiers fathered children and then left the mothers 
*
alone to fend for themselves and the children. This was particularly a 
problem whenever the father was a black man. Children of such mixed
215
heritage were never really accepted in German society as Germans; they were 
always thought of as different. From an institutional point of view, that 
is by the government or the news media etc., it was recognized that they 
were German citizens, and efforts were made to facilitate their acceptance.
In 1952, for example, when the first of the black occupation babies became 
visible in the schools, the media issued appeal after appeal to be nice to 
the black children. It was feared that the children would have enough 
troubles, and indeed that was the case. In I960, the University of Hamburg 
conducted a study that examined the plight of black children in Germany.
This study, Farbige Kinder in Deutschland, concluded that in spite of all 
the efforts made by various groups the children still grew up with 
trauma.37
The Positive Side
An overview of German-American grass-roots relations shows the nature 
of both the positive and negative forces that were at work. In the early 
part of the decade, positive occurrences were basically of a material 
nature. Americans were still helping with food, clothing, and shelter.
By the middle of the decade, these "helping hands" had largely given way to 
joint activities, such as clubs, intended to aid understanding or build bridges. 
At the end of the decade, grass-roots relations featured more sophisticated 
or elaborate events which utilized those bridges; concerts, dancing exhibi­
tions, athletic contests, and discussion groups typified the times. This 
progression represented a natural growth in relationships as the Germans 
became more self-sufficient and had more time and money to indulge in
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leisure activities.38
Some examples serve to illustrate this evolution in relations. In 
1950, twenty million articles of clothing were collected in the U.S.A. 
during a Thanksgiving clothing drive. The clothes were sent to Germany to 
clothe needy people.39 In 1955, a German TV documentary featured Americans 
stationed in the Rhineland-Palatinate. It was reported as "an attempt to 
give the German people a deeper insight into the lives and problems of 
Americans in Germany."^ A more ordinary type of event with a common theme 
saw Americans assisting Germans with the organization of theater or sports 
groups.41 In 1960, an American soldier had a part in a musical performed in 
the municipal theater in Frankfurt. It was an American play, Bells Are 
Ringing, but with a mostly German cast.^2
Although the Americans were often seen in an assistance role 
(providers of food, clothing, and equipment) or as innovators, they also 
contributed to traditional cultural events. For example in 1950, Wieland 
Wagner acclaimed Robert L. Charleboise, a former American soldier, as a 
"great Wagnerian tenor," and he was invited to perform in Bayreuth in 
1951 -43
When the Americans first returned to Zweibruecken, the Germans in the 
community were still struggling to rebuild the city and take care of their 
physical needs. A considerable amount of progress had been made since the 
war, but the destruction had been so extensive that more time was needed.
The French were the official occupiers, so Americans were not immediately 
thrust into positions of visibility; therefore, it can be said that the 
appearance of the Americans generated neither shock nor fanfare.
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In the beginning, the Americans came without their families. Some of 
the soldiers conducted themselves in an ungentlemanly manner, consumed too 
much beer, and made advances towards the local females. These advances 
were not always welcome; they were a nuisance to some, and there were times 
when jealous boyfriends or husbands became irate. Improper behavior 
created hard feelings which no doubt left those who were offended wishing 
that the Americans, and indeed all occupation soldiers, would go away. 
However, there were also Germans who accepted Americans as friends. The 
first local citizens who accepted the Americans were those Germans who were 
employed by the American military. Since the soldiers did not have their 
families with them and were lonely, these Germans assumed the role of hosts 
and invited soldiers into their homes. Friendships developed, and thus 
Germans and Americans started spending their free time as well as their 
duty hours together. Once American families arrived, the possibilities 
for contacts expanded with many good, long-term relationships being a
result.44
As time passed, the web of acquaintances expanded. It became a 
commonplace for Americans to be invited to join German clubs and for 
American and German clubs to develop associations. It is worthwhile to 
give a brief account of some of these associations. A photo club was orga­
nized through which German and American photographers exchanged ideas, went 
on excursions, and arranged joint exhibitions.45 in 1955, a German automo­
bile club (Per allgemeine deutsche Automobil-und Motorradclub) held a 
sports car rally that saw a number of American participants.46
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A lot of Americans missed being able to go hunting, and so it was arranged 
for the hunters in and around Zweibruecken to invite Americans who were 
members of the Rod and Gun Club to go with t h e m . ^7 •jhe Judo Club was 
another forum which brought the people from Kreuzberg Kaserne together 
with those from the city. This particular type of event pitted the 
Americans against the Germans because they competed as teams, but it was 
another building block in their relationship.^® Music, too, was often a 
vehicle for drawing people together. Americans became members of various 
singing clubs, and a former citizen of Zweibruecken arranged for the men's 
choir from his new home in Port Chester, New York to come to Zweibruecken 
and present a joint performance with a German singing club. The proceeds 
from the performance were used to help rebuild the Alexanderskirche in the 
ci ty.^9
Although the Americans had their own church in Kreuzberg Kaserne, 
soldiers and their families attended services in the German churches on 
occasion. There were also special events for which they were invited. The 
procession for Corpus Christi Day (Fronleichnamsprozession) in 1959, and 
the Vorld Day of Prayer (Weitgebetstag) in 1960, were two such
celebrations.50
These activities evolved naturally from German and American asso­
ciations, but they were only the tip of the iceberg. For every organized 
event, there were hundreds of personal visits in homes and restaurants. 
Altogether they contributed much to mutual knowledge and understanding.
More often than not, socializing was the real goal with learning taking
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place in a subtle way.
While learning was of secondary importance at social events, it was 
the primary reason for other activities. There were lectures, slide shows, 
films, and displays sponsored by the America House in Kaiserslautern and 
the Volkshochschule in Zweibruecken. These events helped to broaden the 
Germans' understanding of America and its people. In 1953, there was a 
series of lectures on the "History and Development of American Literature." 
And in 1956, a lecture on "Anglo-Saxon Literature" was presented. A 
further lecture on literature, this time on Thomas Wolfe, was given in 
1958.51 Travel in America was the theme of other presentations. One such 
lecture was "A Trip Through America" with emphasis on the place of 
children in society, mechanization of the household, employment for women, 
and the influence of women in politics.52 Other themes were: "Nature
Parks in America," "City Planning in America," "A View of New York," and 
" P e n n s y l v a n i a ."53 Actually, accounts of trips through America were given 
rather frequently. The Historical Society of Zweibruecken used this as a 
theme when a reporter from Suedwestfunk spoke on how widespread and 
numerous Germans are in America.
The people of Zweibruecken expressed a particular interest in the 
Germans who had emigrated to America. This interest helped spark atten­
dance at the lecture on Pennsylvania mentioned above. It also contributed 
to attendance at a special display in 1955 which stressed cultural and 
historical ties between Germany and America.54 Something which aroused
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considerable attention was the fact that a regiment of soldiers from 
Zweibruecken had fought on the side of the colonists against the British 
at the Battle of Yorktown in October, 1781.
Some lectures were more intellectually stimulating, e.g. "The American 
Space Program" and "Where to, Europe?" (Wohin Europa?); the latter was a 
presentation by a member of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences which set forth an American view of Europe's world problems.55
Both German and American officials took special pains to make things 
go well. Neither group cared about the credit for improving relations. As 
a rule, whenever a good suggestion was made, regardless of who made it, 
both sides worked hard to see to it that it was a success.56 The city 
published in English a guide book to Zweibruecken in March, 1952. The 
historical connection was mentioned, and advertisements for local busi­
nesses were included. Over the years many receptions, parties, and 
assorted other events were celebrated in Zweibruecken with the help of 
Americans.
By 1953 the community was well aware of the spirit of international 
friendship and of the value of improving relations. To that end, the city 
and the military authorities (American, French, and Canadian) staged a 
Christinas celebration called the Union of Hearts (Union der Herzen). There 
were entertainers, speeches, and social opportunities, all dedicated to 
international friendship. It was a major event for the city that has been 
repeated yearly ever since. The proceeds traditionally are donated to 
charity.57 Response to the Union of Hearts was always so great that each 
nation had to be restricted to a set number of participants.
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Fasching (pre-Lenten festival) had long been celebrated with enthu­
siasm in Zweibruecken, and starting in 1954, Americans were included in the 
city's official Fasching balls. At first only officers and their ladies 
were invited, but later the soldiers were welcomed as well. After the for­
mal Fasching ball, the next step was to organize a formal ball dedicated to 
international friendship, and this took place in 1956, with the 
Internationaler Sommernachtsball.58
Somewhat similar to the Fasching season were the various festivals 
which took place every year between late spring and early fall. In this 
category were Volksfeste. Jahrmaerkte, and Kirchweihen. The rides, booths, 
games, and overall carnival atmosphere attracted the Americans, but the 
single biggest drawing card was the beer tent. The soldiers went to the 
beer tent alone or in groups, but they went. They went to drink beer, to 
listen to the music, and to try to meet girls. The large, earthen-ware 
beer mugs were another attraction. Every soldier had to have at least one 
as a souvenir of Germany. It has already been related above how Americans 
were blamed for stealing the mugs; that happened when the mugs were not for 
sale. When the mugs could be purchased, most Americans were willing to pay 
for them. But one way or another, the Americans had to have mugs. On one 
occasion an American man and wife came to the tent with a baby buggy and 
offered to buy a buggy-full of mugs. Vhen told the mugs could not be 
bought empty, he ordered them full, paid for everything, stopped entering 
Germans, gave each a mug full of beer to drink, and then rolled his mug­
laden baby buggy home. There were minor arguments from time to time, but 
from 1952 to 1960 there were no fights between Germans and Americans in
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the beer tent. There were also no lasting or significant negative inci­
dents involving American soldiers and German women in the tent.
Prostitutes* usually from Kaiserslautern or Landstuhl, tended to gather at 
one table where they negotiated with customers. The prostitutes wore spe­
cially colored ribbons in their hair, and thus the potential customers knew 
with whom they could strike up casual relationships. The festivals, as a 
whole, were judged to be beneficial to the city's economic well being, as 
well as to German-American relations, and the beer business owed much of 
its success to the Americans' thirst.^9
As an additional encouragement to mingling, the city sponsored an offi­
cial program whereby American soldiers were invited to spend Christmas in 
German homes in 1959.^0
Hunting had informally been opened to Americans in 1957; to this was 
added the privilege of fishing in 1958. To make this possible, the Germans 
made three kilometers of a fishing stream available to the American Rod and 
Gun Club. This was not a gift but rather a lease; money changed hands, but 
in an area where both hunting and fishing rights are precious, it was also
an act of goodwill.^0 Before the decade had ended, more land for
recreational areas (fishing ponds, tennis courts, playgrounds etc.) had 
been turned over to American control.
It was a further act of goodwill when the city granted the Americans 
the right to name the streets in Kreuzberg Kaserne. The installation was 
within the city's jurisdiction, a fact which gave the city the authority to
designate the streets. After the names were decided, the city undertook
the job of marking them as a favor to the people who lived and worked 
there.63
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Initiatives to enhance relations were taken by the Americans as well. 
American officials were, first and foremost, concerned with cultivating the 
democratic ideas which had taken root. This goal may have been vague to 
the average soldier —  even though it was part of his initial orientation 
when he came to Germany and was periodically reinforced in troop infor­
mation classes; ideals have a tendency to become blurred among the concerns 
for daily living. Nevertheless, individuals were a part of the process of 
democratization, because it was based on the theory that "democracy 
observed is democracy learned." The programs and established controls pro­
duced a continuing environment where democracy could grow and rewarding 
personal relationships could thrive.
One institution which provided an impetus to German-American relations 
in Zweibruecken was the America House in Kaiserslautern. During the course 
of the decade, the America House sponsored a number of events which helped 
the Germans to become better acquainted with the Americans in their midst. 
Some of these have already been mentioned, but still more merit additional 
discussion.
Concerts were always popular. The U.S. Air Force Band gave a public 
concert in 1953, which was openly appreciated.^ American musicians pre­
sented a violin and piano concert in November of the same year. This was 
followed a few months later by two American operas which featured both 
German and American singers; the accompanying music was provided by the 
Seventh U.S. Army Symphony Orchestra.^5 An all-female orchestra from 
Portland, Oregon, played a summer concert in the Rosengarten while on a
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tour of Europe in 1957. Shortly before, the orchestra had performed for 
the Queen of England, a fact which the Zweibruecken newspaper reported 
proudly.®® The Seventh U.S. Army Symphony Orchestra, the same orchestra 
that accompanied the two operas in 1954, was a favorite of the people in 
Zweibruecken; the orchestra made more appearances in the latter half of the 
1950s, evidently strengthening German-Americans relations with every 
visit.67 The Seventh Array Symphony Orchestra was very much in demand all 
over Germany. It had an excellent reputation, and its performances were 
free —  no minor consideration for the thrifty Germans. Due to its popu­
larity, it was frequently not available when wanted, so other American 
military bands appeared in Zweibruecken on occasion. An Army band provided 
the music for the city's 600th anniversary, a ceremony which also saw the 
American commander (who was a guest of honor) read a letter from the 
governor of Virginia congratulating the city and recalling Zweibruecken1s 
part in the battle of Yorktown. Another American band played at the horse 
races in 1954, and yet another one played at the coronation of the city's 
Rose Queen in 1957.®®
In 1954, Americans and Germans started to marry one another, although 
the requirements for obtaining permission were still exhaustive. To aid 
understanding, the American consulate in Frankfurt sent a representative to 
Zweibruecken at the request of the America House to give a lecture on 
"American Marriage Laws."69
These efforts on the part of the America House combined with other 
smaller but still helpful programs, such as visits by the bookmobile,
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brought bits of Americana to Zweibruecken and added to the good feelings 
that already existed.
As a means of informing local citizens on what takes place on military 
installations, the American military has long held "open houses." The 
gates are opened to the community, and equipment and facilities are put on 
display. This was the practice in Zweibruecken as well. At these open 
houses, the people of the city who were guesits of the Americans saw aero­
batic exhibitions, simulated rescues hy helicopters, fire-fighting 
demonstrations, parades, aTtillery pieces, and other types of equipment. 
Sporting events, bands, fireworks, hot dogs, hamburgers, and Coca Cola were 
standard offerings at every open house. America's Independence Day and 
Memorial Day were sometimes celebrated in such a fashion as well. Events 
like these gave the Americans an opportunity to extend hospitality to the 
Germans, and they responded in numbers.
German-American friendship had grown so much by the latter part of the 
decade that it was deemed appropriate to set aside an entire week to celebrate 
it. The first German-American Friendship Week was declared in 1957 by the 
Lord Mayor and the American commander. It was such a success that it was 
decided to continue the practice. These weeks contained a host of activi­
ties, all of which were accented by public declarations of friendship be­
tween the two nations with special emphasis on the situation in 
Zweibruecken. The number of events was always sizable. Some typical, 
joint activities were church services, dances, athletic contests, films, 
concerts, dinners, trips, Bcouting exhibitions, car races, open houses,
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and variety shows. Awards for contributions to German-American friendship 
were routine during these weeks as well.70
The list of ways which were found to do things jointly is extensive. 
Whenever an occasion to be celebrated arose, Germans and Americans did so 
together. In the entire period from 1950 through 1960, not even one 
German-American event was ever reported in the press as having produced 
negative results. Joint events were an unquestioned success.
Occasions were even invented. One can find evidence of this in the 
papers or by talking with persons who were in Zweibruecken at the time. A 
few such events are given here as examples. A women's group put on its own 
fashion show with members working as models. On another occasion the 
American movie house, the Idle Hour Theater, held a fashion show for German 
women from a local shoe factory.71
As the American community grew larger, so did the employment oppor­
tunities for the Germans. The American Civilian Personnel Office offered a 
program designed to inform the Germans on how to find jobs with the 
Americans and conducted a tour of Kreuzberg Kaserne so that they could 
become familiar with the American surroundings.72
German-American friendship clubs had started in many parts of Germany 
in the early days of the occupation, but for one reason or another formally 
organized clubs did not get off to such a good start in Zweibruecken. 
Perhaps it was because there were troops from three foreign nations 
occupying the small city, and to start a formal club with one would have
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required the Germans to include all three. Or perhaps it was because there 
did not appear to be a need for one. Whatever the reason, the first 
attempt to establish a formally structured club was not made until May of 
1955. The Public Relations Adviser to the Commanding General of the 
Western Area Command (the American Military Command which included 
Zweibruecken) proposed the organization and urged participation.^ The 
idea, however, did not particularly appeal to those involved, and it was 
allowed to wither. It was not until a year and a half later that the idea 
came back to life and was adopted.?^
Meanwhile, a group was getting together regularly and doing valuable 
work in community relations, even though it did not become a formally 
recognized club for a few more years. The group met regularly and con­
sisted of the Lord Mayor, the Police Chief, and the military commanders 
stationed in Zweibruecken. The men first began to meet in 1955 to deal 
with mutual problems. One of the notable challenges with which they had to 
cope was the traffic problems created by soldiers who drove recklessly 
through the city, as related above. The club which eventually grew out of 
this group was called Little NATO. Little NATO developed three different 
levels, Commanders' Little NATO, Junior Officers' Little NATO, and the 
Noncommissioned Officers' Little NATO. Of these three, the junior 
officers organization proved to be the most active; monthly meetings with 
dinners, soccer and softball games, and various culturally oriented outings 
were typical activities. The group ultimately included officers from the 
German army and air force as well as officers from the U.S. Army and Air
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Force, the Canadian air force and the French army. The German officers 
came into the picture because the Federal Republic established its own 
military force in 1955 and stationed units in Zweibruecken in 1956. The 
Junior Officers' Little NATO was not chartered until 1966, but it evolved 
from the group of 1955, and is cited as an example of the enduring nature 
of the spirit of the 1950s.
The women of the community also started to think in terms of a formally 
structured club. In April, 1957, the wife of the American commander 
suggested that the prominent women in the German and American communities 
meet on a regular basis. The suggestion was enthusiastically accepted, and 
the meetings did take place, but an actual club was not formed until the 
following decade. Once formed, the German-American Wives' Club took a 
leading role in promoting German-American relations. It accepted the 
wives of the French officers as members but the Germans and Americans pro­
vided the leadership. The club sponsored activities for charity, organized 
social events, and encouraged exchanges of a cultural nature.
In the final analysis, clubs did not play a big role in community 
relations in Zweibruecken in the 1950s. They were positive factors, but 
they were more a manifestation of good relations than the cause. The seeds 
were planted in the 1950s, but they did not grow to bear fruit in the form 
of clubs until subsequent years. Even without clubs per se, relations in 
Zweibruecken were solid enough that it was chosen as a model community for 
a film made in 1956, by the American Press and Information Service and 
shown to German audiences elsewhere.
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Just as the people in Zweibruecken avoided the formal organizations 
popularly accepted elsewhere in Germany where Americans were stationed, 
they also adopted a different course for youth activities. The GYA program 
was evidently never a part of life in Zweibruecken. The Americans were 
most definitely concerned with youth problems, but these were addressed by 
volunteers or locally devised programs rather than through the 
official GYA channels. The Methodist congregation from Kreuzberg Kaserne 
was an early, active force on behalf of the city's young. The Methodists 
organized a Christmas party for German children in 1952. They also worked 
with the U.S. Service Clubs to offer the German children a chance to play 
bingo, billiards, and table tennis. Gifts, refreshments, and the use of 
recreational facilities not otherwise available no doubt gladdened the 
hearts of the children. American-sponsored Christmas parties for German 
children became common occurrences in Zweibruecken. The various military 
units hosted their own parties with individual soldiers "adopting" indivi­
dual children. The soldiers gave presents and a Christmas meal to each 
child; this practice was called "Dad for a Day." The American officers' 
club traditionally gave a Christmas party for the children of the Germans 
who worked in Kreuzberg Kaserne.
The Protestant women of the chapel gave a Christmas party for refugee 
children, and childless American couples took German children into their 
homes for the holidays, while needy children received presents from other 
Americans.?7 These parties and presents were paid for by individuals.
Other presents came from America and were distributed by soldiers, and the 
recipients were told from whence the gifts came.^® America, particularly 
at Christmas, must have looked like a veritable cornucopia to the young
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people in Zweibruecken.
American scouts, both boys and girls, had a part in building 
German-American relations, too. The American scout troops invited German 
scouts to join them in outings and in their annual banquets with parents. 
This practice, together with school visits, gave a youthful dimension to 
relations within the community.^9
Others who needed help were not overlooked. The American womens' 
clubs visited the homes for the elderly, gave Christmas parties and pre­
sents, entertained, and conversed with the lonely. In 1956, the American 
commander presented a gift of money on behalf of the American community to 
the Lord Mayor to be used for the elderly, and the American Officers'
Wives' Club presented a coffee table and books to a home for the elderly in 
January 1957.®®
Many isolated expressions of concern were made, too. The U.S. 
military made a donation to the city to provide food for the needy, and 
American officers gave presents to hospital patients in 1954. To help 
atone for the death of a German killed in a hit-and-run accident by an 
American, American soldiers took up a collection for the f a m i l y . T h e  
German blood bank in Landau issued a call for blood in 1960, and eighty 
Americans responded.®2
The Germans did not always have the heavy construction equipment they 
needed to restore or build community structures. As a rule, the Americans 
did not help with private or conniercial construction, but they frequently
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assisted with community projects. American soldiers and equipment helped 
to build the stadium in Zweibruecken in 1954 and 1955.83 They also moved a 
monolith from near Landstuhl to Niederauerbach and set it up at the request 
of the monuments association in Zweibruecken.84 Help was offered in dif­
ferent ways. The American fire department put out a fire in the city's 
train station in 1953, and in 1957, the American Red Cross chapter in 
Zweibruecken made it known that its help was available to the city in case 
of emergencies.
In general, a spirit of cooperation was always present in 
Zweibruecken; the people of the different nations in Zweibruecken shared 
responsibilities. Individual tendencies toward polarization were offset by 
the common desire to work together. For example, in 1952 a joint police 
patrol was established. Policemen from all four nations patrolled the city 
to control problems. The patrols were numerous and effective. The number 
of patrols ranged from 85 to 105 per week, and in one year, 1953, they 
retrieved 20 stolen cars and assisted 24,900 motorists in one way or
another.85
The American soldiers in Zweibruecken certainly caused their share of 
problems, as did the Canadians, French, and Germans, but the people of 
Zweibruecken forgave incidents when corrections were made and when the com­
manders apologized or otherwise demonstrated their regret for any problems 
created by their s o l d i e r s . 86
Housing was always a problem in Zweibruecken. Before the war, in 
1939, there had been an average of eight persons per domestic building. 
During the war, 1,587 buildings with living accommodations had been
232
destroyed; another 564 had been severely damaged and 1,128 slightly 
damaged. This all translated into a shortage of 4,000 apartments at war's 
end. Between the end of the war and the return of the Americans, about 
five percent of the uninhabitable buildings had been restored to the point 
where they were habitable. At that time the density of persons per habi­
table building stood at twelve.
During the decade of the 1950s, construction took place at a rapid 
pace in Zweibruecken. At the same time, refugees arrived in the city from 
the east, the birth rate exceeded the death rate, and the number of person­
nel in the various military installations grew. The net result was that by 
the end of the decade there were still six hundred too few apartments in 
the city.®^
Americans were part of the problem as well as the solution. As men­
tioned above, the Americans were able to compete for existing dwellings by 
paying high rents —  rents which were sometimes used to build more houses. 
This meant that for every American family living in a German apartment, a 
German family was left wanting, but the prospects for expanded housing were 
brighter due to American money.
Aside from the complex issue of housing, the Germans were pleased to 
see American families join their husbands in Zweibruecken. First of all, 
the presence of the American wives reduced the number of American males who 
had dumme Gedanken (dumb ideas) about German women. A second factor which 
influenced the Germans was that the expanded American community meant more 
money for local merchants and the economy of Zweibruecken as a whole.
A third factor was that the number of Americans who lived among the Germans
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increased, and therefore the possibilities for making friends increased 
correspondingly. It was so much more convenient for both sides when 
Americans lived as neighbors rather than in relative isolation in the 
caserne.®®
Particularly good contacts were made between German and American 
women. Most of the American women were homemakers and thus spent the 
majority of their time at home. As is the American custom, they tended to 
go next door to chat and drink coffee (which they frequently obtained ille­
gally for their German friends in the American commissary). These contacts 
spread to the husbands, children, and acquaintances. They were also a 
source of information for the Americans on where and how to buy things and 
what to see during leisure time. Knowledge about Germany and America 
was exchanged freely. As might be expected, not all the exchanges were 
heart warming. The German desire for privacy and order was not always com­
patible with the American penchant for casualness. American women in hair 
curlers would suddenly appear at the door when German women were busily 
preparing the mid-day meal. Or, even worse, American women went shopping 
with their hair in curlers. Such practices gave rise to expressions 
reflecting German disapproval; schlampige Frauen (sloppy women) was a 
typical term used to describe American women. Another cultural difference 
which was highlighted as a result of proximity had to do with the rearing 
of children. Germans were appalled at the ungezogene amerikanische Kinder 
(undisciplined American children). They found it hard to believe that 
American children were allowed to do what they wanted to do and were not 
properly dressed.®®
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Marriages between Americans and Germans were very much accepted in 
Germany in the 1950s, even more so at the end of the decade than at the 
beginning; the stigma that had been attached to these marriages in the 
immediate postwar period had dissipated considerably. However, it must be 
stated that some people on both sides always looked down on anyone who 
married a foreigner —  particularly if it was an interracial marriage. As 
in so many other cases where precise statistics would be helpful, the num­
bers of German-American marriages that took place in Germany were not made 
a matter of record until 1959. Nevertheless, an idea of the magnitude can 
be gained by reviewing the number of immigrants admitted to the United 
States from Germany by reason of marriage to American citizens. Table 21 
shows the numbers of marriage partners admitted during the period under 
consideration.^ it is recognized that some of these marriages took place 
prior to 1950, and some of the persons who married during the 1950s 
emigrated later or never emigrated. Even though not exact, an impression 
can be obtained of the frequency with which German-American marriages 
occurred, which reflects a state of acceptance at the grass-roots level.
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TABLE 21 
GERMANS ADMITTED TO THE
U.S.A. BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
TO CITIZENS 1950-1960
Year No. of Marri,
1950 4,399
1951 2,382
1952 4,465
1953 6,455
1954 5,659
1955 6,151
1956 7,622
1957 6,715
1958 7,667
1959 6,007
1960 5,534
TOTAL 63,056
NOTE: Beginning in 1959, the Statistisches Bundesamt commenced keeping 
accurate records on marriages between Germans and non-Germans. As a 
measure of comparison with the figures in this table, in 1959, there were 
7,828 German-American marriages in the Federal Republic, and in 1960, the 
count was 6,159.
More accurate statistics can be constructed for Zweibruecken. Table 
22 depicts the total number of marriages per year in the city and those 
which were between Germans and Americans.91
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TABLE 22 
MARRIAGES IN ZNEIBRDECKEN 
1950-1960
Year Total Marriagea German-A»erican Marriages
1950 266
1951 283 -
1952 258 -
1953 300 -
1954 332 21
1955 342 24
1956 387 23
1957 377 40
1958 402 42
1959 392 52
1960 360 42
It is interesting to note that there were no German-American 
marriages prior to 1954, and then suddenly there were twenty-one. The 
reason is clear. The year 1954 marked the end of the first full tour for 
the real build-up of troops which commenced in 1952, when expanded facili­
ties allowed the assignment of soldiers in numbers. The fact that the 
wedding bells rang out for the first time in 1954 (and in respectable 
numbers), reflects a tendency on the part of both the soldiers and their 
girlfriends to wait until the last minute to take the big step.
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Similarly the jump between 1956 and 1957, was due to the increase in the 
number of Americans in Zweibruecken which occurred in 1955, when the count 
swelled from 302 to 1,101.
It is also worthwhile to look at how the German-American marriages 
compared, statistically, with the totals for other groups. From 1954 
through 1960, the period when German-American marriages were taking place, 
there were 2,592 total marriages in Zweibruecken. Of this total, 244 or 
9.4 percent of the marriages were between Germans and Americans. During 
this same period, there were 489 other marriages involving foreigners, or 
13.2 percent; these marriages were almost exclusively German-Canadian or 
German-French.
From the nature and frequency of the positive experiences, it can be 
concluded that Americans were accepted as friends in Zweibruecken. It 
appears that there were several reasons for this acceptance.
Zweibruecken had international connections long before the Americans 
returned. It is rather close to the French border and not far from 
Luxembourg and Belgium. It is not situated on a particularly historical 
trade route, but through the centuries travelers have come and gone, and 
strangers have settled there as well. The city was never really wealthy; 
therefore, some native sons went elsewhere in search of their fortunes. 
This was especially true during the last two centuries when many persons 
left the area and moved to America. It was common for these emigrants to 
maintain contact with the people back home, and a degree of sympathy for
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foreign ideas had become a part of the Zweibruecken psyche. The historical 
connection between the city and America that went back to the battle of 
Yorktown also conditioned the people of Zweibruecken to think in terms that 
reached beyond Germany's borders. More recently the French had occupied 
the city after World War I. As a consequence of these various inter­
national connections, people in Zweibruecken were predisposed to accept
foreigners and foreign influences. They were not conciously aware of this 
at the time, but in retrospect it apparently was a factor. In the postwar 
period, it was common for local citizens to talk about their relatives in 
the United States. This may have been a result of the American presence, 
but even so it was a factor which facilitated acceptance. Other connec­
tions between America and Zweibruecken were also cited, whenever the oppor­
tunity arose. The people liked to recall that the famous dog of American 
movie fame, Rin-Tin-Tin, had been born in their town, or that the widow of
their beloved Duke Christian IV had been one of Benjamin Franklin's lovers.
Such connections with the home country of their most powerful military
neighbor were trivial but r e a l . ® ^
There were even natives of Zweibruecken serving in the U.S. Army. One
of these soldiers lost his life fighting for democracy in Korea. The
Purple Heart was awarded posthumously and presented to his family in 
Zweibruecken by the American commander.93 Another son of Zweibruecken came 
back to Germany in an American uniform and was stationed in nearby 
Kaiserslautern. Yet another one served in H a w a i i . 94
America was the strongest power in the world* She had helped to 
defeat the Germans, but as a victorious power she was not acting the way 
victors traditionally acted. Instead, she was helping to rebuild the very 
country over which she had triumphed. Even before the Americans returned 
to Zweibruecken, the people there knew of America's magnanimous gestures. 
Some families in Zweibruecken had received CARE packages, while their 
children in school had been given soup from American Quakers. The CARE 
packages and the soup were welcomed; they were important to the recipients, 
but even more important was the symbolic value as seen by those who were 
aware of their arrival; it was recognized that Americans thought that the 
Germans were worth helping. This was very important psychologically; it 
was a vote of confidence in the value of a people who had been totally 
defeated and who were despised by so much of the rest of the world.95
Additionally, the Germans were aware of the deepening rift between the 
East and the West. The people in West Germany were convinced that life in 
a democracy as advocated by the Americans was far superior to the way their 
relatives in the Russian-dominated part of Germany had to live.
These conditions contributed to the acceptance of the Americans. But 
even before these conditions existed, the Americans had taken a big step 
which had facilitated their ascent to a position of preeminence in the 
minds of the Germans; at the outset, Americans had appointed local leaders 
who were sympathetic with American goals. The leaders worked with the 
Americans, and the communities were rewarded. Success bred further 
cooperation, which earned more rewards. In this manner, Germans and
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Americans combined their efforts and resources to put Germany back on the 
road to recovery.96
In brief, it was generally believed that Germany's future could best 
be served by an alliance with America. This was the idea at large in 
Germany. This was the guiding principle for Germany's conduct. However, 
it does not necessarily follow that individual Germans had to accept indi­
vidual Americans, or vice versa.
The reasons for private acceptance are as varied as those for accep­
tance at large. To many Germans, Americans represented the idea of a far­
away world (Duft der grossen, weiten Welt) and were interesting from that 
point of view. In the eyes of the Zweibruecker, a person who knew hard 
times, Americans seemed lax, open, receptive, uninhibited, and happy. At 
the same time, they gave the impression of being practical, level-headed, 
and quite natural with a mixture of naivete and sovereignty. These 
characteristics seemed somewhat strange in Zweibruecken, where propriety, 
form, and tradition had always been so important. In spite of being 
strange, these characteristics appealed to the people of the small city, 
who pointed with pride to their international connections. The 
Zweibruecker felt that only a citizen of a free and prosperous land could 
conduct himself in such a way. Surely, such a man was from a country that 
had been spared the pain of war on its own soil, and certainly he must be 
free from major problems and confident of the future; otherwise, how could 
he be so conscious of the importance of his country? The American soldier 
in Zweibruecken was the symbol of a country that was experiencing con­
ditions unknown in Zweibruecken —  but conditions that the people wanted
to get to know.97 The Americans, in spite of their shortcomings, 
served as models; they had freedom, material goods, and peace of mind. 
Twelve years of National Socialism and its aftermath gave its survivors a 
heightened appreciation for freedom. The devastation of the war created a 
great need for material things, and the psychological trauma stemming from 
the total experience of war, destruction, and hatred spawned a yearning for 
tranquility. The Germans, at least the people in Zweibruecken, looked at 
the Americans in their midst and reasoned that there must be some wisdom in 
the American way of life. A survey of 1,500 Germans in the U.S. Zone in 
1950 indicated that fifty-seven percent of the Germans believed they could 
learn "some good things" from the Americans. These "good things" were 
identified as: tolerance, trust, absence of envy and hatred, political
affairs, and technical and scientific knowledge. On the other hand, German 
pride was shown by the fact that sixty-five percent of those polled stated 
that the Americans could learn "some things" from the Germans; they cited 
ability to work, discipline, orderliness, and thoroughness as German quali­
ties worthy of emulation by the Americans.98
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Die Rheinpfalz. June 24, 1952; "Amerikaner fuhr gegen Verkaufsbaracke,"
Die Rheinpfalz, January 26, 1947; "Amerikaner halfen," Die Rheinpfalz, 
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September 5, 1951; "Raeumung fuer Amerikaner," Die Rheinpfalz, September 
29, 1951; "Vor Amerikanischen Truppen," Die Rheinpfalz, December 7, 1951.
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Rheinpfalz, March 16, 1953.
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29"KUrzschrift sollte Gemeingut Aller werden," Die Rheinpfalz, April 7, 
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1983, in Zweibrucken. He is the city archivist.; Kurt Werle, interview 
held on July 28, 1983, in Zweibruecken. He is the printing manager with 
the Pfaelzischer Merkur newspaper in Zweibruecken. Kurt Werle grew up in 
Zweibruecken in the postwar years and has vivid memories of the food from 
America which was distributed in his school. He is a skilled printer and 
the business manager for the Merkur Druck, where one of Zweibruecken1s 
largest newspapers is printed. His first contacts with Americans were 
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33Mootz undated letter.
3 t > R o s e m a r i e  k. Lester, Dr., interview on July 27, 1983, in Frankfurt.
She is the author of Trivialneger: Das Bild des Schwarzen im west-
deutschen Illustriertenroman (Stuttgart: Hans—Dieter Heinz, 1982).
37Ibid.
3®Survey of Stars and Stripes. European Edition, using the months of
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European Edition, January 29, 1950.
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Stripes. European Edition, January 17, 1950.
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^3"Miss Wood vom Special Services Club hatte eingeladen: Ein Hobby
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Rheinpfalz, October 29, 1954; "Lichtbildvortrag," Die Rheinpfalz, January 
25, 1957.
^"Zur Foerderung deutsch-amerikanischer Freundschaft," Die Rheinpfalz, 
August 3, 1955.
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Rosengarten: Routine Besprechung zwischen Alliierten und Deutschen diesmal
auf dem L a n d r a t s a m t Die Rheinpfalz, April 26, 1957.
4®"Amerikanische Judokas zu Gast," Die Rheinpfalz, February 7, 1959.
^"Amerikanische Gesangverein,11 Die Rheinpfalz, May 7, 1954.
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September 24, 1956.
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96Ibid.
9^Ibid.
9®Crespi, "Germans View Reorientation," pp. 179-182.
Chapter 9 
Summary
In the years of the postwar period, the average German found himself 
or herself living through the trauma of seeing the crushed country grasp for 
the barest necessities while standing humiliated before the eyes of the 
world for the macabre deeds of the National Socialists. The experiences of 
daily life were largely controlled by the occupying powers. The occupying 
powers were determined from the very beginning to reorient the Germans by 
punishing the guilty, developing new attitudes, and changing the institu­
tions which constituted the framework of German society.
In the West, the Americans, British, and French chose to build a 
democracy. Each of the three occupying powers administered its own zone, 
directed reorientation programs, erected institutions, and consented to 
the ultimate merger that formed the Federal Republic of Germany. But, 
America, as the strongest member of the triad,, was destined to have 
influences which transcended the bounds of its assigned zone.
One of the most basic principles of the American occupation was to 
democratize Germany through Germans. At each step in the process, the 
re-education machinery was set in motion, Germans were involved, and then 
control was given to them so that they could reorient others.
As time passed, society was changed in Germany by both overt and 
subtle means. Proclamations and dicta were issued, which the typical 
German knew had to be obeyed. Behind the scenes, these overt pressures
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were supplemented by urgings which were often heeded by the German authori­
ties and ultimately followed by the public* At the same time, examples of 
American society offered by the presence of Americans were also at work.
By the time the country achieved autonomy, institutions were established 
and society's course was charted.
Progress in the economy put people to work, fed and clothed the fami­
lies, paid for comforts, and provided for the future. Economic prosperity 
demonstrated to the Germans the advantages of capitalism and generated gra­
titude for America.
The educational system offered a realistic, more expanded view of 
Germany and the world than had been the case during the Hitler years. It 
taught Germans to have an appreciation for others while casting light on 
the past, and, for some, it offered a critical view of the society that had 
spawned the Third Reich and those who had lived in it as adults. The edu­
cational system gave the Germans the wherewithal to climb back, but at the 
same time it created an acknowledgement of national guilt which would hang 
over their heads for years. Education reforms were achieved; however, many 
of the reforms sought by the Americans were not realized because German 
educators had their own ideas about how to reconstruct a system that would 
meet the needs of a democracy. But in one sense, the school system that 
evolved after the war was the product of a joint effort. The Americans 
insisted on a democratic, decentralized means of education and provided 
German educators with the freedom to implement changes. Some of these 
changes were new, others had already been suggested unsuccessfully during 
the Weimar period, while yet others represented a restoration of pre-1933
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practices. Although not practiced to the extent desired by the Americans, 
democratization of the education system seems to have enhanced social mobi­
lity. It was concluded, in 1970, that:
social mobility, while still limited in many ways, is 
greater than in Britain or France: it is easier in
Germany for newcomers, not from the poorest circles but 
from the middle ranks of society, to become members of 
the governing class.1
The information media had a new mission; it was to inform and enter­
tain, not deceive. Every German had access to the airways and the 
newspapers and other forms of the print media —  and the media were free.
The arts had been liberated from the stultifying constraints of 
National Socialism. Creative minds were once again free to express them­
selves, but Germany had been divested of much of its talent, and it would 
take several years for German artists in various fields to find themselves 
and begin producing German works again. Germany was not without native 
talent, but those who survived National Socialism had to regenerate their 
energies and find a new orientation while coping with scarcities of every 
kind. In the meantime, the gap was filled with imported plays, com­
positions, and other forms of art.
The traditional religious institutions once again offered refuge to 
troubled souls. Immediately after the war, when the moral atrocities of 
Nazism were exposed, the Germans went to church in droves. This was a tem­
porary phenomenon, as the material demands of life required so much effort, 
and attendance soon dropped.
Politics had come to mean something to the individual. Human rights
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and individual obligations had achieved a balance so that the citizens of 
Germany could lay claim to their right as masters of government, rather 
than its servants. The German citizen had a place in society and Germany 
had reclaimed a place as a nation among nations. This reorientation was 
not without turmoil. Opposing points of view evolved which embraced a wide 
range of options from extreme, left-wing socialism to extreme, right-wing 
conservatism. There was also a sizable portion of society that was reluc­
tant to have anything at all to do with politics.
At the grass-roots level, personal problems and ventures received more 
attention than the conscious development of democracy. The belief that 
the individual American was the best possible ambassador for the nation 
allowed for this, and as a result, the presence of the American forces in 
Germany served both to protect the fledgling democracy aiid to instruct it. 
Institutionally, no stone was left unturned to further friendship, and the 
two peoples proved to be compatible. Ethnic similarities, compatible 
values, a common potential enemy, American resources, and German needs all 
figured in the mutual successes of the decade of the 1950s. The conduct of 
the American personnel in Germany spoke to the Germans in both negative and 
positive terms, but on balance the positive factors seem to have had more 
lasting effects, perhaps because the prevailing view on both sides was that 
the Germans and Americans would get on well with one another —  a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. Virtually every facet of every person's life in West 
Germany was touched, if not molded, by American influence. This is not to 
say that Germany could not have recovered without America's assistance, 
because it could have. America did not make the Germans an industrious
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people, bat it did help guide their energies and thoughts, and Americans 
provided valuable resources. Zweibruecken is an example of this.
Interviews with citizens of Zweibruecken who lived and worked there during 
the 1950s reveal a common conclusion: without Americans, Zweibruecken's
economy would not have rebounded so quickly as it did or to the extent that 
it did. The citizens of Zweibruecken owed their prosperity in the decade 
of the 1950s to the presence of U.S. military forces.^
Americans were constantly on the scene. They supervised the recovery 
and then partook of the benefits derived from that recovery. Germany 
became a favored destination for American tourists, a profitable environ­
ment for American business, a lucrative market for American products, a 
strong military ally, and a home away from home for hundreds of thousands 
of American military men and women and their families. Not every American 
soldier who went to Germany during the decade of the fifties liked it, but 
the majority did, and few who served there regretted it afterwards.
Germans acquired a taste for American things —  democracy, styles, and the
material products, and even after the period of forced acceptance was over,
that taste persisted. It was nourished by the continued presence of 
Americans in German communities and homes and Germans in American homes and 
institutions. The daily contact that many Germans had with Americans
helped to keep their mutual interests alive; they shared ideas, time,
things, and values. The Germans retained their "Germanness" but it was 
spiced by "Americanness."
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ENDNOTES 
Chapter 9
^Grosser, Germany in Our Time. p. 186.
^Franck interview; Mootz interview; Roth interview; Witzgall inter­
view.
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